Quora Answer: Is It True that the Malaysia Armed Forces’ Combat Readiness is Terrible Compared to the Singapore Armed Forces?

The following is my answer to a Quora question: “Is it true that Malaysia Armed Forces’ combat readiness is terrible compared to the Singapore Armed Forces?  How could they win a war against Singapore?” 

These are two distinct questions here.  With regards the first, we have to consider that Malaysia’s defence budget is less than 1% of GDP, and is at a historic low.  The Malaysian ringgit has weakened tremendously against other currencies, and the country is so bankrupt that they are considering quantitative easing, which is a short-term measure.  Malaysia has attempted to negotiate barter for defence acquisitions merely to maintain their current hardware.  They have not been successful. 

Due, also, to the poverty of the nation, they do not have money for military exercises, meaning that the men are not as trained at manoeuvres.  They may have tactical discipline for some units, but they lack overall strategic discipline, and command and control.  Hardware is not maintained, and much of their fleet of aircraft and armour is in no condition to be deployed.  The endemic corruption and nepotism has also ensured that the procurement of weapons has been haphazard, riddled with corruption, and inefficient.  How else would it explain a nation that tried to deploy both American and Soviet-era aircraft?  How else do we explain why their fighter aircraft cannot fly, their submarines cannot submerge, and their radar stations are not run 24 hours a day? 

Winning a war against Singapore is a distinct question.  Malaysia is in no position to wage an offensive campaign.  Half of her military is in East Malaysia, across the sea.  Malaysia does not have the means to deploy them to the Peninsula quickly, in the event of hostilities, meaning that her tiny military is even smaller.  Singapore is the most militarised state in Southeast Asia, when we consider defence spending as percentage of GDP, defence spending per capita, defence spending overall, numbers of key military hardware, number of men in the standing military and strategic reserves.  More importantly, it has wealth, and wealth grants you options in the international arena.  Malaysia does not have equivalent standing, and that is solely due to decades of shortsighted policies by Mahathir bin Mohamad, and his successors then. 

Any conflict with Singapore will largely be characterised by Singapore being the aggressor to create strategic depth.  This is part of her preemptive strike doctrine.  Malaysia has decent infantry and special forces units, all specialised in jungle warfare.  The problem, again, is that many of these better units are at the Thai border or the Indonesian border with Kalimantan.  Singapore is not likely to seek the conquest of the entirety of Peninsular Malaysia.  That would be a costly campaign.  All it needs to do is achieve naval and air superiority, and control the ports and airports.  That would starve the military logistically.  It then needs to control major population centres.  In this, the SAF has an advantage because it trains extensively in CQB and urban warfare. 

The Malaysian military is quite aware of this, so their strategy has been to keep their artillery and major formations north of Kuala Lumpur, outside Singapore’s immediate artillery blanket.  This explains why most of their bases on the Malay Peninsula re up north.  The idea is to ambush SAF columns going north at certain chokepoints where their infantry units would have some advantage from ambush.  The also purchased MLRS systems from Brazil.  This is meant to be a deterrent, since they could, conceivably, attack Singapore itself from outside our immediate artillery blanket.  The problem is that their MLRS system is not GPS-guided, due to budget constraints.  They are a terror device to sow panic, but not particularly useful from a tactical sense.  Singapore’s MLRS system is GPS-guided. 

The intent of having submarines was to block of the Malacca Straits, particularly One Fathom Bank.  Malaysia’s thinking is that any external military coming from the Indian Ocean might not be neutral, and to starve Singapore’s port.  Another submarine could shut down the entrance to Horsburgh.  In reality, their submarines are not fit to be deployed due to internal corruption. 

All this has a window of between several hours to two weeks, depending on the international climate.  Both sides would then seek some sort of negotiated settlement.  To be in a stronger position, both sides need to take and hold territory, or get immediate allies involved.