These are my thoughts on business development and management issues. I worked for years as a consultant and in various positions in the logistics and maritime industry. We have handled projects from training and development to corporate imaging and branding.
17 December, 2019
Toa Payoh South TMC as Toastmaster of the Day, 13th November 2019
02 December, 2019
The Artist's Eye
Imagined Then
Andromache Queen
28 November, 2019
Separated by a Common Language
22 November, 2019
Quora Answer: Under Singapore Law, is It an Offence to Criticise Foreign Politicians?
The following is my answer to a Quora question: “Under Singapore law, is it an offence for a person to criticise, or slander, foreign politicians, and heads of states, such as Queen Elizabeth II?”
No. Singapore has no such legislation, covering lese majeste, for either external or internal dignitaries. In the case of a foreign dignitary, there is the Defamation Act, Cap. 75. However, any such legal proceedings much take place in Singapore, and filed in country. I seriously doubt someone truly important and powerful would want to fly in simply to sue an ordinary citizen, and undergo the legal process here.
Defamation and slander is often difficult to prove and even more difficult to quantify in terms of damages. If the slander is serious enough to impact a foreign head of state, then there has to be some basis of truth or a malicious campaign that would entail the use of laws other than defamation.
On a related note, the Head of State of Singapore has very stringent laws protecting the dignity of the office. As per the Penal Code, Section 121A:
121A. Whoever compasses, imagines, invents, devises, or intends the death of or hurt to or imprisonment or restraint of the President, shall be punished with death, or with imprisonment for life and shall, if he is not sentenced to death, also be liable to fine.
Essentially, merely fantasising a violent
BDSM tickle-fest of the President’s person could carry the death penalty. And if they have not hanged you, but merely
incarcerated you for life, you will be fined. Such an indignity.
Quora Answer: Will Singapore Invade West Malaysia in the Future?
20 November, 2019
Being Retirement Ready
Diamonds are Not “Forever”; They were Never Even Rare
Diamonds are not as rare as people
believe. They rank as the most common of
the traditional precious stones. Rubies,
sapphires, and emeralds are rarer, especially at high quality, and gem experts
have said so for decades. The price of
diamonds was raised by a monopoly, and by an advertising campaign that
convinced people this arrangement was tradition.
The Campaign That Invented a
Tradition
De Beers controlled 80 to 90 per cent of
global diamond supply from 1888 into the late 1990s, the longest-running
monopoly of the modern era. By 1938, the
Great Depression had gutted demand.
Diamond sales were collapsing. De
Beers hired N.W. Ayer & Son, an American advertising agency, with one
brief: make diamonds essential to love itself.
Ayer did not advertise a product. It built a social norm from nothing. Diamonds appeared on the fingers of Hollywood
stars. Lecturers visited American high
schools to teach students that a diamond ring belonged in every
engagement. Magazines ran romantic
diamond storylines planted by the agency.
In 1947, copywriter Frances Gerety wrote four words that closed the
loop: “A Diamond is Forever.”
Advertising Age later named it the greatest advertising slogan of the
twentieth century.
The financial result speaks for
itself. Annual US diamond sales sat at
US$23 million in 1939. By 1979, that
figure reached US$2.1 billion.
The “Salary Rule” was Never a
Tradition
De Beers introduced a benchmark: a man
should spend one month’s salary on a ring.
Sales stagnated. In the 1980s,
the benchmark doubled to two months’ salary, a figure with no basis in custom,
invented entirely by ad copy. In Japan,
where De Beers ran a parallel campaign from 1968, the local benchmark reached
three months’ salary. Different
countries received different numbers, tuned to what each market would
bear. None of it traced back further
than an advertising brief.
The slogan also served a second purpose,
rarely stated aloud. “Forever”
discouraged resale. A diamond meant to
last a lifetime is a diamond that never re-enters the market to compete with
new stock. De Beers protected its own
pricing power by convincing buyers that selling a diamond back was close to
sacrilege.
The Collapse Now Under Way
The empire built on that campaign is
coming apart. De Beers reported an
underlying EBITDA loss of US$511 million for 2025, against a US$25 million loss
the year before. Parent company Anglo
American has written down De Beers’ value by US$6.8 billion across three
consecutive years: US$1.6 billion in 2023, US$2.9 billion in 2024, and US$2.3
billion in 2025, cutting its carrying value from over US$4 billion to US$2.3
billion. Anglo American’s group net loss
reached US$3.7 billion for 2025, driven by that impairment. Anglo American Chief Executive Officer Duncan
Graham Wanblad confirmed the company is in advanced talks to sell or spin off
De Beers entirely.
The cause is structural, not
cyclical. Laboratory-grown diamonds,
chemically and optically identical to mined stones, now account for more than
45 per cent of US engagement ring purchases, up from 5.2 per cent in 2019. Lab-grown prices fell 74 per cent between 2020
and 2024 as production capacity expanded by over three hundred per cent. De Beers’ own realised price per carat fell 7
per cent in headline terms in 2025, and 25 per cent once inventory rebalancing
is included. Pandora, one of the world’s
largest jewellery brands, dropped natural diamonds from its collection entirely
and grew sales after the switch.
An industry built on manufactured scarcity
is now watching real scarcity disappear from underneath its own marketing. A stone that was never rare, sold at a price
justified by a slogan written in 1947, is losing to a laboratory-grown version
nobody can tell apart with the naked eye, at a fraction of the cost. The three months’ salary rule was never a
tradition worth honouring. It was an
invoice, written by an advertising agency, and the industry that sent it is now
the one going broke.
Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code
Keep Calm & Brexit
Quora Answer: How Do Companies Invest in Each Other?
Churn & Burn: The Oldest Trick in Finance
Churning is the term applied
to the unethical and illegal practice of a broker conducting excessive trading
in a client’s account, primarily to generate commissions. The same principle applies to insurance
advisors who persuade clients to constantly switch policies for identical
effect. Different product, identical
crime: generating fees for the advisor while generating losses for the client.
How Regulators Prove
It
Churning is not proven by
vibes or client complaints alone. FINRA
relies on two quantitative metrics. The
first is the turnover ratio, calculated by dividing the total value of
securities purchased in an account over a year by the account’s average monthly
balance. An annualised turnover rate
between three and four has repeatedly triggered liability for excessive
trading, and courts and the SEC have held that a ratio above six leaves little
question about the excessiveness of the trading involved. The second is the cost-to-equity ratio,
sometimes called the break-even percentage, calculated by dividing total annual
costs, including commissions and margin interest, by the account's average
balance. A cost-to-equity ratio above
20% is generally treated as indicative of excessive trading, because it means
the client needs a 20% annual return simply to avoid losing money to fees
alone.
In June 2026, FINRA brought an
enforcement action against Reid & Rudiger LLC and several of its
principals, finding the firm had operated a retail brokerage business
recommending a high-volume, high-cost market-timing strategy to customers over
several years. The strategy involved
repeatedly buying large equity positions, often on margin, then selling them
after short holding periods to fund the next purchase. FINRA found supervisors failed to identify or
investigate accounts carrying annualised cost-to-equity ratios above 20% and
turnover rates above six, both explicitly flagged as indicia of excessive
trading. This is not a historical curiosity
from a 1990s boiler room. This happened
in 2026, under a regulatory framework, Regulation Best Interest, specifically
designed to prevent exactly this behaviour.
A related FINRA case makes the
human cost impossible to ignore. One
client’s account carried a cost-to-equity ratio exceeding 111%, meaning that
client needed to generate returns above 111% in a single year simply to break
even. Other clients in the same firm
carried ratios of 69% and 67%. Across
the affected accounts, clients paid roughly US$2 million in commissions while
incurring approximately US$2.7 million in losses. FINRA Enforcement Head Bill St. Louis
described the conduct as egregious churning and excessive trading resulting in
significant customer losses over nearly six years, and noted the firm had built
its business model around cold-calling high-net-worth investors and steering
them into precisely this pattern.
Why This Persists despite
Decades of Regulation
Churning survives because the
incentive structure rewarding it has never fully disappeared. A broker or advisor paid on commission, or on
the frequency of product switches rather than the quality of long-term outcomes,
has a direct financial interest in activity, not in stillness. Regular BI’s Care Obligation requires brokers
to exercise reasonable diligence, care, and skill in every recommendation. A supervisory structure that fails to check
its own accounts' turnover rates and cost-to-equity ratios, as happened at Reid
& Rudiger, is not merely negligent.
It is a business model tolerating fraud so long as the compliance
department never looks too closely at the numbers sitting in plain sight.
The Lesson for
Every Client
Ask two questions of any
account under active management. What is
the account’s actual turnover rate this year?
What is the total cost-to-equity ratio, inclusive of every commission,
markup, and margin charge? If nobody can
answer both questions promptly and precisely, that silence is itself the
answer. Churning has never required
sophistication to detect. It has only
ever required someone bothering to ask.
Terence Nunis |
Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The
Billionaire Cheat Code

































