28 July, 2026

The Benjamin Franklin Effect: A Tool for Sales, & a Confession about How Predictable We All Are

This concept is complicated and rarely well understood on first encounter.  Once mastered, however, it becomes an invaluable tool in sales and in building genuine relationships.

Every serious discussion begins with definitions.  Definitions set the parameters of what is actually being discussed, and establish shared understanding before anything else gets built on top of it.  Imam Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali, the Persian theologian, observed, to the effect, that before speaking of a cup, one should first understand what a cup is.  What follows here is considerably more complicated than a cup.

The Benjamin Franklin Effect is a proposed psychological phenomenon, a form of cognitive dissonance.  In essence, when people do us a favour, they become more likely to hold a favourable opinion of us.  The intuitive assumption runs the other way: people do favours because they already like us, and that may hold in some cases.  In business, however, the causation frequently runs in reverse.  People come to like us precisely because of the favours we induce them to perform on our behalf.

Leon Festinger, the American social psychologist, formalised the underlying mechanism in his 1957 theory of cognitive dissonance, arguing that people experience genuine psychological discomfort when their actions contradict their existing attitudes, and resolve that discomfort by adjusting the attitude rather than undoing the action.  A person who has already done you a favour cannot easily continue disliking you, because disliking someone he has just helped creates exactly the discomfort Festinger described.  Adjusting the opinion is simply easier than confronting the contradiction.

The effect takes its name from Benjamin Franklin, one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, who wrote in his autobiography, “He that has once done you a kindness will be more ready to do you another, than he whom you yourself have obliged.”  Franklin illustrated this with an account of a rival legislator during his service in the Pennsylvania legislature in the eighteenth century.  Learning the man owned a scarce and curious book, Franklin wrote requesting to borrow it.  The book arrived immediately.  Franklin returned it within a week, accompanied by a note expressing genuine appreciation.  At their next meeting in the House, the legislator, who had never previously spoken to Franklin, addressed him with unexpected civility, and remained willing to assist him on every subsequent occasion.  Their friendship, by Franklin’s own account, lasted until the man’s death.

Anyone who has read Franklin’s biography in full knows he was not, by most measures, an especially likeable man.  He drank to excess on occasion, pursued numerous romantic entanglements, boasted more than modesty allowed, and could not keep a confidence to save his own reputation, a flaw so pronounced that his own government deliberately withheld sensitive information from him.  And yet he was widely liked, across an entire political career, largely through mechanisms exactly like this one.  If a man with Franklin’s considerable personal flaws could engineer genuine goodwill this reliably, the technique itself deserves serious attention rather than dismissal as a parlour trick.

Application

This principle applies across three domains: networking, prospecting for clients, and closing a deal or completing a negotiation.  Between them, these three scenarios cover nearly every situation a person is likely to encounter professionally.

Networking happens constantly, whether consciously recognised or not.  Even the most solitary person requires validation from at least one other human being, a basic feature of gregarious social creatures.  Prospecting is where a person markets himself, present in nearly every social interaction whether framed that way or not.  Closing the deal is where genuine accord gets reached on any outstanding issue.

Scenario: Networking

Networking, in this context, means meeting new people in specific settings, at events, and increasingly in non-physical, digital environments.  How and where those meetings happen matters considerably.

Every person wants recognition, wants to feel elevated.  That flattery, however, must feel sincere.  Insincere flattery breeds hostility, because people instinctively grow suspicious of unearned praise.  Applying the Franklin Effect requires cultivating the habit of requesting small, innocuous favours first.  Smokers borrowing cigarettes or a lighter from strangers illustrate this precisely.  The bond only forms, however, if the item is returned.  Failing to return it converts the exchange from a bond-building gesture into simple taking, and the psychological mechanism collapses entirely.  People resolve dissonance between their thoughts, attitudes, and actions by rationalising: having done a favour, they conclude they must like the recipient, and adjust their attitude to match the action already taken.

The reverse mechanism deserves equal attention.  Doing a favour for someone who already dislikes you tends to deepen the dislike rather than repair it, because the recipient feels burdened by an unwanted obligation rather than warmed by generosity.  This creates distance, not closeness.  It explains the instinctive suspicion many people feel toward those who appear excessively generous without an obvious motive.  Unprompted giving strikes most people as unnatural, and that discomfort is set aside reliably only in narrow circumstances, religious giving among them, where the power dynamic quietly inverts: the giver gives precisely to receive more in return later, a transaction dressed convincingly enough that conscience does not object.

Scenario: Prospecting

Prospecting occurs in corporate settings, across social networks, and at public events alike, and understanding the psychology of favours matters here just as much.  Performing a favour does not, on its own, create closeness.  A single major favour for a friend produces genuine gratitude.  Constant, repeated favours produce resentment instead, because the underlying power dynamic becomes impossible to ignore, and nobody enjoys feeling perpetually indebted or helpless.

In any setting with an audience present, the other party must be made to feel he holds the advantage in the relationship’s power dynamic.  The actual objective is never to demonstrate superiority.  It is to achieve the outcome sought.  Requesting a favour, properly framed, creates the illusion that the other person occupies the higher position, while the genuine intent is building a favourable impression and, ultimately, genuine liking.  Illusion, deployed carefully, serves the underlying reality.

What, specifically, can be “borrowed” from a prospect?  Nothing physical is required.  Credibility can be borrowed by quoting someone directly.  Achievements can be borrowed simply by remembering them accurately, correctly recalling who delivered which speech, who accomplished what, and when.  People crave that fleeting form of immortality, being properly acknowledged and correctly remembered.  Providing it, convincingly, is the actual mechanism at work, whether or not the sincerity behind it is entirely genuine.

Scenario: Succeeding

Just as failure requires planning, success requires equally deliberate planning: getting the deal over the line, addressing hesitation directly, and ensuring the other party believes the outcome was their own idea.  That final element carries disproportionate weight.  Consider how frequently interpersonal friction stems from exactly this failure to let someone feel ownership of a decision.

The Franklin Effect resolves tension precisely because some degree of hesitation accompanies almost every significant agreement, particularly where large sums are involved, and cold feet are a genuine risk.  Manufacturing the right cognitive dissonance forces the issue toward resolution.  Once someone has convinced himself he likes you, and that the decision was genuinely his own, reversing course means contradicting himself, which people resist instinctively.

Shaping the conversation to plant that ownership, framing the outcome as being in the other party’s own interest, driven by the other party’s own initiative, works reliably because most people, most of the time, do not have a firm grasp on what they actually want or what genuinely serves their own interest.  National politics demonstrates this mechanism at a considerably larger scale, and with considerably higher stakes.  President George W. Bush, following his narrow 2004 re-election victory, a margin of roughly 2.4 percentage points in the popular vote, declared, “I earned capital in this campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it,” proceeding to pursue policy priorities, including Social Security privatisation, that had barely featured in the campaign itself.  The electorate had voted for a candidate and a party.  The winning side proclaimed a sweeping mandate regardless, and pursued its pre-existing agenda under that banner.  Executed skilfully, the electorate remains convinced this was precisely what it voted for all along.

In Closing

What has been covered here is only an introduction to the Benjamin Franklin Effect, and a handful of suggested applications within a selling context.  The deeper lesson sits beneath the technique itself.  The more thoroughly human psychology is understood, the more apparent it becomes that people are remarkably predictable, and correspondingly susceptible to deliberate influence.  Understanding precisely how this phenomenon operates is inseparable from recognising how often it has already been used on each of us, for better reasons and for considerably worse ones.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code



Quora Answer: Is the Technology Industry a Bubble That Will Eventually Burst?

The following is my answer to a Quora question: “Is the technology industry a bubble that will eventually burst?

Yes, in the specific, narrow sense that matters: valuations in a handful of names have detached from any plausible earnings trajectory, and the mechanism sustaining those valuations increasingly resembles the participants financing their own demand.  That is not a market broadly overheated.  It is a market with an extremely concentrated fuse, and fuses of that kind tend to produce contagion rather than a contained correction.

The Magnificent Seven Concentration Problem

Seven companies, Nvidia, Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Tesla, account for roughly a third of the entire S&P 500’s market capitalisation, up from just 12.4% eight years ago.  According to Russell Investments data, these seven companies generate close to 70% of the total economic profit produced by the entire S&P 500.  That concentration is not diversified risk spread across an index.  It is a leveraged bet on seven balance sheets, wrapped in the psychological comfort of a broad-market label.

The contagion mechanism is straightforward.  These seven names share overlapping exposure to the same triggers: AI capital expenditure sentiment, interest rate expectations, and a heavily overlapping institutional shareholder base.  When sentiment turns on any one of these names, it rarely stays contained.  SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust, the flagship cap-weighted fund, is up just 7.58% year to date through mid-2026, materially lagging its own equal-weight counterpart, which strips Magnificent Seven weighting down from a third to roughly 1.4%.  A third of the index’s fate now rides on seven earnings calls a quarter, and the index itself has started showing exactly what that dependency looks like when the mood shifts.

The SpaceX IPO as the Purest Distillation of the Bubble

If a single event captures the current disconnect between valuation and fundamentals, it is the SpaceX initial public offering.  SpaceX priced its June 2026 listing at US$135 a share, implying a valuation of approximately US$1.77 trillion, against 2025 revenue of roughly US$18.7 billion and a net loss of US$4.9 billion.  That prices SpaceX at roughly 95 times trailing revenue, a multiple with no precedent among the world’s most valuable companies, and a valuation exceeding Meta and Tesla combined on a revenue basis.

David Trainer, CEO of the research firm New Constructs, ran the numbers properly.  His discounted cash flow model found SpaceX would need to reach US$1.1 trillion in annual revenue by 2035 to deliver investors a modest 10% annual return, requiring roughly 50% compound annual growth sustained for ten consecutive years.  Over the past thirty years, according to FactSet data cited by Invesco, only about 3% of companies have managed to sustain top-quintile sales growth for even three consecutive years.  SpaceX priced itself at a valuation requiring a growth feat no company in recorded market history has ever achieved, for a full decade, and investors bought it anyway.  That is not a valuation.  It is a statement of faith.

The AI Concentration beneath the Concentration

Peel back the Magnificent Seven, and the AI infrastructure boom underneath it looks considerably more fragile than the headline numbers suggest.  Analysts have identified over US$800 billion in what is now openly called “circular financing” across the AI supply chain.  Nvidia invests billions into AI labs such as OpenAI and Anthropic.  Those labs use the capital to sign enormous cloud and compute contracts with Oracle, Microsoft, and Amazon Web Services.  Those cloud providers, in turn, spend a considerable share of that revenue buying chips from Nvidia.  Cash leaves Nvidia’s balance sheet as an “investment” and returns to its income statement as “revenue,” having merely toured through two or three other balance sheets along the way.

OpenAI alone has committed roughly US$1.15 trillion across seven major vendors between 2025 and 2035, including US$350 billion to Broadcom, US$300 billion to Oracle, and US$250 billion to Microsoft, while reportedly on track to lose approximately US$14 billion in 2026, nearly triple its 2025 loss, against a projection of US$100 billion in revenue by 2029.  Nvidia’s own CEO, Jensen Huang, has publicly dismissed the circularity concern as “ridiculous,” even as Nvidia continues backing the very companies that represent its largest customers.  Analysts at Bernstein Research have been considerably less dismissive, warning explicitly that deals of this scale “will clearly fuel circular concerns.”

This is not a new pattern.  During the dot-com era, telecommunications firms such as Lucent Technologies and Nortel Networks extended enormous vendor financing to their own customers, allowing those customers to buy equipment with money the vendor had effectively lent them, inflating reported revenue on both sides of the transaction.  When real-world demand failed to materialise at the promised scale, both the financing and the revenue it generated evaporated within a single downturn, taking enormous swathes of the telecom sector down with it.  The AI circular financing loop is the same mechanism, run through chips and cloud contracts instead of routers and fibre, at a considerably larger scale.

Why the Market is Stagnant Once You Strip Out Technology

Strip the Magnificent Seven out of the S&P 500, and the remaining 493 companies have delivered performance close to flat for extended stretches of 2025 and 2026, while the equal-weight index has occasionally outpaced the cap-weighted version specifically during periods when AI enthusiasm cooled.  The cap-weighted S&P 500’s entire headline return has, for long stretches, been carried by a handful of names, while the broader economy represented by the other 493 companies has generated close to nothing in aggregate gain.

This matters because market breadth, not headline index performance, is the more reliable signal of underlying economic health.  A market where seven companies do all the work, and 493 companies tread water, is not a broadly thriving economy expressing itself through equities.  It is a narrow speculative overlay sitting on top of an otherwise stagnant market, and narrow overlays are precisely the structures that collapse fastest once the handful of names holding them up stumble simultaneously.  If the Magnificent Seven falter, and the underlying 493 companies are already generating negligible growth, there is no broad-based economic strength left to catch the index on the way down.

The Verdict

None of this guarantees an imminent crash, and pretending certainty about timing would be dishonest.  What the data does show, unambiguously, is a market where valuation, concentration, and financing structure have all moved in the same dangerous direction simultaneously: extreme reliance on seven companies, an IPO priced on a growth assumption no company has ever sustained, an AI financing loop increasingly resembling the vendor-financing scheme that preceded the dot-com collapse, and a broader market that, absent technology, is barely moving at all.  A bubble does not require universal euphoria to be dangerous.  It requires exactly this: a narrow, over-leveraged core, propping up a market that has otherwise stopped generating genuine breadth on its own.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code



27 July, 2026

Quora Answer: What is Behind the Economic Collapse of Tesla?

The following is my answer to a Quora question: “What is behind the economic collapse of Tesla?

Tesla posted record revenue of US$28.24 billion in the second quarter of 2026, up 26% year-over-year, alongside a record 480,126 vehicle deliveries.  Read no further, and that sounds like a company thriving.  Keep reading, and the picture inverts entirely.  Operating income fell 57% to just US$398 million.  Operating margin collapsed to 1.4%, down from 4.1% a year earlier.  Adjusted earnings came in at US$0.33 per share, well short of the roughly US$0.53 Wall Street expected.  Free cash flow turned negative, at US$1.1 billion, its first negative reading in two years.  The stock fell over 12% in a single session, wiping out more than US$140 billion in market value.  Shares are down 28.91% year to date through 23 July 2026.  A company can grow revenue and simultaneously collapse economically underneath it, and Tesla is currently demonstrating exactly how.

The Carbon Credit Racket, Explained Plainly

Regulatory bodies in the United States and European Union impose emissions targets on every automaker.  Manufacturers who fall short face fines.  Manufacturers who exceed the target, because they sell nothing but electric vehicles, generate surplus zero-emission credits they can sell to the manufacturers falling short.  Tesla, selling nothing else, has spent years selling these credits to Stellantis, Toyota, Ford, Mazda, and Subaru, among others, effectively taking a direct cash payment from its own competitors in exchange for a compliance certificate that changes nothing about how many petrol vehicles those competitors actually put on the road.

This is not a subsidy for innovation.  It is a wealth transfer from rivals to Tesla, mediated by a regulatory loophole, and Tesla built a genuinely enormous slice of its reported profitability on top of it.  Tesla earned a record US$2.76 billion from credit sales in 2024 alone.  That fell 28% in 2025 to roughly US$2 billion.  In the second quarter of 2026, that figure collapsed to just US$146 million, down 67% year-over-year and down 62% from the previous quarter alone, a near-total evaporation of what was, until recently, close to pure margin.  Regulatory credit revenue had been boosting Tesla’s total margin percentage by 1.6 to 2.5 percentage points in recent quarters.  In Q2 2026, that contribution fell to a mere 0.6%.

The mechanism is dying for reasons that expose exactly how artificial it always was.  In the United States, the 2025 Working Families Tax Cuts Act reduced the civil penalty for missing Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards to zero for any automaker.  Rivals no longer need to buy Tesla’s credits at all, because the fine they were avoiding no longer exists.  The bitter irony writes itself: this policy shift came from the Trump administration, the same administration Elon Reeve Musk personally financed and formally joined.  Musk helped elect the government that then dismantled one of Tesla’s most profitable revenue lines.

In Europe, the collapse is even more structurally embarrassing.  Toyota and Stellantis have withdrawn entirely from Tesla’s EU CO2 pooling arrangement for 2026.  Only Ford, Honda, Mazda, and Suzuki remain.  Stellantis, rather than continuing to pay Tesla, is instead forming its own internal pool with its Chinese EV partner Leapmotor, and preparing local production of the Leapmotor T03 in Spain specifically to keep its regulatory compliance spending in-house rather than handing it to Tesla.  A revenue stream that depends entirely on rivals being either unable or unwilling to build their own compliant vehicles was never a business model.  It was a toll booth erected on someone else’s regulatory shortfall, and the moment rivals built their own road around it, the toll booth became worthless.

Why the Market Capitalisation is Untethered from Reality

Tesla carried a market capitalisation of approximately US$1.423 trillion as of 21 July 2026.  That figure exceeds the combined market capitalisation of the next 37 largest automotive manufacturers on the planet, a list including Toyota, BYD, Ferrari, General Motors, Ford, and Hyundai.  Toyota, for context, earned roughly six times more profit than Tesla over the same period, and still trades at a fraction of Tesla’s valuation.  Tesla trades at a price-to-earnings ratio of 346.  Toyota trades at 10.

Look at per-vehicle profitability, the metric that actually measures whether a car company is good at making and selling cars, and Tesla’s supposed edge has essentially vanished.  Tesla’s profit per vehicle fell roughly 40% year-over-year to approximately US$2,140 in the first quarter of 2026, nearly identical to Toyota’s US$2,078 per unit.  Ford sold 457,000 vehicles in the first quarter of 2026, comfortably more than Tesla’s delivery total for the same period.  Tesla is being valued as though it is winning a race in which, on the actual unit economics, it is now running roughly even with a Japanese conglomerate trading at 3% of its multiple.

A separate data point from February 2025 makes the disconnect even starker: Tesla’s market capitalisation at the time exceeded the combined value of fifteen major global automakers by 10%, while commanding just 2.5% of global vehicle sales volume.  This is not a valuation built on market share.  It is a valuation built entirely on the promise that robotaxis, Full Self-Driving, and the Optimus humanoid robot will one day generate profits large enough to retroactively justify the multiple.  Management itself has said as much, telling investors that Tesla expects “hardware-related profits to be accompanied by an acceleration of AI, software, and fleet-based profits,” a forward-looking bet priced into the stock today against an income statement that currently shows the opposite trend.

The Balance Sheet Reading That Strips Away the Bullshit

Strip away the narrative and look at what the actual quarterly filings show.  Automotive gross margin fell to 16.8% to 16.9%, down from over 20% just two quarters earlier.  Average revenue per vehicle dropped to approximately US$42,730, down from US$45,345 a year earlier.  Research and development spending jumped 49% to US$2.37 billion, driven by artificial intelligence, the Robotaxi programme, and Optimus, all businesses that remain, by revenue, vastly smaller than the automotive division still carrying the company.  Tesla spent US$5.8 billion during the quarter alone, and its cash outflow exceeded cash generated by US$1.1 billion, the negative free cash flow figure already noted.  Net income fell roughly 5% year-over-year to approximately US$1.11 billion for the quarter, with compressed margins, not merely softer volume, driving the decline.

None of this is a single bad quarter.  Tesla posted its first-ever annual revenue decline in 2025, with full-year revenue falling to approximately US$94.8 billion, down roughly 3%.  Fourth-quarter 2025 revenue came in around US$24.9 billion, itself down roughly 3% year-over-year despite a slight beat against depressed analyst expectations.  A company recording consecutive years of declining vehicle deliveries, a first-ever annual revenue contraction, collapsing operating margin, negative free cash flow, and the accelerating disappearance of a regulatory revenue stream that never reflected genuine product superiority in the first place, is not a company undergoing a temporary rough patch.  It is a business whose core economics are deteriorating on every measurable axis simultaneously, propped up by a valuation multiple that has stopped listening to any of those measurements.

The Verdict

Tesla’s collapse is not a collapse in demand.  Deliveries hit a record.  It is a collapse in the economics underneath that demand: margins compressing, a regulatory credit scheme drying up from both the American deregulation Musk himself helped engineer and the European rivals it was extracting money from, per-vehicle profitability converging with a conventional Japanese automaker trading at a tenth of the multiple, and a balance sheet now burning cash rather than generating it. Elon Musk has spent years asking the market to trust the next set of promises over the current set of numbers. The numbers have finally started arriving faster than the promises, and for the first time in years, the market is beginning to notice the gap between the two.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code





Quora Answer: How Vulnerable are Mid-Sized Banks to Higher-for-Longer Interest Rates & Tightening Credit Conditions?

The following is my answer to a Quora question: “How vulnerable are mid-sized banks to higher-for-longer interest rates and tightening credit conditions?

Mid-sized banks are not marginally exposed to higher-for-longer rates and tightening credit.  They are structurally overweight in the asset class most vulnerable to both.  The FDIC’s 2026 Risk Review found institutions with assets between US$1 billion and US$100 billion carry median commercial real estate loan concentrations hovering around 300% of Tier 1 capital and reserves.  Federal regulators flag any bank crossing that 300% threshold for heightened supervision.  Hundreds of community and regional banks sit at or above it, not as an outlier group, but as a defining characteristic of the sector.

The Maturity Wall Nobody Can Postpone Indefinitely

Approximately US$1.5 trillion to US$2 trillion in commercial real estate debt is maturing across the United States through 2026, according to multiple market estimates.  Every one of those loans must either refinance at today’s considerably higher rates or see the underlying property sold at a lower valuation than the one it was financed against.  Neither outcome is comfortable for the lender holding the paper.  In Manhattan alone, the delinquency rate for office building loans jumped over 1,000% between January 2023 and January 2024, an eye-watering statistic that tells you office valuations have not merely softened; they have structurally broken in a way remote work has made largely permanent.

This is not evenly distributed across the banking system.  US community and regional banks are almost five times more exposed to commercial real estate than the largest banks, with the heaviest concentration sitting specifically among banks holding US$1 billion to US$10 billion in assets.  Commercial real estate comprises roughly 13% of large banks’ balance sheets against 44% of regional banks’ balance sheets, according to Reuters reporting.  The Klaros Group, an investment and advisory firm, analysed approximately 4,000 banks and identified 282 carrying both elevated commercial real estate exposure and substantial unrealised losses from the rate surge, a combination that may force some of them into raising fresh capital or seeking a merger partner before the maturity wall arrives in full.

Jerome Hayden Powell, Chair of the Federal Reserve, has directly warned that commercial real estate risk will remain with banks for years, and has confirmed regulators are actively engaging smaller banks to ensure they can manage it.  He has also stated plainly that failures among small and mid-sized banks should be expected as office valuations continue falling.  When the Federal Reserve Chair uses the word “failures” rather than “headwinds,” that is not a hedge.  That is a warning delivered as clearly as a central banker is ever willing to deliver one in public.

The Anecdote That Should Still Alarm Every Regional Bank Treasurer

Silicon Valley Bank collapsed in March 2023 for a reason directly relevant here, even though its specific exposure was long-duration fixed income securities rather than commercial real estate.  The bank had concentrated its balance sheet in fixed-rate securities funded by short-duration, largely uninsured deposits.  When interest rates rose sharply, those securities lost substantial market value, and a depositor run, amplified within hours by social media and mobile banking, forced the bank to crystallise losses it could otherwise have waited out.  The mechanism generalises directly to commercial real estate exposure today: a concentrated, long-duration asset, financed by liabilities that can walk out the door far faster than the asset can be sold or refinanced.  Change the asset class from mortgage-backed securities to office loans, and the vulnerability is structurally identical.

To its credit, the industry has made genuine progress since 2023.  Unrealised losses on securities across the banking sector fell 36% to US$306 billion in 2025, a meaningful improvement from the 2022 peak.  Deposit bases have grown, led by uninsured deposits, and banks have actively built additional borrowing capacity.  None of that progress addresses the underlying credit risk sitting inside the loan book itself.  The total commercial real estate past-due and nonaccrual ratio ticked up to 1.45%; non-farm non-residential loans and multifamily lending are driving delinquencies specifically at the largest exposed banks, and agricultural credit quality is independently deteriorating after a third consecutive year of declining crop receipts, pushing farm bank delinquency rates to their highest level since 2021.  Liquidity has improved.  Credit quality has not, and credit quality is the metric that determines whether a bank survives the maturity wall or becomes the next FDIC case study.

The Verdict

Mid-sized banks are vulnerable in the specific, structural sense that matte
rs most: concentrated exposure to an asset class experiencing a genuine, multi-year repricing, financed by deposit bases that have proven, since March 2023, capable of evaporating within a single trading day.  Higher-for-longer rates did not create this vulnerability.  They simply removed the cheap refinancing option that had spent over a decade quietly disguising it.  The banks that survive the next eighteen months will be the ones that stress-tested their commercial real estate books honestly, rather than the ones that assumed extend-and-pretend could outlast the maturity wall itself.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code

Toastmasters Speech Evaluations: Dissecting the Message

George Bernard Shaw, the Irish playwright and social activist, allegedly observed that the United States and Great Britain are two countries separated by a common language.  The same trap awaits any Toastmasters programme that skips its own vocabulary.  An evaluation is a judgement, an assessment.  In this context, it concerns a speech delivered.  The word itself traces to the mid-nineteenth century, from the French “évaluer”, a portmanteau built from the Latin “ex-”, meaning “out,” and the Old French “value”.  It means, quite literally, to draw the value out of something.  That etymology is not decoration.  It is the entire job description.

The Purpose of Evaluation

Project evaluation serves two functions, and most people only remember the first.  The obvious one is technical: assessing a speech’s structure, its points of acclamation, its points for improvement.  The second function is the actual reason Toastmasters exists in the first place.  The evaluator must ensure there is a next speech, and another after that.  He must encourage, educate, and inspire the speaker.  An evaluation that fails to accomplish this has failed, regardless of how technically accurate its criticism was.

What an Evaluator Does Not Do

Evaluators overstep their role constantly, and the mistakes are not confined to beginners.  Senior Toastmasters, ironically, commit several of these errors more often than newcomers, having grown comfortable enough to forget the boundaries of the job.

Recounting the speech is the first and most obvious error.  The audience already heard it.  Re-enacting or repeating the project speech entertains nobody and helps the speaker even less.

Duplicating the roles of the language evaluator and the ah counter is the second.  The language evaluator addresses grammar, morphology, and rhetorical devices, not the structure of the speech itself.  The ah counter tracks pauses and filler words, and a competent one explains where and why they occurred so the speaker can correct them.  Neither role belongs to the project evaluator, and folding their work into his own is redundant, not thorough.

Becoming personally involved in the speech is the third, and it afflicts senior Toastmasters and Distinguished Toastmasters with particular regularity.  The audience exists to be moved emotionally by the speaker.  The evaluator exists to notice that movement without being consumed by it.  Just as the speaker adopts a speaker persona, the evaluator must adopt an evaluator persona, remaining neutral, above the emotional current of the room.  An evaluator swayed by pathos cannot honestly assess whether the pathos actually worked.

Making the evaluation about oneself is the fourth, and perhaps the most self-indulgent.  Bringing knowledge to an evaluation is necessary.  Bringing the baggage of personal experience is not.  Even where the evaluator has walked the same road, eaten the same food, met the same people described in the speech, the story belongs to the speaker.  It is his hero’s journey, not an invitation for the evaluator to reminisce about his own.

The Structure of an Effective Speech

Evaluating a speech properly requires understanding what a good speech actually is.  A good speech is a complete journey.  It opens with a statement, sometimes framed as a rhetorical question.  It expands on that statement, carries the audience through development, and argues a cogent, coherent position designed to sway them toward it.  It then returns home, circling back to the opening statement, now transformed into a call to action, propelling the audience to continue the hero’s journey on their own terms.

Depending on the audience and material, the speech must balance logos, pathos, and ethos.  The speaker wears the mantle of the speaker persona, and his task is convincing the audience that he channels their own thoughts, hopes, and fears back at them.  That is what the evaluator is listening for.

Coherency

The first thing to assess is the logic of the argument, its coherency.  An incoherent speech loses the audience, and the spell breaks.  The evaluator’s job is identifying exactly where that incoherency occurred and addressing it directly.  Where the speech is cogent and contextual, the evaluator must say so, and explain why, because good work can always become better work, and both directions deserve equal attention.

Values

Next comes the ethical dimension of the hero’s journey: whether the speaker’s actions align with the story and the character he has presented.  A disconnect between stated belief and demonstrated action is the evaluator’s responsibility to flag.  Alignment deserves the same attention, highlighted specifically to reinforce what the speaker is already doing correctly.  There is always a reason people do what they do, and become who they become.  The evaluator’s task is understanding that reason well enough to name it.

The Emotional Rollercoaster

People are, ultimately, creatures of feeling, prisoners of their own history, their fears, their melancholy, their hatreds, their loves, their hopes.  Every listener searches for themselves inside every story told.  The evaluator’s job is noticing where the delivery and the story align, and where they diverge, and naming both honestly.

“Vocal Variety”

Few phrases in Toastmasters have been reduced to meaningless filler as thoroughly as “vocal variety.”  What does it actually mean?  How does it affect the speech in question?  Which direction, specifically, should the speaker move toward?  A speech is not a play.  It is not a re-enactment of a life event staged for dramatic effect.  It is a recounting of an event, carrying a message and an intent.  Nobody is performing Shakespeare in the Park.  Any recommendation involving vocal variety must be quantifiable and measurable, or it collapses into cliché, offering the speaker nothing he can actually act on.

“Use the Stage”

The instruction to “use the stage” suffers the identical fate.  Not every speech requires movement, and treating stage movement as a universal virtue ignores context entirely.  A speaker delivering remarks in the capacity of a public officeholder or policymaker should not be wandering the stage.  He is the focal point of the room, and his task is capturing that attention and holding it without dilution.  Movement, in that context, breaks the gravitas the moment demands.  At its worst, it signals indecision, incredulity, even a lack of credibility, precisely the opposite of what the speaker is trying to project.

Three Points, or You Are Nagging

The evaluation itself begins by addressing the speaker directly.  For the duration of that evaluation, he is the centre of the room, and the evaluator’s own presence becomes secondary to his hero’s journey.  My own preference runs to three points of acclamation and three points for improvement, no more.  There is frequently more worth saying, and resisting the urge to say all of it is the entire discipline.  Detailed analysis belongs to a mentor, working privately and at length.  The evaluator’s role is highlighting the good and the bad clearly enough for the whole room to learn from it, not producing an exhaustive breakdown nobody in the audience has the capacity to absorb in one sitting.  Exceed three points, and the lesson goes over everyone’s head, or worse, demoralises the speaker entirely.

What to Avoid

Newer evaluators frequently apologise for their own feedback.  This is a mistake.  Apologising for an honest assessment diminishes both the evaluator’s credibility and his own confidence, and the words a person hears himself say shape him as much as they shape his audience.

No evaluator should ever claim a speech was perfect.  That is a lie, and everyone in the room knows it.  No such speech exists.  However strong a speech is, another point of improvement is always available.

Some evaluators swing to the opposite extreme, denigrating the speaker outright.  This is equally wrong.  Nobody begins as a finished speaker.  That is the entire reason project speeches and evaluations exist in the first place.  Being trusted to evaluate someone’s hero’s journey is a privilege, not a licence to tear it down.

Summarising

Every evaluation must close with a statement of broad intent, one that inspires the speaker toward the next speech rather than away from public speaking altogether.  Watch for breadth versus depth, the credibility of the story, the veracity of sources and quotations, and the transition between points.  A credible speech rests on verified facts and properly attributed quotes.  I am particular, deliberately so, about quotation attribution and scientific accuracy.  Far too many speeches lean on cliché built from misconception, outright fabrication, or superstition.  A good speech educates.  It does not spread misinformation dressed up as inspiration.

Beating the Clock

Time management follows its own discipline.  A speech evaluation runs roughly three minutes for a reason.  Psychologically, tolerance for sustained criticism is limited, which makes diplomacy in delivery an art in itself, one that must still elevate and inspire the speaker rather than simply cushion the blow.  By the green light, the evaluator should have covered every point of acclamation and begun the recommendations.  By the yellow light, he should be transitioning toward the summary.  By the red light, that summary should already be underway.  Thirty seconds remains more than sufficient to close.

In Closing

Speech evaluations form one half of the Toastmasters journey, and a genuinely capable Toastmaster is proficient in both halves of effective communication: the ability to speak, honed through project speeches, and the ability to understand, honed through project evaluations.  Neglect either half, and the whole discipline remains unfinished.


Terence Nunis, DTM | Division Advisor, District 80 Division M | Club Advisor, AIA Toastmasters | Past President & Founder, Awesome Toastmasters



Quora Answer: What Does China, Japan, Et Al Dumping US Treasury Bonds s Say about the Future of the US Currency & Economic Outlook?

The following is my answer to a Quora question: “China, Japan, et al. have recently been dumping a lot of US Treasury bonds.  What does this say about the future of the US currency and economic outlook?

Foreign central banks sold US$138.4 billion in Treasuries in March 2026 alone.  Japan led the exit at US$47.7 billion; China followed at US$41 billion, with Luxembourg, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, India, Canada, and the United Arab Emirates all selling too.  China’s holdings fell to US$652.3 billion, the lowest level since September 2008, an eighteen-year low.  Overall foreign holdings dropped from US$9.49 trillion in February to US$9.25 trillion in March.  Read the headlines, and this looks like the opening chapter of dollar collapse.  When we read the actual mechanism behind the numbers, the story is more mundane, considerably more revealing, and a great deal less flattering to the people currently shouting about it on financial television.

Why They Sold, & It was Not Ideology

This was not strategic de-dollarisation.  It was currency intervention, forced on central banks by the outbreak of the US-Iran conflict.  Crude oil prices surged as the war broke out, and the yen and other Asian currencies tumbled in response.  The Bank of Japan intervened in currency markets in late March and early April 2026, after the yen weakened past the politically sensitive 160 level against the dollar, a threshold Tokyo has treated as a red line since the currency last breached it in 2024.  Surging oil import costs widened Japan’s current account at exactly the wrong moment, and Japan, as one of the most energy-import-dependent economies among the major powers, had no realistic alternative but to sell dollar assets to fund yen support.  Frederic Neumann, chief Asia economist at HSBC, summarised the mechanism without ambiguity: exchange market intervention to support local currencies forced central banks to sell part of their dollar-denominated holdings.  That is defence, not defiance.

A Pattern with Precedent

This is not the first time global central banks have been forced into exactly this position, and the historical parallel is instructive.  During the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Thailand’s central bank spent down its foreign reserves defending the baht’s peg to the dollar before finally floating the currency on 2 July 1997, triggering a regional contagion that swept through Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia within months.  Central banks across the region learned then, at enormous cost, that defending a currency against a genuine shock requires burning through dollar reserves, not hoarding them for symbolic effect.  The 2013 “Taper Tantrum,” triggered when then Federal Reserve Chair Ben Shalom Bernanke merely signalled the possibility of reducing asset purchases, produced a similar scramble across emerging markets as capital fled and currencies buckled.  March 2026 is simply the latest entry in a well-established pattern: an external shock hits, a currency wobbles, and the central bank sells dollar assets to stabilise it.  Nobody called Thailand’s 1997 reserve drawdown “de-baht-isation.”  Calling March 2026’s intervention “de-dollarisation” applies the same logical error, dressed up for a modern audience.

The Bond Market Felt the Pain Regardless

None of this was painless for holders of Treasuries generally.  Treasuries came under significant pressure as the Middle East conflict stoked inflation fears, forcing investors to demand higher compensation for holding US government debt.  Foreign investors logged a US$142.1 billion valuation loss on long-term Treasury holdings in March alone, on top of the outright selling.  Yields climbing under geopolitical stress is a genuine market event.  It is simply not the same event as strategic abandonment of the dollar as a reserve asset, and conflating the two produces bad analysis and, for anyone trading on the panic, potentially expensive decisions.

The Number That Matters, & Nobody is Reporting It

Here is the detail that undercuts the entire panic narrative, and it rarely makes it past the headline.  Total foreign holdings of Treasuries rose from US$7.7 trillion in December 2021 to approximately US$9.2 trillion in December 2025, an increase of US$1.5 trillion over four years, encompassing multiple periods of supposed “de-dollarisation” panic along the way.  In March 2026 itself, the very month everyone is citing as evidence of flight from the dollar, net foreign private inflows into long-term US securities reached US$162.1 billion, comfortably outweighing the US$14.9 billion in net official-sector selling.  The overall net TIC inflow for the month, combining long-term securities, short-term instruments, and banking flows, came to a positive US$150.7 billion.  Central banks retreated for a month under duress from an oil shock.  Private capital, the money with no political intervention mandate attached to it, kept buying anyway, in considerably larger size.

The Expert Who Actually Checked the Data

Brad Setser, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and one of the most rigorous trackers of Chinese reserve behaviour, has directly challenged the popular assumption that China is engaged in deliberate, strategic dollar diversification.  He notes that China has not disclosed the currency composition of its reserves since 2020, which makes confident claims about its intentions inherently speculative.  What evidence does exist suggests China’s currency composition has not shifted dramatically, partly because the dollar’s share of its reserves was already structurally low, around 55%, and further underweighting the dollar means sacrificing yield for no clear strategic gain.  He is similarly sceptical that the 2022 freezing of Russian reserves triggered a wholesale Chinese reserve rebalancing, noting the increased bid for gold from the People’s Bank of China has been, by China’s own disclosed data, marginal rather than transformative.  Setser’s broader point deserves repeating: official Treasury data structurally undercounts China’s actual footprint in US debt markets, because a considerable share of Chinese dollar exposure sits inside custodial accounts, swaps, and funding arrangements that never appear cleanly labelled “China” in the published figures.  The headline number understates China’s real exposure, even as commentators use that same understated figure to declare that China is fleeing the asset class entirely.

Where the Genuine De-Dollarisation Story Sits

The real structural story is slower, considerably less photogenic, and impossible to compress into a single dramatic month.  The dollar’s share of global reserves has fallen from a peak above 70% in 2000 and 2001 to 56.77% by the fourth quarter of 2025, according to IMF Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves data.  Central bank gold purchases have exceeded 1,000 tonnes annually since 2022, more than double the 400 to 500-tonne pre-2022 norm, according to World Gold Council figures. The reason traces back to a single, well-documented event.  In February 2022, the United States, coordinating with the European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, froze approximately US$300 billion of Russia’s central bank reserves in response to the invasion of Ukraine.  Every non-aligned central bank on the planet absorbed the identical lesson simultaneously: dollar and euro reserves held inside someone else’s financial system can be rendered inaccessible by a political decision, with no court proceeding and no warning.  That is genuine, durable de-dollarisation, driven by a documented act of financial statecraft rather than a currency intervention triggered by an oil shock.  It has been building quietly for four years.  It has nothing to do with what Japan and China did to their Treasury holdings in March 2026.

The Verdict

Conflating a single, crisis-driven month of central bank selling with a structural loss of dollar privilege is lazy analysis dressed up as geopolitical insight.  The dollar’s genuine vulnerability is not one volatile month of intervention.  It is the decade-long, deliberate diversification into gold and an expanding tail of smaller currencies, driven by the entirely rational fear that Washington will weaponise the dollar system again the next time it decides a foreign government has misbehaved.  China and Japan did not sell Treasuries in March 2026 because they have lost faith in America.  They sold because an oil shock hit their currencies, leaving them no alternative, just as Thailand had none in 1997.  Private capital, watching the same events with none of the political obligation to intervene, bought the dip regardless.  If dollar privilege is ending, it will not end with a headline this dramatic.  It will end the way Setser’s own data suggests it is actually happening: quietly, gradually, and largely off the page that everyone else is reading.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code



25 July, 2026

Quora Answer: Does De-Dollarisation Imply a Shift towards a Multipolar Currency System?

The following is my answer to a Quora question: “Does the concept of de-dollarisation imply a shift towards a multipolar currency system with multiple reserve currencies?

Yes, though not in the way most commentary frames it.  The popular version of this story casts it as a two-horse race, the dollar losing ground directly to the Chinese renminbi.  The data says otherwise, and the actual mechanism is more interesting, and considerably more inconvenient for Beijing, than the popular version admits.

According to the International Monetary Fund’s Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, the US dollar’s share of global reserves fell to 56.77% in the fourth quarter of 2025, down from 56.93% the prior quarter, out of total global reserves reaching US$13.14 trillion.  The euro held 20.25%, the Japanese yen 5.56%, sterling 4.64%, the Canadian dollar 2.49%, the Australian dollar 2.01%, and the Swiss franc a mere 0.19%.  The Chinese renminbi, the currency most commonly cited as the dollar’s heir apparent, held just 1.95%.

The residual “other currencies” category, covering reserve holdings not individually identified anywhere in the COFER framework, reached 6.13% in the fourth quarter of 2025, up from 5.61% the previous quarter, and more than double what it was in 2021.  Central banks are not consolidating their diversification into one clean alternative.  They are scattering it across an expanding tail of smaller currencies, likely including the Singapore dollar, the South Korean won, and various Nordic currencies, none individually significant enough to warrant its own COFER line item, but collectively now larger than the renminbi’s entire disclosed share.  That is the actual signature of multipolarity.  Not one challenger rising to meet the dollar.  Dozens of smaller holdings quietly growing in the shadows of a category literally labelled “other.”

Why the Renminbi is Not the Beneficiary Bulls Expect

The renminbi’s stagnation at under 2% of global reserves, despite a decade of Beijing actively promoting its internationalisation, is not an accident of insufficient marketing.  It is a direct consequence of China’s continued capital account controls, which prevent the renminbi from being freely convertible in the way a genuine reserve currency requires.  Central banks diversifying away from the dollar are choosing convertible, rule-of-law-anchored alternatives such as the Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar, and a widening basket of smaller currencies, because those currencies do not carry the political risk premium a capital-controlled renminbi does.  Beijing built the infrastructure, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System among it, but infrastructure alone has not overcome the trust deficit inherent in a currency Beijing itself refuses to let float freely.

In February 2022, the United States, coordinating with the European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, froze approximately US$300 billion of Russia’s central bank reserves in response to the invasion of Ukraine.  Every non-aligned central bank on the planet absorbed the same lesson simultaneously: concentration in any single reserve currency, or bloc of allied currencies, creates a single point of political failure.  The logical response to that lesson is not to swap one concentration risk, the dollar, for another, the renminbi.  It is to disperse holdings widely enough that no single government’s political decision can freeze a meaningful share of a nation’s reserves at once.  Central bank gold purchases, which more than doubled after 2022 to over 1,000 tonnes annually according to World Gold Council data, follow the identical logic.  Gold cannot be frozen by anyone’s central bank.  Neither, in practical terms, can a reserve position scattered across a dozen minor currencies nobody thought worth sanctioning.

The Verdict

De-dollarisation does imply a shift toward a multipolar system, but multipolar does not mean a tidy new order with two or three great reserve currencies sharing the stage.  It means fragmentation: a dollar still comfortably dominant at 56.77%, a euro holding steady around a fifth of global reserves, a yen and sterling occupying their traditional secondary tiers, a renminbi stubbornly stuck under 2% despite a decade of promotion, and an ever-growing tail of smaller currencies absorbing the overflow.  Anyone predicting a clean handover of reserve currency status from Washington to Beijing has misread the data entirely.  The world is not choosing a new hegemon.  It is quietly refusing to trust any single one of them completely, including the one everybody keeps expecting to win.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code