These are my thoughts on business development and management issues. I worked for years as a consultant and in various positions in the logistics and maritime industry. We have handled projects from training and development to corporate imaging and branding.
22 September, 2015
A Short Explanation about MediShield Life
21 September, 2015
Some Thoughts about the Minimum Wage
19 September, 2015
Temasek Holdings & Olam International: Our Money at Work
17 September, 2015
Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth Numbers: Confusing by Accident, or Confusing by Design?
The following points concern Singapore and our
Sovereign Wealth Funds. The numbers are
estimates, rounded off, and drawn from whatever was publicly available at the
time.
The 2015 Numbers, as They Stood
The official balance sheet of the Government of
Singapore, as at 31st March 2015, showed total income at S$150
billion, and net surplus at S$111 billion.
Cash and cash assets stood at $256 billion out of total assets of S$1.366
trillion. Temasek Holdings reported
assets of S$256 billion as at that date, since revised upward to S$266
billion. Combined with the stated
portfolio figure, that alone accounts for S$512 billion.
Outstanding Singapore government borrowing, as at the
same date, stood at S$396 billion, undoubtedly larger since. Taking that as the outstanding liability, and
treating Singapore as a giant corporation, which is not an unreasonable
comparison given how it manages its reserves, shareholder equity works out to S$970
billion.
In the twenty years since 1975, government debt rose
by almost S$350 billion. The IMF put
Singapore’s operational surplus over that period at S$280 billion. Temasek Holdings claimed an average return of
17% across those two decades, and 19% in one year alone. GIC claimed a 5% average return over the
identical period.
Why the Arithmetic Refuses to Reconcile
Run the numbers backwards from those claimed returns,
and the total assets should be considerably larger than the $1.366 trillion
reported as at 31 March 2015.
Compounding at even a blended rate somewhere between GIC’s 5% and
Temasek Holdings’ 17% over twenty years produces a figure the disclosed balance
sheet does not come close to matching.
Taken at face value, the actual realised return implied by the reported
totals sits under 1% across the full period, a number that makes both GIC’s and
Temasek Holdings’ own headline claims look, at best, disconnected from the
consolidated figures the Ministry of Finance and the Monetary Authority of
Singapore publish.
The Ministry of Finance states this outright, in its
own published guidance: “We do not disclose the amount each term of Government
has protected as Past Reserves, nor the amount accrued to the incoming term of
Government, as this could allow speculators to arrive at a more accurate
estimate of the full size of our reserves.” That is not an oversight. That is a stated policy of incomplete
disclosure, written into how Singapore’s reserves are governed under the
Constitution’s Fifth Schedule, covering GIC, Temasek Holdings, MAS, CPF Board,
HDB, and JTC collectively. As recently
as 2024, independent estimates placed Singapore’s total reserves at a conservative
S$2.5 trillion, with the Ministry itself acknowledging, in a separate public
document, that even GIC’s own management figure, “well over US$100 billion,” is
stated only as a floor, not a ceiling, “as our reserves form a key part of our
strategic defence against threats that undermine the interests of Singapore and
Singaporeans.”
Why the Confusion Cannot be Resolved from
Outside
The numbers released by the Ministry of Finance and
MAS on one hand, and by Temasek Holdings and GIC on the other, are incongruent
because they were never designed to reconcile in public. Every figure disclosed is a partial figure,
filtered through a constitutional framework built specifically to prevent
exactly the kind of backward calculation attempted above. The elected presidency itself exists as the
sole institutional check on this opacity, holding a veto over any government
attempt to draw down Past Reserves, a “second key” introduced in 1991 precisely
because Parliament alone was judged insufficient to guard a sum too large, and
too politically consequential, to ever be fully counted in public. Citizens funding this system through CPF
contributions and taxation are asked to trust returns nobody outside the
institutions themselves can verify, audited by a mechanism whose entire design
assumes the public should never possess enough information to check the sum for
itself.
Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code
Typos Can be Deadly
16 September, 2015
Our GDP to Public Debt Relationship with Our CPF
15 September, 2015
Some Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) on Singapore
CECA at Twenty: Why the 2005 Deal Still Cannot Be Fixed
On the 29th June 2005, Singapore, under
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, and India, under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,
concluded the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement. What followed became a genuine, recurring
concern for ordinary Singaporeans, and the concern was never really about trade
in goods. It was about Chapter 9:
Movement of Natural Persons, and specifically Annex 9A, a list of 127
professions Singapore contractually agreed to keep open to Indian nationals,
without the right to apply labour market testing, economic needs testing, or “other
procedures of similar effect” as a precondition for entry.
Why It was Not Well Thought Out
The clause on intra-corporate transferees compounds
the problem directly. A company can open
a nominal office in both India and Singapore and use that structure to
parachute professionals, technicians, and managers into the Singapore labour
market with a guaranteed approval of short-term stay, bypassing the scrutiny
every other work pass applicant faces.
This was not a minor drafting oversight.
It was a structural loophole, written into the treaty text itself, and
treaties are considerably harder to unwind than domestic policy.
The consequences showed up in the numbers almost
immediately. The “other work passes”
category grew by roughly 22% in both 2012 and 2013, then by 30% in the first
six months of 2014 alone. Professor
Tommy Koh Thong Bee explained the underlying wage mechanism plainly: Singapore
pays certain workers low wages “not primarily because their productivity is
inherently low, but largely because they are competing against an unlimited
supply of cheap foreign workers,” and the fix required either reducing that
supply, introducing a minimum wage, or targeting specific sectors for wage
enhancement directly. None of that fix
was available to Singapore unilaterally, because the treaty had already locked
in the supply side of the equation.
Why the Issues Have Still Not Been
Adequately Resolved
The Third Review of CECA has been ongoing since
September 2018. As of the joint
statement issued in early 2025, both governments were still describing their
task as making “progress on initiation” of that Third Review, meaning a review
launched in 2018 had not even been substantively concluded seven years
later. Compare that to the First Review,
concluded within two years, in 2007. The
Second Review took eight years and drew direct parliamentary criticism over the
delay. A Third Review now stretching
past seven years without resolution is not evidence of careful diplomatic
calibration. It is evidence that the two
governments cannot agree on how to unwind a structural problem neither side
wants to be blamed for creating.
Singapore has, in the meantime, tried to patch the
wound domestically rather than at the treaty level. The Complementarity Assessment Framework,
COMPASS, introduced for all new Employment Pass applications from September
2023 and extended to renewals from September 2024, requires a minimum score of
40 points across salary, qualifications, workforce diversity, and support for
local employment, specifically to prevent any single nationality from
dominating a firm’s professional workforce.
It is a genuinely more rigorous filter than anything Singapore had in
2015. It also does not touch the
original problem. Multiple immigration
advisories confirm that certain intra-corporate transferees remain
COMPASS-exempt under the specific provisions of CECA itself, and separately,
any Employment Pass applicant earning above S$22,500 a month is exempt from
COMPASS scoring entirely, regardless of nationality concentration at the hiring
firm. Singapore built an elaborate new
points system explicitly to manage exactly the risk CECA was already
contractually forbidden from letting it manage, for the one category of
applicant the original 2005 agreement was actually written around.
The trade case for the agreement remains genuinely
strong, and pretending otherwise would be dishonest. Singapore was India’s largest source of FDI
in 2013-14 at US$5.98 billion, roughly a quarter of India’s total inflows that
year, and Temasek Holdings alone has continued growing its India-linked
exposure, with its net portfolio value rising to S$389 billion partly on the
strength of US and Indian investments.
Bilateral trade, having expanded from US$4.2 billion in 2003-04 before
CECA to considerably higher levels since, has been genuinely volatile,
reflecting global conditions as much as the agreement’s own design. None of that commercial success addresses the
specific structural flaw the movement-of-persons chapter created, and no amount
of GDP growth retroactively justifies signing away the labour market testing
tools every other trade partner is permitted to retain.
The Verdict
CECA was not badly negotiated because Singapore lacked
capable trade negotiators. It was badly
negotiated because the negotiators optimised for corporate access and
geopolitical diversification away from China, and treated the domestic labour
market consequences as a manageable afterthought rather than a central design
constraint. Twenty years, three review
cycles, and one entirely new immigration points system later, the core
structural loophole, intra-corporate transfer without labour market testing, remains
contractually intact, patched around at the edges rather than fixed at the
source. A treaty that takes longer to
renegotiate than it took to originally draft is not a living agreement being
carefully maintained. It is an admission
that both governments know exactly what is wrong with it, and neither has found
the political will to actually change it.
Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code







