The following is my answer to a Quora
question: “What
is the impact of prolonged sub-US$20 crude oil on the Malaysian economy,
ringgit, and Petronas?”
Malaysia is
in a difficult position. At the
beginning of the year, they were projecting a GDP growth if around 3%, meaning
that the economy was already slowing down due to several other factors. The pandemic simply made it worse
exponentially. Malaysia’s economy is now
projected to grow at -0.1%, and they will likely fall into a technical
recession. A worst-case scenario,
considering a prolonged U-curve, would be an actual recession.
Malaysia’s
budget was tabled on the assumption that oil would trade at US$62 per
barrel. Even then, it was rather
optimistic. However, with oil trading at
around US$23 or US$24 per barrel at the moment, that budget is in deficit by
the billions. Analysts have calculated
the loss at between MYR31 billion to MYR40 billion. They will likely have to propose another
budget for the year, and soon.
The
Malaysian government is already heavily constrained, with limited tools to
address this. Their foreign exchange
reserves are low, institutional confidence and ratings have not recovered since
the 1MDB debacle, and the ringgit will continue to fall against international
and regional currencies. The last
stimulus package of MYR20 billion, with an additional MYR620 million, is a stop
gap, and definitely not enough for a prolonged lockdown of the economy. The market thinks so as well, and the local
bourse is trading flat, after almost reaching 10-year lows earlier in the
month. This makes borrowing in the
international markets very expensive. Malaysia will likely table a deficit budget,
and this will be carried forward next year.
It will be a difficult time for Malaysians.
Specific to
the Malaysian government, the Perikatan Nasional needs to prove they are
better stewards of the economy than the Pakatan Harapan they
replaced. Otherwise, they will face a
reckoning at the ballot box from the rural Malays, who will bear the brunt of
this economic malaise. PAS has its
heartland, but BERSATU has no such fallback.
They are still a minor party, with limited support, cobbled together by
disaffected Malay nationalists. The
party that has the best chance of gain would likely be UMNO, since they can
claim that they alone have presided over a period of sustained growth, and can
do that leading a new coalition.
I see no way
back for the DAP. Their ministers have
proven to be terrible at building bridges, and spent too much time fighting the
civil service, sniping at Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah; and moaning about the
poor state of the government. PKR has an
existential crisis, being seen as merely a vehicle for Anwar bin Ibrahim. The smaller parties have no national
consequence.
I foresee
the MYR to continue being undervalued compared to regional currencies and the
US Dollar, at least until well into 2021.
No one will make major investments until we are convinced that this
government has a viable economic recovery plan.
That means next year’s budget will be closely watched. We must remember that concerns about the
economy encompass more than merely the current pandemic. For example, Malaysia is a major exporter of
palm oil. The European Union is looking
to ban imports, and may even write off much of the trade credit. That is a major source of revenue gone.
Malaysian
financial institutions’, and the sovereign credit rating, is still down. They still have to deal with the consequences
of the 1MDB, as mentioned above. A low
credit rating makes the terms of borrowing more expensive and onerous. For example, Indonesia recently had to issue
50-year bonds. This constrains how much
debt they can take for half a century.
Malaysia might have to do the same.
Petronas
will continue to struggle. We have to
remember that even with OPEC and Russia agreeing to cut production by an
unprecedented 10%, it only comes into effect in May and June. It is not immediate. We are looking at 10 million barrels a day
less, when global demand is down 30%.
The projected recovery of oil prices will be slow. We are looking at US$50 per barrel by the
middle of 2021, which is still well below nominal Malaysian budget assumptions. This loss of revenue will affect production,
field development, exploration, and will cascade downline to the thousands of
contractors and parasites. There will be
job losses, and pay cuts on a massive scale.
What is likely to happen is that Malaysia will sell stakes in Petronas
to raise revenue short term. I am not
sure how attractive that will be when we consider that Malaysia is not a net
importer, not exporter. There will be
too much political red tape for it to be attractive.
In summary,
things are not looking good, and while seemingly competent, this Malaysian
government does not have the mandate to make serious changes. Paradoxically, going to the polls early
before a sustained economic recovery will punish them further, likely leading
to a hung parliament. This will further
batter market sentiment, and push the currency value down.