The following is
my answer to a Quora question: “Would Singapore be more
backwards if it were part of Malaysia, rather than an independent country?”
Does that even need to be asked? Malaysia’s Article 153 of the Federal
Constitution guarantees the “special position” of the Malays and the rights of
other communities. What it does not do
is mandate apartheid economics. That
creative interpretation belongs to the political class — to the concept of Ketuanan
Melayu, which holds that Malays are the rightful lords of the land and that
non-Malays are guests who should be grateful they are tolerated.
The New Economic Policy, launched in 1971,
set a target: Bumiputera ownership of corporate equity should reach 30
per cent by 1990. It is now 2026. The target has never been met. Bumiputera equity ownership in
publicly listed companies has hovered well below 30 per cent for decades,
depending on how the government chooses to measure it in any given year — and
they change the methodology when the number becomes embarrassing.
Half a century of affirmative action, and
the stated goal remains unachieved. The
policy did not fail to redistribute wealth.
It succeeded brilliantly — at redistributing it to a small circle of
politically connected elites while leaving ordinary Bumiputera in the
B40 income bracket firmly in place.
Cronyism is Not a Bug; It is the
Feature.
The NEP and Bumiputera privileges are
reserved for a small circle of political cronies and their associates. Most Bumiputera have never enjoyed any
real benefit from these policies. The
clearest evidence is 1Malaysia Development Berhad. 1MDB was a state investment fund created in
2009 under Dato’ Sri Haji Mohammad Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak, who was
Prime Minister at the time. US$4.5
billion was misappropriated from the fund in what the United States Department
of Justice described as the largest kleptocracy case it had ever
prosecuted. The money went on private
jets, luxury yachts, Picassos, and the production of The Wolf of Wall Street
— a film about financial fraud, funded through financial fraud. Najib was convicted in 2022 and jailed –
allegedly.
This is what Ketuanan Melayu
produces: a system in which political power and economic patronage are fused,
in which every contract, licence, and concession runs through the ethnic
gatekeeper. It does not build a strong
Malay commercial class. It builds a
small, dependent, rent-seeking elite that requires the system to persist
because it cannot survive without it.
Penang: The Case Study
Penang is the most economically productive
state in Malaysia outside the Klang Valley.
It contributes disproportionately to federal revenues and receives
disproportionately little in return. Prime
Minister Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim tabled parliamentary figures in June 2026
showing that, averaged over 2023 to 2025, Penang contributed RM10.7 billion a
year to federal revenue and received RM7.9 billion in allocations — a shortfall
of RM2.8 billion annually. Selangor
contributed RM43.6 billion and received RM15 billion. Kedah, which produces little, received RM9.5
billion on a contribution of RM3.7 billion.
This is not fiscal policy. This
is a transfer mechanism — from states that work to states that vote
correctly. Penang’s Chief Minister, Chow
Kon Yeow, has been asking for equitable treatment, not preferential
treatment. The federal government’s
response, thus far, has been to point out that it is very busy.
Penang was once a thriving port and
commercial entrepôt. Its regression
relative to its own potential is a direct function of federal policies that
starve productive, non-Bumiputera-majority states to subsidise racial
patronage elsewhere. A Singapore that
was part of Malaysia would suffer the same sorry fate.
The Brain Drain is Not a Coincidence
Malaysia’s Digital Minister, Gobind Singh
Deo, confirmed in April 2025 that 1.86 million Malaysians have emigrated over
the past 50 years. That is 5.6 per cent
of the population — above the global average of 3.6 per cent. A 2024 study found that three in four
Malaysians living and working in Singapore are skilled or semi-skilled. Of Malaysians resident in Singapore, 46.2 per
cent are Chinese, and 11.3 per cent are Indian. Together, non-Malays account for 58 per cent of
the Malaysian diaspora here — a disproportionate share relative to their share
of Malaysia’s population. This is not a coincidence.
It is the predictable outcome of a
system that told an entire class of citizens their qualifications, their
effort, and their talent count for less because of their ethnicity.
They did not leave because Singapore was
pretty. They left because Malaysia codified their second-class status in law,
repeated it in every university admissions round, and embedded it in every
government contract. They came here and
built what we see. Malaysian-born talent
and their children shaped Singapore’s financial sector, its legal profession,
its medical institutions, its airlines, and its civil service. This is not Singaporean exceptionalism. It is Malaysian self-sabotage at scale.
Even members of the ruling coalition have
admitted it. Liow Tiong Lai, then deputy
president of the Malaysian Chinese Association, acknowledged that Ketuanan
Melayu caused some migration of people from the country. That is the sanitised version. The honest
version is that Malaysia ran a decades-long programme to make its most
economically productive citizens feel unwelcome, and was then surprised when
they left. Singapore did not steal
Malaysian talent. Malaysia exported it.
The Economic Numbers
In 1965, Singapore’s GDP per capita was US$500
— comparable to Mexico and South Africa at the time, and not far from Malaysia’s. In 2025, Singapore’s GDP per capita was
US$94,481. Malaysia’s was only
US$13,901. Singapore ranks 7th
in the world. Malaysia ranks 78th. The gap is US$80,580 per person — and it was
only US$27,610 in 2006. The divergence
is not stabilising. It is accelerating.
In 1967, two years after separation,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei signed the Currency Interchangeability
Agreement. One ringgit bought one
Singapore dollar at par, with no transaction charges. Malaysia unilaterally withdrew from that
agreement on 8th May 1973.
Today, one Singapore dollar buys RM3.19.
That is not an exchange rate. It
is a report card on fifty years of divergent governance. Singapore left in 1965 with no natural
resources, no hinterland, no agricultural land, and no Bumiputera equity
quota. It left with meritocracy, rule of
law, and the conviction that talent matters more than ethnicity. Malaysia kept the rubber, the palm oil, the
tin, the petroleum, and the ethnic quota system. The results speak for themselves.
The most instructive comparison is
Penang. It is Malaysia’s most
economically productive state — the best the Malaysian model can produce. Its per capita income in 2024 was RM76,033,
the highest of any Malaysian state. At
current exchange rates, this is US$17,000.
Singapore’s per capita GDP is more than five times Penang’s income
figure. Penang contributes more to
federal tax revenue than it receives back, funds states that produce far less,
and still cannot keep pace with a city-state that started from the same point
and had none of its natural advantages.
Now consider the counterfactual. Singapore inside Malaysia would be
Penang. Its revenues would flow to Kuala
Lumpur and be redistributed according to political calculations that have
nothing to do with productivity. Its
non-Malay majority would face university admission caps, government contract
restrictions, and a civil service structurally closed to them. Its best talent — the Malaysian Chinese and
Indian professionals who built its financial sector, its legal institutions,
and its aviation industry — would have had no reason to stay, and no
meritocratic ladder to climb if they did.
Singapore’s per capita GDP would not be US$94,000. It would look like Penang’s: capable enough
to be milked, not free enough to compound.
The question is not whether Singapore would be more backwards inside
Malaysia. The question is whether it
would still recognisably exist as an economic entity at all, or whether sixty
years of Bumiputera quota allocation, federal revenue extraction, and
institutional marginalisation of its majority population would have reduced it
to a mid-tier port city nursing a permanent grievance about its federal
allocation — which is precisely what Penang is today.
The Religious Dimension
The Malaysian government’s use of Islam to
justify ethnic privilege is offensive to anyone who has read the source
material. Islam does not sanction racial
hierarchy. Muhammad said in his final
sermon, “No Arab has superiority over a non-Arab, and no non-Arab has
superiority over an Arab; no white person has superiority over a black person,
and no black person has superiority over a white person, except through taqwa.” What Malaysia practises is not Islam. It is ethnic nationalism wearing the clothing
of Islam. It is a deviant political
construct that exploits religious sentiment to entrench a patronage
network. The ‘ulama who provide
cover for it know that they are munifiqin – hypocrites.
The danger is that this construct is now
radicalising further. Parti Islam
Se-Malaysia, known as PAS, governs four states: Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah,
and Perlis. It is the dominant force
within the Perikatan Nasional opposition coalition, which analysts now
consider best placed to form the federal government after the next general
election, GE16. As of October 2026, PAS
president Abdul Hadi bin Awang’s allies are openly predicting that GE16 will
end Pakatan Harapan’s time in Putrajaya.
The question is what a PAS-led federal government would mean for
Malaysia’s economy. The answer is
visible in the states it already governs.
According to Malaysia’s Department of
Statistics, GDP per capita in 2025 was RM18,085 in Kelantan — the state PAS has
governed continuously since 1990.
Terengganu’s figure was RM32,657.
Kedah’s was RM28,537. Perlis came
in at RM25,089. The national average was
RM59,167. Every PAS-governed state is at
less than half the national average.
Kelantan, after 35 years of PAS administration, produces less than a
third of the national per capita output.
The social indicators are no better. In 2025, the four PAS-governed states held
the top four positions nationally for drug abusers and addicts per 100,000
residents — Kelantan at 1,105, Terengganu at 997, Perlis at 970, and Kedah at
965. Kelantan recorded 252 rape and
incest reports in 2024, up 22.3 per cent from the year before. The incest statistics and the projected cases
not reported are quite telling. Non-revenue
water loss rates — a measure of infrastructure decay — ran at 64.5 per cent in
Perlis, 54.5 per cent in Kelantan, and 50.7 per cent in Kedah. PAS’s response to these figures is to argue
that geography and historical underinvestment explain the gap. This is the same argument Malaysia has made
about Singapore for sixty years.
Singapore’s geography is worse — it has none of Malaysia’s resources. The variable is not geography. It is governance.
A federal government led by or dependent
on PAS would apply the Kelantan model nationally: Malay-ethnocentric political
Islam, structural hostility to non-Muslim investment, and the prioritisation of
religious signalling over economic competence.
Foreign direct investment, which flows to legal certainty and
institutional reliability, would reprice Malaysia’s risk. The non-Malay professional class — already
emigrating at above-average rates — would accelerate its departure. The talent base that sustains what remains of
Malaysia’s productive economy would leave, most of it to Singapore. Malaysia would, in that scenario, have
completed the journey from a country that once shared a currency at par with
Singapore to one that cannot retain the people needed to close the gap.
The Verdict
Would Singapore be more backwards inside
Malaysia? Categorically yes. Singapore would be Penang — productive enough
to be taxed, constrained enough never to compound, and perpetually underfunded
by a federal government that redistributes wealth by ethnicity rather than by
output. In 1967, one ringgit bought one
Singapore dollar. Today, one Singapore
dollar buys RM3.19. That gap is the cost
of Ketuanan Melayu, denominated in currency.
Ketuanan Melayu
has had over five decades to demonstrate its merits. It has produced the four poorest states in
Malaysia, a brain drain of 5.6 per cent of the population, the largest
kleptocracy prosecution in US Department of Justice history, and a currency
that has lost two-thirds of its value against the country it used to
equal. Now its logical terminus — a
PAS-led federal government — is within electoral reach. Singapore had the same five decades to
demonstrate what meritocracy produces. The
results are in. The trajectory is not.
Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code

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