19 April, 2020

Quora Answer: Would Singapore be Backwards if It were Still Part of Malaysia?

The following is my answer to a Quora question: “Would Singapore be more backwards if it were part of Malaysia, rather than an independent country?”

Does that even need to be asked?  Malaysia’s Article 153 of the Federal Constitution guarantees the “special position” of the Malays and the rights of other communities.  What it does not do is mandate apartheid economics.  That creative interpretation belongs to the political class — to the concept of Ketuanan Melayu, which holds that Malays are the rightful lords of the land and that non-Malays are guests who should be grateful they are tolerated.

The New Economic Policy, launched in 1971, set a target: Bumiputera ownership of corporate equity should reach 30 per cent by 1990.  It is now 2026.  The target has never been met.  Bumiputera equity ownership in publicly listed companies has hovered well below 30 per cent for decades, depending on how the government chooses to measure it in any given year — and they change the methodology when the number becomes embarrassing.

Half a century of affirmative action, and the stated goal remains unachieved.  The policy did not fail to redistribute wealth.  It succeeded brilliantly — at redistributing it to a small circle of politically connected elites while leaving ordinary Bumiputera in the B40 income bracket firmly in place.

Cronyism is Not a Bug; It is the Feature.

The NEP and Bumiputera privileges are reserved for a small circle of political cronies and their associates.  Most Bumiputera have never enjoyed any real benefit from these policies.  The clearest evidence is 1Malaysia Development Berhad.  1MDB was a state investment fund created in 2009 under Dato’ Sri Haji Mohammad Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak, who was Prime Minister at the time.  US$4.5 billion was misappropriated from the fund in what the United States Department of Justice described as the largest kleptocracy case it had ever prosecuted.  The money went on private jets, luxury yachts, Picassos, and the production of The Wolf of Wall Street — a film about financial fraud, funded through financial fraud.  Najib was convicted in 2022 and jailed – allegedly.

This is what Ketuanan Melayu produces: a system in which political power and economic patronage are fused, in which every contract, licence, and concession runs through the ethnic gatekeeper.  It does not build a strong Malay commercial class.  It builds a small, dependent, rent-seeking elite that requires the system to persist because it cannot survive without it.

Penang: The Case Study

Penang is the most economically productive state in Malaysia outside the Klang Valley.  It contributes disproportionately to federal revenues and receives disproportionately little in return.  Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim tabled parliamentary figures in June 2026 showing that, averaged over 2023 to 2025, Penang contributed RM10.7 billion a year to federal revenue and received RM7.9 billion in allocations — a shortfall of RM2.8 billion annually.  Selangor contributed RM43.6 billion and received RM15 billion.  Kedah, which produces little, received RM9.5 billion on a contribution of RM3.7 billion.  This is not fiscal policy.  This is a transfer mechanism — from states that work to states that vote correctly.  Penang’s Chief Minister, Chow Kon Yeow, has been asking for equitable treatment, not preferential treatment.  The federal government’s response, thus far, has been to point out that it is very busy.

Penang was once a thriving port and commercial entrepôt.  Its regression relative to its own potential is a direct function of federal policies that starve productive, non-Bumiputera-majority states to subsidise racial patronage elsewhere.  A Singapore that was part of Malaysia would suffer the same sorry fate.

The Brain Drain is Not a Coincidence

Malaysia’s Digital Minister, Gobind Singh Deo, confirmed in April 2025 that 1.86 million Malaysians have emigrated over the past 50 years.  That is 5.6 per cent of the population — above the global average of 3.6 per cent.  A 2024 study found that three in four Malaysians living and working in Singapore are skilled or semi-skilled.  Of Malaysians resident in Singapore, 46.2 per cent are Chinese, and 11.3 per cent are Indian.  Together, non-Malays account for 58 per cent of the Malaysian diaspora here — a disproportionate share relative to their share of Malaysia’s population.  This is not a coincidence.  It is the predictable outcome of a system that told an entire class of citizens their qualifications, their effort, and their talent count for less because of their ethnicity.

They did not leave because Singapore was pretty. They left because Malaysia codified their second-class status in law, repeated it in every university admissions round, and embedded it in every government contract.  They came here and built what we see.  Malaysian-born talent and their children shaped Singapore’s financial sector, its legal profession, its medical institutions, its airlines, and its civil service.  This is not Singaporean exceptionalism.  It is Malaysian self-sabotage at scale.

Even members of the ruling coalition have admitted it.  Liow Tiong Lai, then deputy president of the Malaysian Chinese Association, acknowledged that Ketuanan Melayu caused some migration of people from the country.  That is the sanitised version. The honest version is that Malaysia ran a decades-long programme to make its most economically productive citizens feel unwelcome, and was then surprised when they left.  Singapore did not steal Malaysian talent.  Malaysia exported it.

The Economic Numbers

In 1965, Singapore’s GDP per capita was US$500 — comparable to Mexico and South Africa at the time, and not far from Malaysia’s.  In 2025, Singapore’s GDP per capita was US$94,481.  Malaysia’s was only US$13,901.  Singapore ranks 7th in the world.  Malaysia ranks 78th.  The gap is US$80,580 per person — and it was only US$27,610 in 2006.  The divergence is not stabilising.  It is accelerating.

In 1967, two years after separation, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei signed the Currency Interchangeability Agreement.  One ringgit bought one Singapore dollar at par, with no transaction charges.  Malaysia unilaterally withdrew from that agreement on 8th May 1973.  Today, one Singapore dollar buys RM3.19.  That is not an exchange rate.  It is a report card on fifty years of divergent governance.  Singapore left in 1965 with no natural resources, no hinterland, no agricultural land, and no Bumiputera equity quota.  It left with meritocracy, rule of law, and the conviction that talent matters more than ethnicity.  Malaysia kept the rubber, the palm oil, the tin, the petroleum, and the ethnic quota system.  The results speak for themselves.

The most instructive comparison is Penang.  It is Malaysia’s most economically productive state — the best the Malaysian model can produce.  Its per capita income in 2024 was RM76,033, the highest of any Malaysian state.  At current exchange rates, this is US$17,000.  Singapore’s per capita GDP is more than five times Penang’s income figure.  Penang contributes more to federal tax revenue than it receives back, funds states that produce far less, and still cannot keep pace with a city-state that started from the same point and had none of its natural advantages.

Now consider the counterfactual.  Singapore inside Malaysia would be Penang.  Its revenues would flow to Kuala Lumpur and be redistributed according to political calculations that have nothing to do with productivity.  Its non-Malay majority would face university admission caps, government contract restrictions, and a civil service structurally closed to them.  Its best talent — the Malaysian Chinese and Indian professionals who built its financial sector, its legal institutions, and its aviation industry — would have had no reason to stay, and no meritocratic ladder to climb if they did.  Singapore’s per capita GDP would not be US$94,000.  It would look like Penang’s: capable enough to be milked, not free enough to compound.  The question is not whether Singapore would be more backwards inside Malaysia.  The question is whether it would still recognisably exist as an economic entity at all, or whether sixty years of Bumiputera quota allocation, federal revenue extraction, and institutional marginalisation of its majority population would have reduced it to a mid-tier port city nursing a permanent grievance about its federal allocation — which is precisely what Penang is today.

The Religious Dimension

The Malaysian government’s use of Islam to justify ethnic privilege is offensive to anyone who has read the source material.  Islam does not sanction racial hierarchy.  Muhammad said in his final sermon, “No Arab has superiority over a non-Arab, and no non-Arab has superiority over an Arab; no white person has superiority over a black person, and no black person has superiority over a white person, except through taqwa.”  What Malaysia practises is not Islam.  It is ethnic nationalism wearing the clothing of Islam.  It is a deviant political construct that exploits religious sentiment to entrench a patronage network.  The ‘ulama who provide cover for it know that they are munifiqin – hypocrites.

The danger is that this construct is now radicalising further.  Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, known as PAS, governs four states: Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis.  It is the dominant force within the Perikatan Nasional opposition coalition, which analysts now consider best placed to form the federal government after the next general election, GE16.  As of October 2026, PAS president Abdul Hadi bin Awang’s allies are openly predicting that GE16 will end Pakatan Harapan’s time in Putrajaya.  The question is what a PAS-led federal government would mean for Malaysia’s economy.  The answer is visible in the states it already governs.

According to Malaysia’s Department of Statistics, GDP per capita in 2025 was RM18,085 in Kelantan — the state PAS has governed continuously since 1990.  Terengganu’s figure was RM32,657.  Kedah’s was RM28,537.  Perlis came in at RM25,089.  The national average was RM59,167.  Every PAS-governed state is at less than half the national average.  Kelantan, after 35 years of PAS administration, produces less than a third of the national per capita output.

The social indicators are no better.  In 2025, the four PAS-governed states held the top four positions nationally for drug abusers and addicts per 100,000 residents — Kelantan at 1,105, Terengganu at 997, Perlis at 970, and Kedah at 965.  Kelantan recorded 252 rape and incest reports in 2024, up 22.3 per cent from the year before.  The incest statistics and the projected cases not reported are quite telling.  Non-revenue water loss rates — a measure of infrastructure decay — ran at 64.5 per cent in Perlis, 54.5 per cent in Kelantan, and 50.7 per cent in Kedah.  PAS’s response to these figures is to argue that geography and historical underinvestment explain the gap.  This is the same argument Malaysia has made about Singapore for sixty years.  Singapore’s geography is worse — it has none of Malaysia’s resources.  The variable is not geography.  It is governance.

A federal government led by or dependent on PAS would apply the Kelantan model nationally: Malay-ethnocentric political Islam, structural hostility to non-Muslim investment, and the prioritisation of religious signalling over economic competence.  Foreign direct investment, which flows to legal certainty and institutional reliability, would reprice Malaysia’s risk.  The non-Malay professional class — already emigrating at above-average rates — would accelerate its departure.  The talent base that sustains what remains of Malaysia’s productive economy would leave, most of it to Singapore.  Malaysia would, in that scenario, have completed the journey from a country that once shared a currency at par with Singapore to one that cannot retain the people needed to close the gap.

The Verdict

Would Singapore be more backwards inside Malaysia?  Categorically yes.  Singapore would be Penang — productive enough to be taxed, constrained enough never to compound, and perpetually underfunded by a federal government that redistributes wealth by ethnicity rather than by output.  In 1967, one ringgit bought one Singapore dollar.  Today, one Singapore dollar buys RM3.19.  That gap is the cost of Ketuanan Melayu, denominated in currency.

Ketuanan Melayu has had over five decades to demonstrate its merits.  It has produced the four poorest states in Malaysia, a brain drain of 5.6 per cent of the population, the largest kleptocracy prosecution in US Department of Justice history, and a currency that has lost two-thirds of its value against the country it used to equal.  Now its logical terminus — a PAS-led federal government — is within electoral reach.  Singapore had the same five decades to demonstrate what meritocracy produces.  The results are in.  The trajectory is not.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code



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