Inflation is the thief in the room. It does not announce itself. It does not demand your wallet. It sits across the table and, over decades,
eats everything you saved while you were not watching. Understanding this is the foundation of every
serious retirement plan. Not the
government’s projections. Not the bank’s
savings calculator. Not the CPF
brochure. The foundation is a single,
unpleasant arithmetic fact: if your money earns less than inflation, you are
losing wealth every day, regardless of what the account balance says. 2026 has not been kind to complacency. A war in the Middle East, an AI debt cliff
that is now arriving, and a global retirement system already short by tens of
trillions. Every one of these forces is
inflationary in some way.
The Singapore Numbers
Start with Singapore, since that is where
most of my clients are. Core inflation
peaked at around 4 per cent in 2022. It
cooled to 1.6 per cent by the end of 2024 and briefly touched 1.0 per cent in
January 2026 — and it looked like it might hold. It did not.
By February 2026, core inflation had climbed back to 1.4 per cent — the
highest since December 2024. Services
inflation rose to 2.0 per cent, driven by airfares and holiday costs. Food inflation moved to 1.6 per cent. The Monetary Authority of Singapore revised
its 2026 core inflation forecast upward in its April 2026 policy statement —
from 1.0 to 2.0 per cent to 1.5 to 2.5 per cent — citing rising energy prices
and global uncertainties. Maybank,
responding to the same pressures, revised its own 2026 core inflation estimate
to 1.9 per cent. The Singapore economy
shrank 0.3 per cent in the first quarter of 2026, after growing 1.3 per cent in
the previous quarter. That is not the
end of the story. It is the beginning.
The Iran war changed the energy
calculus. Global crude oil prices
crossed US$100 per barrel in the second quarter of 2026. OCBC noted in March that crude around US$100
in Q2 would push both headline and core inflation higher from the February
readings. Second-round effects — the
pass-through from transport and utilities costs into broader goods and services
pricing — had not yet appeared in the February data. They will.
The CPF Ordinary Account pays 2.5 per cent
per annum. During peak inflation years,
that rate is below inflation. The CPF
Special, MediSave, and Retirement accounts pay 4 per cent — a floor that beats
inflation in most normal years, but not years in which energy shocks are
working their way through the price chain.
Many Singaporeans treat the OA as a de facto savings benchmark. It is not.
It is the minimum.
Now look at what the banks offer. DBS, OCBC, and UOB all post base savings
rates of 0.05 per cent per annum on standard balances — the rate that applies
if you do not meet the multiplier conditions attached to their bonus interest
products. At 2 per cent annual
inflation, money sitting in a standard savings account loses 1.95 per cent of
its purchasing power every year. After
twenty years, S$1,000 of idle cash has the purchasing power of about S$673 in
today’s money. After thirty years,
S$552. The bank earned the spread. You absorbed the loss.
The Global Picture
Singapore’s inflation trajectory, even
with the current pressures, remains contained relative to the global
experience. In the United States, the
annual CPI rate was 3.3 per cent in March 2026 — well above the Federal Reserve’s
2 per cent target. Real average weekly
earnings fell 0.9 per cent in March alone, the steepest monthly decline since
mid-2022. The University of Michigan
consumer sentiment index fell to 47.6 in April 2026, a record low, with
one-year inflation expectations rising to 4.8 per cent. These are not marginal data points. They are the readings of a population that
has stopped trusting the trajectory.
The LiveCareer Retirement Reality Check
survey, published in April 2026, surveyed 878 US workers aged 50 and
older. Ninety-one per cent reported that
inflation or tariffs had affected their retirement plans. Seventy-five per cent were delaying
retirement due to recent market volatility.
Sixty-one per cent were regularly withdrawing from retirement accounts
to cover current living expenses — not in retirement, but while still
working. Vanguard reported that 6 per
cent of defined contribution plan participants took hardship withdrawals in
2025, up from 4.8 per cent in 2024 and about 2 per cent before the pandemic. A major 2026 financial planning survey of
more than 4,000 US adults found that Americans now believe they need US$1.46
million to retire comfortably — up US$200,000 from the previous year’s
figure. Federal financial data puts the
typical retirement account balance for households aged 65 to 74 at around
US$200,000. The gap is US$1.26
million. That is not an aspirational
shortfall. It is a structural one —
compounded by decades of undersaving and the quiet erosion of inflation on
assets that do not keep pace.
The World Economic Forum has projected the
global retirement savings gap will reach US$400 trillion by 2050. That figure is so large it has stopped
producing a useful emotional response in most people. So, to reduce it to something more concrete:
90 per cent of retirees globally fear inflation more than they fear market
volatility, healthcare costs, or outliving their savings. That is what the data says. The fear is rational.
The Geopolitical Dimension
The Iran conflict is not just a
humanitarian catastrophe and a foreign policy problem. It is an inflationary event of the first
order. About 20 per cent of global oil
supply transits the Strait of Hormuz.
Any sustained disruption to that corridor drives energy costs upward
across every economy that imports oil — which is most of them. The National Institute of Economic and Social
Research modelled multiple scenarios for the UK. Under a one-quarter closure of the Strait of
Hormuz, US headline inflation rises by 0.6 percentage points by the end of 2026. Under a three-quarter closure, the figure
rises to 1.1 percentage points. If the
conflict widens and the supply shortfall reaches 20 per cent of global output,
headline inflation climbs by up to 1.8 percentage points. WTI crude, in the most severe scenario,
climbs toward US$167 per barrel.
For Singapore — an open economy with no
domestic oil production, fully dependent on imported energy, and deeply
integrated into global trade flows — this is not a distant risk. Petrol prices, diesel costs, taxi fares,
airfares, and fixed-price electricity plan renewals have already risen
materially. The question is not whether
energy inflation feeds through to the broader basket. It is how much and how fast.
Then there is the AI debt cliff. The short version: the largest technology
companies in the world are collectively burning through capital at a rate that
has no precedent outside of wartime infrastructure programmes, with no clear
path to profitability before the end of the decade. When those capital markets correct — and they
will — the downstream effect on investment portfolios, pension funds, and
institutional investors will not be trivial.
Concentration risk in AI-exposed equities is real. Most retail investors do not know how much of
their supposedly diversified fund is sitting in a handful of technology names
whose valuations rest on a narrative rather than earnings.
Inflation is not only a monetary
phenomenon. It is also a geopolitical
one. The retirement plan built in 2024
for a benign, low-inflation environment looks different in November 2026 than
it did when it was constructed.
The Framework That Works
The starting point is not a number. It is
a projection. When I begin a retirement
plan, I project an annual inflation rate of 2 per cent across the entire
investment horizon. This is a planning
anchor for a stable, well-managed economy in normal conditions. In the current environment — with energy
shocks, geopolitical disruption, and a technology sector debt reckoning in
progress — that anchor needs stress-testing.
Then I allocate assets to funds with an overall projected growth rate of
between 4.5 and 5.5 per cent per annum over that period. That spread — between 2.5 and 3.5 percentage
points above projected inflation — is the real return. It is what grows wealth after inflation’s
annual cut.
For conservative clients, the allocation
typically runs at around 40 per cent in debt instruments and 60 per cent in
equities. The debt component provides
stability and income. The equity
component provides the growth necessary to stay ahead of inflation. The blended outcome, over a 20 to 30-year
horizon, generates real purchasing power — which is the only measure of
retirement planning that matters. The
60/40 portfolio — 60 per cent equities, 40 per cent bonds — was built on a
single assumption: that bonds rise when equities fall, cushioning the portfolio
in downturns. That assumption held for
most of the period between 1990 and 2020. It broke in 2022. The stock-bond correlation hit positive 0.50
that year — the highest in the modern sample. Equities and bonds fell simultaneously. A standard US 60/40 portfolio lost 17.5 per
cent — its worst year since 1937. The
Bloomberg US Aggregate bond index lost 13 per cent. The cushion was not there because it had never
been about bonds as a category. It was
about what bonds do in a falling-rate environment. In a rising-rate, inflationary environment,
they do the opposite.
In March 2026, as the S&P 500 fell on
Iran conflict fears, 10-year US Treasury yields rose to 4.28 per cent. Bonds offered no refuge again. BlackRock flagged this: persistent inflation,
elevated US debt, and the Strait of Hormuz disruption have broken the inverse
relationship that the 60/40 relied upon.
The institutional managers have already adjusted. BlackRock now runs 50
per cent equities, 30 per cent bonds, and 20 per cent private markets. KKR runs 40/30/30 — equities, bonds, and
alternatives split across private credit, real estate, and infrastructure. J.P. Morgan’s 2026 Long-Term Capital Market
Assumptions found that adding 30 per cent diversified alternatives to a 60/40
raises projected annualised returns to 6.9 per cent and improves the
risk-adjusted return by 25 per cent.
The issue is not the ratio. The issue is what is inside the bond sleeve. Long-dated government bonds at 4 to 5 per cent
nominal yields carry duration risk — when rates rise further, they fall in
price. Inflation-linked bonds adjust. Short-duration instruments preserve capital. Private credit generates floating-rate income
that moves with rates rather than against them. A conservative 40 per cent allocation to
undifferentiated fixed income is the version of this framework that gets
punished in a stagflationary environment. A 40 per cent allocation to short-duration,
inflation-sensitive, and private credit instruments is a different animal.
The mandate matters as much as the ratio. A static allocation held through all market
conditions is a relic of a low-inflation, falling-rate world that no longer
exists. A portfolio with the mandate to
rotate — reducing duration exposure when inflation rises, shifting toward real
assets when the energy environment is volatile, moving out of growth equities
when the AI debt reckoning arrives — is what the 60/40 should always have been.
The long-run data supports this
approach. UBS’s Global Investment
Returns Yearbook 2025, covering 1900 to 2024, shows annualised real equity
returns of 5.2 per cent globally, against 1.7 per cent for bonds and 0.5 per
cent for cash. Equities outperform
inflation over the long run. Cash does
not. Bonds barely do, in historical
terms.
A portfolio generating 5 per cent nominal
returns against 2 per cent inflation grows real wealth by 3 per cent per annum,
compounded. At 3 per cent real growth,
money doubles in purchasing power every 24 years. That is retirement planning. A savings account generating 0.05 per cent
against 2 per cent inflation shrinks real wealth by 1.95 per cent per year. That is retirement destruction on a 30-year
delay.
What “Move Funds Elsewhere” Means
If inflation runs materially above 2 per
cent for a sustained period, the underlying conditions have changed. The 2026 scenario — energy shock feeding into
services and food, with geopolitical uncertainty suppressing the usual
corrective mechanisms — is exactly the kind of environment that demands a
portfolio review, not portfolio paralysis.
In a structurally inflationary environment, the response is not to hold
more cash. Cash loses purchasing power
fastest. The correct response is to
rotate toward assets with pricing power: physical property, infrastructure,
commodities, and equity in companies that can pass cost increases to
customers. Fixed-rate bonds lose real
value as inflation rises.
Inflation-linked bonds adjust.
Equities in sectors with low input sensitivity — financial services,
healthcare, software — outperform relative to sectors with high raw material
exposure.
The error most retail investors make
during inflationary periods is the reverse of the correct response. Inflation arrives, markets become volatile,
media coverage turns pessimistic, and investors move to cash to feel safe. Cash is not safe in an inflationary
environment. Moving to cash during
inflation is the financial equivalent of treating a wound with a tourniquet
applied to the wrong limb.
The 2026 environment adds two dimensions
the standard inflation playbook does not cover.
First: AI-exposed equities. A substantial proportion of global equity
indices and many actively managed growth funds carry heavy exposure to
technology companies whose valuations are built on future earnings that require
a capital market environment willing to keep funding losses at scale. That environment is under stress. The retail investor who believes their
diversified global equity fund is insulated from this has not looked at the
composition carefully enough.
Second: energy transition assets. The Iran conflict has accelerated the
conversation about energy security.
Economies that have invested in domestic renewable capacity are demonstrating
lower inflation pass-through from oil shocks than those that have not. This is not an environmental argument. It is an economic one. Assets with structural demand from the energy
transition — infrastructure, storage, grid investment — carry a different risk
profile in a volatile energy environment than they did three years ago.
The CPF Question
A substantial portion of Singaporean
retirement savings sits in the CPF. This
is not entirely voluntary, and it is not without benefit. The Special, MediSave, and Retirement account
rate of 4 per cent is a government guarantee that beats most risk-free
alternatives. The Ordinary Account rate
of 2.5 per cent beats bank deposits by a factor of fifty. The limitation is clear. CPF is not designed to make you wealthy. It is designed to prevent you from becoming a
burden on the state. The CPF Life
payouts in retirement are calibrated to provide a base income, not a
lifestyle. The difference between a base
income and a comfortable retirement is funded by everything outside the CPF.
The Singapore Savings Bond currently
offers an average return of 2.25 per cent per annum if held for ten years —
above current inflation in the base case, below the target return in a properly
constructed retirement portfolio. The
6-month Treasury bill yielded 1.56 per cent at the August 2026 auction. These are not retirement vehicles. They are capital preservation tools,
appropriate for liquidity reserves, not for the growth portion of a retirement
plan.
The practical architecture is this: CPF
provides the floor. A properly
constructed investment portfolio — diversified across equities, fixed income,
and selected alternatives — provides the growth. Insurance policies with participating
structures provide both a capital floor and a death benefit, decoupled from
market timing. The three operate
together. None is a substitute for the
others.
The Longer Game
The fundamental error in retirement
thinking is treating it as an accumulation problem rather than a real return
problem. Saving more is good. Saving more in assets that do not outpace
inflation is not saving. It is moving
money from your left pocket to your right pocket and congratulating yourself on
your financial discipline. The question
is never “how much have I saved?” The
question is "what is my real return over my investment horizon, and does
it leave me with purchasing power that meets my retirement income needs?"
The retirees most at risk are not those
who saved too little — although many of them are very much at risk. The retirees most at risk are those who saved
dutifully, in the wrong vehicles, for 30 years, and arrived at retirement age
with an account balance that looks adequate and a purchasing power that is not. The LiveCareer survey found that 61 per cent
of workers over 50 are already drawing on their retirement accounts to fund
current expenses. They are eating the
seed corn. When those accounts are
depleted, there is nothing left to compound.
Inflation in Singapore is currently 1.5 to
2.5 per cent, according to the MAS forecast.
It is not subdued. It is at the
top of the forecast range, being pushed higher by an energy shock that has not
yet fully passed through to the broader price basket. Every economy has cycles. The 2022 peak was not an anomaly. The current 2026 pressures are not an
anomaly. They are the structural
condition of an economy that is open, dependent on imported energy, and
embedded in a geopolitical environment that is becoming more volatile, not
less. A 2 per cent long-run inflation
assumption, a 4.5 to 5.5 per cent target return, and a disciplined allocation
to growth assets across a 20 to 30-year horizon is not a sophisticated
strategy. It is basic arithmetic dressed
in a suit. The question is not whether
you can afford to invest properly. The
question is whether you can afford not to.
Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code

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