17 April, 2020

Quora Answer: What Do Singaporeans Who Have Been Overseas Think of Singapore’s Political System?

The following is my answer to a Quora question: “What do Singaporeans, who have lived and studied overseas, think about the Singapore political system?”

Having lived and worked abroad, I have observed how other countries govern themselves.  In my opinion, most democracies are a theatrical performance of governance rather than the real thing.  I do not believe every person should have the right to vote.  The Ancient Athenians understood that citizenship is a privilege, not a birthright.  It carries responsibilities and requires a minimum level of engagement, understanding, and investment in the common good.  The idea that a person who cannot name their own Member of Parliament, has never read a budget statement, and votes based on a candidate’s appearance should carry the same electoral weight as a tax-paying professional who has studied the policy positions is, to me, philosophically indefensible.

The Idiocracy Problem

The Ancient Greek political philosophers called a government run by the least qualified a kakistocracy — rule by the worst.  The satirical film that popularised the term “idiocracy” depicted an America so thoroughly dumbed down by generations of bad choices that the most intelligent man in the country was also its least successful citizen.  The film was released in 2006 as a comedy.  It aged into a documentary.

In November 2016, the United States of America elected Donald John Trump to the presidency.  He was a real estate developer with multiple business bankruptcies, a documented history of fraud litigation and sexual assault, no prior political or military experience, and a campaign built on slogans rather than policy.  The press dismissed him.  The Republican establishment dismissed him.  Analysts dismissed him.  Sixty-two million people did not.  In November 2024, they elected him again.  This time they knew what they were getting.

A RealClear Opinion Research poll in January 2026 found that 66 per cent of registered American voters believe Congress does not represent them.  The RealClearPolitics average puts Congressional approval at 22.3 per cent.  Fifty-three per cent of Americans describe their own democracy as weak.  Trump’s approval rating is below 40 per cent; his disapproval is almost 60 per cent.  These are not the numbers of a functioning political system.  They are the numbers of a population that has lost confidence in the apparatus it operates, but cannot agree on what to replace it with, and so periodically vents its frustration by handing power to whoever shouts loudest about the frustration itself.

This is the predictable outcome of a system that makes no distinction between informed and uninformed participation.  Rage votes count the same as reasoned votes.  The demagogue who manufactures the rage knows this.  His voters, by and large, do not.

The Dark Arts of Democratic Manipulation

Rhetoric is a dual-use technology.  Every device that a skilled speaker uses to move an audience toward truth can be deployed with equal facility to move that audience toward a lie.  The difference is not the technique.  The difference is the ethics of the person wielding it.  Demagogues do not need to study rhetoric.  They use it intuitively, because the underlying mechanics are not complicated.  Identify what the audience fears.  Name an enemy responsible for that fear.  Promise to destroy the enemy.  Deliver the promise in language that activates emotion and bypasses critical evaluation.  Repeat until the audience has been conditioned to distrust any source that contradicts the narrative.

Trump did not invent this.  Every successful demagogue in recorded history — from Alcibiades of Athens to Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini of Italy to Rodrigo Roa Duterte of the Philippines — has run the same programme.  What Trump demonstrated, in the world’s most loudly proclaimed democracy, was that the programme works just as well in 2016 as it did in 1930.  Arguably better, because social media has removed the friction from mass emotional manipulation.  A demagogue in 1933 needed control of newspapers and radio stations.  A demagogue in 2016 needed only Twitter and a willingness to say the things that institutional politics had been too polite to say.

Moral and political judgements are driven overwhelmingly by intuition rather than deliberation.  Reason functions primarily as a post-hoc rationalisation of conclusions the emotional brain reached first.  A demagogue who activates fear or disgust bypasses rational evaluation not because voters are stupid, but because the human brain is not designed to subject emotionally charged information to the same critical scrutiny it applies to neutral information.  The design flaw is universal.  Democratic systems that provide no structural protection against it invite exploitation.

Brexit: Fifty-Two Per Cent of a Country Voted to Impoverish Itself

On 23rd June 2016, 51.89 per cent of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union.  The margin was 1.3 million votes.  The campaign was decided not by economic analysis, but by a red bus carrying a lie.  The Vote Leave campaign’s claim — that the UK sent £350 million per week to the EU, and that this money should instead go to the National Health Service — was not a simplification.  It was a fabrication.  The UK’s net contribution, after rebate, was £160 million per week.  The figure on the bus ignored the rebate entirely.  The UK Statistics Authority wrote to the campaign to say the figure was misleading.  The campaign continued to use it.  Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson knew this.  He put his name on the bus anyway.

The economic consequences were predictable to anyone who read the analysis produced before the vote.  The Office for Budget Responsibility has since confirmed that Brexit reduced UK trade intensity by 15 per cent relative to the counterfactual, costing the economy four per cent of GDP.  The NHS did not receive £350 million per week.  It received a health service stretched beyond capacity by a combination of austerity, demographic pressure, and the loss of European medical staff who exercised their right to leave.  The NHS waiting list in England now covers 6.5 million patients, according to British Medical Association estimates.  Knee surgery patients wait 12 to 18 months from GP referral to operation.  This is the NHS that was going to receive the £350 million per week.

The voters who chose Leave were not uniformly stupid.  Some had legitimate grievances about sovereignty, about the democratic deficit in EU institutions, about immigration pressures in communities that had received no support managing the transition.  Those grievances were real.  The solution offered — leave the single market, crash the pound, and trust that a government that had spent six years cutting public services would use the dividend to rebuild them — was not.  The dark arts were deployed, the emotional manipulation worked, and the next generation of British voters will spend their working lives paying for a decision made by people who will mostly not live to see the full cost.

Malaysia: Race-Based Politics as a Permanent Electoral Strategy

If the United States and the United Kingdom demonstrate how democracies can be captured by demagogues in a single electoral cycle, Malaysia demonstrates something more structurally troubling: a democracy in which tribal politics has been institutionalised for so long that the electorate has been conditioned to demand it.  Parti Islam Se-Malaysia — PAS — governs Kelantan and Terengganu.  In the November 2022 general election, PAS won forty-nine parliamentary seats, the single largest seat count of any party.  The Perikatan Nasional coalition it anchors won seventy-four seats.  That coalition then sat in opposition not because it lacked seats, but because the other coalition — Pakatan Harapan under Prime Minister Anwar bin Ibrahim — assembled enough post-election support to form a government.

PAS campaigns on Islamic governance and Malay ethnonationalism.  Its policy positions include the expansion of hudud criminal punishment, restrictions on non-Muslim cultural and religious expression, and the continued entrenchment of the Bumiputera preference system — a set of policies that reserves quotas in university admissions, government contracts, and business ownership for the Malay majority at the expense of Chinese and Indian Malaysians, who constitute a third of the population.  The Bumiputera system has been in operation since 1971.  Its stated rationale was to correct the economic imbalance between the Malay majority and the economically dominant Chinese minority in the immediate post-independence period.  Fifty-five years later, it remains in place, not because the imbalance has not shifted, but because removing it would cost votes.

The preference system creates a protected class of politically connected Malay businesses that compete not on merit but on access, suppresses productivity among the majority population by removing competitive pressure, and drives away Chinese and Indian Malaysian talent — the segment of the population most likely to generate the innovation and enterprise a middle-income economy needs to break through to the next level.  Malaysia has been stuck in the middle-income trap for twenty years.  The middle-income trap is the structural phenomenon in which a developing economy achieves a comfortable standard of living through cheap manufacturing and commodity export, then cannot generate the innovation-driven growth needed to cross to high-income status, because its institutions do not reward merit, its education system does not produce the right skills, and its business environment does not attract the foreign direct investment needed to bridge the gap.

None of this changes PAS’s electoral calculus.  Its voters are not voting for a better economy.  They are voting for religious identity, ethnic solidarity, and the reassurance that the political system will continue to protect them from having to compete on equal terms with their fellow citizens.  The demagogue’s toolkit, deployed along ethnic and religious lines rather than economic ones, produces the same result: people voting for their immediate cultural interest at the direct expense of the next generation’s economic future.

People Vote Badly

The theory of cognitive dissonance, first articulated in 1957, explains the mechanism by which people who have committed — to a party, a leader, an identity — selectively process information to protect that commitment.  Contradictory evidence is not evaluated on its merits.  They reject it as biased, hostile, or the product of an elite that does not understand real people.  The more invested a voter is in a political identity, the more resistant they are to information that would require revising it.  This is not stupidity in the ordinary sense.  It is a predictable output of how human beings process social information.  Tribal affiliation has survival value.  Lone dissent within a tribe does not.  The brain optimises for social belonging over epistemic accuracy, and in electoral democracies where political operators deliberately cultivate identity politics, that optimisation produces catastrophically bad collective decisions.

The demagogue does not argue.  He does not need to.  He identifies the audience’s fear — of the immigrant, of the elite, of the infidel, of the competitor — names the enemy, and runs the emotional programme.  He knows that the audience will rationalise their emotional response as a reasoned conclusion.  He knows that evidence contradicting the narrative will be processed as further evidence of conspiracy.  He knows that the louder the contradiction, the more credible the persecution narrative becomes.  He has read no academic papers.  He understands this intuitively.  Every successful demagogue in history has understood it intuitively.  The sophistication is in the execution, not in the insight.

The Singapore Contrast

Freedom House classified Singapore as “Partly Free” in 2026, with an overall score of 48 out of 100.  Political rights score nineteen out of forty.  Civil liberties score twenty-nine out of sixty.  Free media, assembly, civil society, trade unions, and judicial independence each score one out of four.  The Western commentariat cites these figures as condemnation.  I regard them as a description of a trade-off that Singapore made consciously and has, on the available evidence, executed well.

Singapore ranked third on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index in 2026 — the least corrupt country in Asia.  It ranked 13th on the 2025 United Nations Human Development Index, with a score of 0.946, a life expectancy of 83.7 years, and a GNI per capita of US$111,239 in purchasing power parity terms.  Its GDP per capita in nominal terms is US$98,000 — comparable to Switzerland and Luxembourg, and seven times that of Malaysia.

The People’s Action Party won 87 of 97 parliamentary seats in the May 2025 general election, with 65.57 per cent of the national vote — its best result since 2011, and up from 61.24 per cent in 2020.  The Workers’ Party held its ten elected seats.  Twenty-four candidates from smaller opposition parties failed to reach 12.5 per cent of the vote and forfeited their election deposits.  The combined forfeitures exceeded S$320,000.

Critics of Singapore’s political system note that the PAP has governed since 1959 and that structural features of the electoral system — Group Representation Constituencies, the Non-Constituency Member of Parliament scheme, and defamation litigation that has historically discouraged opposition candidacy — are not neutral.  This is true.  It is also true that the PAP regularly wins elections with majorities that most Western governments would consider an implausible mandate.  The two facts coexist.  The system is not a model of liberal democracy.  It is also not a system that has failed its people by any standard that matters in daily life.

The Architecture of Managed Consent

Every functioning state rests on managed consent.  The PAP does not pretend it governs through the spontaneous will of an enlightened citizenry.  It governs through technocratic competence, long-term planning, meritocratic recruitment into the civil service, and a social compact built on the delivery of housing, education, healthcare, and economic growth.  The Housing Development Board has housed 80 per cent of the resident population.  The Medisave, Medishield Life, and Medifund framework has avoided both the American insurance catastrophe and the British waiting-list crisis.

The model’s weakness is its dependence on continued competence at the top.  A system built on elite governance works when the elite deserves the designation.  It becomes fragile the moment the meritocracy is compromised by entrenchment.  The nepotism question — whether a city-state of six million people produces its best leaders through open competition, or whether proximity to the founding family structure remains an informal advantage — is a legitimate one.

The model’s strength is what its critics find objectionable: the willingness to prioritise long-term stability over short-term popularity.  The population does not vote on whether to build MRT lines that will not open for twenty years.  It does not vote on fiscal discipline, on casino licences, on speech restrictions.  These decisions are made by people with access to information the public does not have, on timescales the electoral cycle does not reward.  Whether you call this enlightened governance or benign authoritarianism depends on whether you are the beneficiary or the critic.  The Singaporean who owns a flat, whose children attend a functioning school, who can walk to an MRT station, and who has not waited eighteen months for a knee operation is likely to have a different view from the academic in London writing a paper on civil liberties scores.

The Freedom Paradox

The Western model conflates freedom of expression with freedom itself.  They are not the same thing.  A country in which citizens may say whatever they wish, but cannot afford housing, cannot access healthcare without financial ruin, and cannot trust their institutions, is not a free country.  It is a country where speech is free, and life is not.  Singapore restricts speech that the government judges seditious, racially inflammatory, or destabilising to religious harmony.  This is the reason that Singapore — a country of six million people drawn from Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Eurasian communities with different languages, religions, and historical grievances — has not experienced significant communal violence since 1969.  That record did not happen by accident.

The United States has unrestricted political speech and a First Amendment that its Supreme Court has interpreted with expansive generosity.  It also has a media and political ecosystem so optimised for outrage that 87 per cent of its voters report concern about political division.  Draw your own conclusions about which model produces more functional freedom in practice.

The Assessment

I am not arguing that Singapore’s political system is beyond criticism.  The use of defamation suits against political opponents has historically served a purpose beyond protecting reputations.  The opacity around sovereign wealth fund management remains incomplete.  The structural advantages built into the electoral system advantage the incumbent in ways not obviously justified by governance quality alone.  These are real problems.  I have written about some of these issues, and been critical of policy decisions.  But the relevant comparison is not between Singapore’s political system and an idealised democracy that has never existed.  The relevant comparison is between Singapore’s outcomes and those of countries that have chosen different models.  On life expectancy, corruption, housing access, educational attainment, income per head, and long-term institutional stability, Singapore’s record is not one that its critics can dismiss.

The countries most loudly criticising Singapore’s governance model are, in several cases, currently failing to govern themselves.  A country that elected the same incompetent leader twice has no standing to lecture anyone about political legitimacy.  A country that voted to impoverish its own economy on the basis of a number on a bus has not demonstrated the superiority of unconstrained popular sovereignty.  A country in which race-based patronage politics has survived for fifty years because politicians have learned that ethnic tribalism is a more reliable vote-bank than competence has not vindicated the proposition that more democracy produces better governance.

Singapore’s system works because it was built by people who understood that a small, resource-poor, ethnically diverse island surrounded by larger and sometimes hostile neighbours could not afford political theatre.  It works because the governing compact — deliver results, maintain stability, manage succession, avoid corruption — has held for sixty years.  It will continue to work only as long as that compact holds.  The moment the meritocracy becomes a gerontocracy, the moment the technocrats become courtiers, the moment results are subordinated to continuity — the legitimacy that sustains the system dissolves.

That is not a criticism unique to Singapore.  It is the central challenge of governance everywhere.  Singapore has been more open about the terms of the deal than most.  The demagogue depends on voters who prioritise emotion over evidence, identity over interest, and the present over the future.  Singapore has structured itself to limit his influence.  The United States, the United Kingdom, and Malaysia have not.  The respective outcomes speak for themselves.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code



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