The following is
my answer to a Quora question: “What do Singaporeans, who
have lived and studied overseas, think about the Singapore political system?”
Having lived and worked abroad, I have
observed how other countries govern themselves.
In my opinion, most democracies are a theatrical performance of
governance rather than the real thing. I
do not believe every person should have the right to vote. The Ancient Athenians understood that
citizenship is a privilege, not a birthright.
It carries responsibilities and requires a minimum level of engagement,
understanding, and investment in the common good. The idea that a person who cannot name their
own Member of Parliament, has never read a budget statement, and votes based on
a candidate’s appearance should carry the same electoral weight as a tax-paying
professional who has studied the policy positions is, to me, philosophically
indefensible.
The Idiocracy Problem
The Ancient Greek political philosophers
called a government run by the least qualified a kakistocracy — rule by the
worst. The satirical film that
popularised the term “idiocracy” depicted an America so thoroughly dumbed down
by generations of bad choices that the most intelligent man in the country was
also its least successful citizen. The
film was released in 2006 as a comedy.
It aged into a documentary.
In November 2016, the United States of
America elected Donald John Trump to the presidency. He was a real estate developer with multiple
business bankruptcies, a documented history of fraud litigation and sexual
assault, no prior political or military experience, and a campaign built on
slogans rather than policy. The press
dismissed him. The Republican
establishment dismissed him. Analysts
dismissed him. Sixty-two million people
did not. In November 2024, they elected
him again. This time they knew what they
were getting.
A RealClear Opinion Research poll in
January 2026 found that 66 per cent of registered American voters believe
Congress does not represent them. The
RealClearPolitics average puts Congressional approval at 22.3 per cent. Fifty-three per cent of Americans describe
their own democracy as weak. Trump’s
approval rating is below 40 per cent; his disapproval is almost 60 per cent. These are not the numbers of a functioning
political system. They are the numbers
of a population that has lost confidence in the apparatus it operates, but
cannot agree on what to replace it with, and so periodically vents its
frustration by handing power to whoever shouts loudest about the frustration
itself.
This is the predictable outcome of a
system that makes no distinction between informed and uninformed
participation. Rage votes count the same
as reasoned votes. The demagogue who
manufactures the rage knows this. His
voters, by and large, do not.
The Dark Arts of Democratic
Manipulation
Rhetoric is a dual-use technology. Every device that a skilled speaker uses to
move an audience toward truth can be deployed with equal facility to move that
audience toward a lie. The difference is
not the technique. The difference is the
ethics of the person wielding it. Demagogues
do not need to study rhetoric. They use
it intuitively, because the underlying mechanics are not complicated. Identify what the audience fears. Name an enemy responsible for that fear. Promise to destroy the enemy. Deliver the promise in language that
activates emotion and bypasses critical evaluation. Repeat until the audience has been
conditioned to distrust any source that contradicts the narrative.
Trump did not invent this. Every successful demagogue in recorded
history — from Alcibiades of Athens to Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini of
Italy to Rodrigo Roa Duterte of the Philippines — has run the same
programme. What Trump demonstrated, in
the world’s most loudly proclaimed democracy, was that the programme works just
as well in 2016 as it did in 1930.
Arguably better, because social media has removed the friction from mass
emotional manipulation. A demagogue in
1933 needed control of newspapers and radio stations. A demagogue in 2016 needed only Twitter and a
willingness to say the things that institutional politics had been too polite
to say.
Moral and political judgements are driven
overwhelmingly by intuition rather than deliberation. Reason functions primarily as a post-hoc
rationalisation of conclusions the emotional brain reached first. A demagogue who activates fear or disgust
bypasses rational evaluation not because voters are stupid, but because the
human brain is not designed to subject emotionally charged information to the
same critical scrutiny it applies to neutral information. The design flaw is universal. Democratic systems that provide no structural
protection against it invite exploitation.
Brexit: Fifty-Two Per Cent of a
Country Voted to Impoverish Itself
On 23rd June 2016, 51.89 per
cent of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. The margin was 1.3 million votes. The campaign was decided not by economic
analysis, but by a red bus carrying a lie.
The Vote Leave campaign’s claim — that the UK sent £350 million per week
to the EU, and that this money should instead go to the National Health Service
— was not a simplification. It was a
fabrication. The UK’s net contribution,
after rebate, was £160 million per week.
The figure on the bus ignored the rebate entirely. The UK Statistics Authority wrote to the
campaign to say the figure was misleading.
The campaign continued to use it.
Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson knew this. He put his name on the bus anyway.
The economic consequences were predictable
to anyone who read the analysis produced before the vote. The Office for Budget Responsibility has
since confirmed that Brexit reduced UK trade intensity by 15 per cent relative
to the counterfactual, costing the economy four per cent of GDP. The NHS did not receive £350 million per
week. It received a health service
stretched beyond capacity by a combination of austerity, demographic pressure,
and the loss of European medical staff who exercised their right to leave. The NHS waiting list in England now covers 6.5
million patients, according to British Medical Association estimates. Knee surgery patients wait 12 to 18 months
from GP referral to operation. This is
the NHS that was going to receive the £350 million per week.
The voters who chose Leave were not
uniformly stupid. Some had legitimate
grievances about sovereignty, about the democratic deficit in EU institutions,
about immigration pressures in communities that had received no support
managing the transition. Those
grievances were real. The solution
offered — leave the single market, crash the pound, and trust that a government
that had spent six years cutting public services would use the dividend to
rebuild them — was not. The dark arts
were deployed, the emotional manipulation worked, and the next generation of
British voters will spend their working lives paying for a decision made by
people who will mostly not live to see the full cost.
Malaysia: Race-Based Politics as a
Permanent Electoral Strategy
If the United States and the United
Kingdom demonstrate how democracies can be captured by demagogues in a single
electoral cycle, Malaysia demonstrates something more structurally troubling: a
democracy in which tribal politics has been institutionalised for so long that
the electorate has been conditioned to demand it. Parti Islam Se-Malaysia — PAS — governs
Kelantan and Terengganu. In the November
2022 general election, PAS won forty-nine parliamentary seats, the single
largest seat count of any party. The
Perikatan Nasional coalition it anchors won seventy-four seats. That coalition then sat in opposition not
because it lacked seats, but because the other coalition — Pakatan Harapan
under Prime Minister Anwar bin Ibrahim — assembled enough post-election support
to form a government.
PAS campaigns on Islamic governance and
Malay ethnonationalism. Its policy
positions include the expansion of hudud criminal punishment,
restrictions on non-Muslim cultural and religious expression, and the continued
entrenchment of the Bumiputera preference system — a set of policies
that reserves quotas in university admissions, government contracts, and
business ownership for the Malay majority at the expense of Chinese and Indian
Malaysians, who constitute a third of the population. The Bumiputera system has been in
operation since 1971. Its stated
rationale was to correct the economic imbalance between the Malay majority and
the economically dominant Chinese minority in the immediate post-independence
period. Fifty-five years later, it
remains in place, not because the imbalance has not shifted, but because
removing it would cost votes.
The preference system creates a protected
class of politically connected Malay businesses that compete not on merit but
on access, suppresses productivity among the majority population by removing
competitive pressure, and drives away Chinese and Indian Malaysian talent — the
segment of the population most likely to generate the innovation and enterprise
a middle-income economy needs to break through to the next level. Malaysia has been stuck in the middle-income
trap for twenty years. The middle-income
trap is the structural phenomenon in which a developing economy achieves a
comfortable standard of living through cheap manufacturing and commodity
export, then cannot generate the innovation-driven growth needed to cross to
high-income status, because its institutions do not reward merit, its education
system does not produce the right skills, and its business environment does not
attract the foreign direct investment needed to bridge the gap.
None of this changes PAS’s electoral
calculus. Its voters are not voting for
a better economy. They are voting for
religious identity, ethnic solidarity, and the reassurance that the political
system will continue to protect them from having to compete on equal terms with
their fellow citizens. The demagogue’s
toolkit, deployed along ethnic and religious lines rather than economic ones,
produces the same result: people voting for their immediate cultural interest
at the direct expense of the next generation’s economic future.
People Vote Badly
The theory of cognitive dissonance, first
articulated in 1957, explains the mechanism by which people who have committed
— to a party, a leader, an identity — selectively process information to
protect that commitment. Contradictory
evidence is not evaluated on its merits.
They reject it as biased, hostile, or the product of an elite that does not
understand real people. The more
invested a voter is in a political identity, the more resistant they are to
information that would require revising it.
This is not stupidity in the ordinary sense. It is a predictable output of how human
beings process social information.
Tribal affiliation has survival value.
Lone dissent within a tribe does not.
The brain optimises for social belonging over epistemic accuracy, and in
electoral democracies where political operators deliberately cultivate identity
politics, that optimisation produces catastrophically bad collective decisions.
The demagogue does not argue. He does not need to. He identifies the audience’s fear — of the
immigrant, of the elite, of the infidel, of the competitor — names the enemy,
and runs the emotional programme. He
knows that the audience will rationalise their emotional response as a reasoned
conclusion. He knows that evidence
contradicting the narrative will be processed as further evidence of conspiracy. He knows that the louder the contradiction,
the more credible the persecution narrative becomes. He has read no academic papers. He understands this intuitively. Every successful demagogue in history has
understood it intuitively. The
sophistication is in the execution, not in the insight.
The Singapore Contrast
Freedom House classified Singapore as “Partly
Free” in 2026, with an overall score of 48 out of 100. Political rights score nineteen out of forty. Civil liberties score twenty-nine out of sixty. Free media, assembly, civil society, trade
unions, and judicial independence each score one out of four. The Western commentariat cites these figures
as condemnation. I regard them as a
description of a trade-off that Singapore made consciously and has, on the
available evidence, executed well.
Singapore ranked third on the Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Index in 2026 — the least corrupt country
in Asia. It ranked 13th on
the 2025 United Nations Human Development Index, with a score of 0.946, a life
expectancy of 83.7 years, and a GNI per capita of US$111,239 in purchasing
power parity terms. Its GDP per capita
in nominal terms is US$98,000 — comparable to Switzerland and Luxembourg, and seven
times that of Malaysia.
The People’s Action Party won 87 of 97
parliamentary seats in the May 2025 general election, with 65.57 per cent of
the national vote — its best result since 2011, and up from 61.24 per cent in
2020. The Workers’ Party held its ten
elected seats. Twenty-four candidates
from smaller opposition parties failed to reach 12.5 per cent of the vote and
forfeited their election deposits. The combined
forfeitures exceeded S$320,000.
Critics of Singapore’s political system
note that the PAP has governed since 1959 and that structural features of the
electoral system — Group Representation Constituencies, the Non-Constituency
Member of Parliament scheme, and defamation litigation that has historically
discouraged opposition candidacy — are not neutral. This is true.
It is also true that the PAP regularly wins elections with majorities
that most Western governments would consider an implausible mandate. The two facts coexist. The system is not a model of liberal
democracy. It is also not a system that
has failed its people by any standard that matters in daily life.
The Architecture of Managed Consent
Every functioning state rests on managed
consent. The PAP does not pretend it
governs through the spontaneous will of an enlightened citizenry. It governs through technocratic competence,
long-term planning, meritocratic recruitment into the civil service, and a social
compact built on the delivery of housing, education, healthcare, and economic
growth. The Housing Development Board
has housed 80 per cent of the resident population. The Medisave, Medishield Life, and Medifund
framework has avoided both the American insurance catastrophe and the British
waiting-list crisis.
The model’s weakness is its dependence on
continued competence at the top. A
system built on elite governance works when the elite deserves the
designation. It becomes fragile the
moment the meritocracy is compromised by entrenchment. The nepotism question — whether a city-state
of six million people produces its best leaders through open competition, or
whether proximity to the founding family structure remains an informal
advantage — is a legitimate one.
The model’s strength is what its critics
find objectionable: the willingness to prioritise long-term stability over
short-term popularity. The population
does not vote on whether to build MRT lines that will not open for twenty
years. It does not vote on fiscal
discipline, on casino licences, on speech restrictions. These decisions are made by people with
access to information the public does not have, on timescales the electoral
cycle does not reward. Whether you call
this enlightened governance or benign authoritarianism depends on whether you
are the beneficiary or the critic. The
Singaporean who owns a flat, whose children attend a functioning school, who
can walk to an MRT station, and who has not waited eighteen months for a knee
operation is likely to have a different view from the academic in London
writing a paper on civil liberties scores.
The Freedom Paradox
The Western model conflates freedom of
expression with freedom itself. They are
not the same thing. A country in which
citizens may say whatever they wish, but cannot afford housing, cannot access
healthcare without financial ruin, and cannot trust their institutions, is not
a free country. It is a country where speech
is free, and life is not. Singapore
restricts speech that the government judges seditious, racially inflammatory,
or destabilising to religious harmony.
This is the reason that Singapore — a country of six million people
drawn from Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Eurasian communities with different
languages, religions, and historical grievances — has not experienced
significant communal violence since 1969.
That record did not happen by accident.
The United States has unrestricted
political speech and a First Amendment that its Supreme Court has interpreted
with expansive generosity. It also has a
media and political ecosystem so optimised for outrage that 87 per cent of its
voters report concern about political division.
Draw your own conclusions about which model produces more functional
freedom in practice.
The Assessment
I am not arguing that Singapore’s
political system is beyond criticism. The
use of defamation suits against political opponents has historically served a
purpose beyond protecting reputations.
The opacity around sovereign wealth fund management remains
incomplete. The structural advantages
built into the electoral system advantage the incumbent in ways not obviously
justified by governance quality alone. These
are real problems. I have written about some
of these issues, and been critical of policy decisions. But the relevant comparison is not between
Singapore’s political system and an idealised democracy that has never
existed. The relevant comparison is
between Singapore’s outcomes and those of countries that have chosen different
models. On life expectancy, corruption,
housing access, educational attainment, income per head, and long-term
institutional stability, Singapore’s record is not one that its critics can
dismiss.
The countries most loudly criticising
Singapore’s governance model are, in several cases, currently failing to govern
themselves. A country that elected the
same incompetent leader twice has no standing to lecture anyone about political
legitimacy. A country that voted to
impoverish its own economy on the basis of a number on a bus has not
demonstrated the superiority of unconstrained popular sovereignty. A country in which race-based patronage
politics has survived for fifty years because politicians have learned that
ethnic tribalism is a more reliable vote-bank than competence has not
vindicated the proposition that more democracy produces better governance.
Singapore’s system works because it was
built by people who understood that a small, resource-poor, ethnically diverse
island surrounded by larger and sometimes hostile neighbours could not afford
political theatre. It works because the
governing compact — deliver results, maintain stability, manage succession,
avoid corruption — has held for sixty years.
It will continue to work only as long as that compact holds. The moment the meritocracy becomes a
gerontocracy, the moment the technocrats become courtiers, the moment results
are subordinated to continuity — the legitimacy that sustains the system
dissolves.
That is not a criticism unique to
Singapore. It is the central challenge
of governance everywhere. Singapore has
been more open about the terms of the deal than most. The demagogue depends on voters who
prioritise emotion over evidence, identity over interest, and the present over
the future. Singapore has structured
itself to limit his influence. The
United States, the United Kingdom, and Malaysia have not. The respective outcomes speak for themselves.
Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code

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