The following is
my answer to a Quora question: “Is it beneficial for
financial advisors to make a lateral change?”
A financial services consultant without a
loyal client base is a salaried employee with a sales target. A financial services consultant with a loyal
client base is a business owner who happens to work from someone else’s
premises. These are not the same professional. They do not have the same leverage. They do not make the same decision when they
consider moving. The first consultant is
replaceable. The second consultant is a
walking balance sheet. Firms pay
handsomely to acquire that balance sheet — and they know it depreciates every time
the consultant moves.
What the Singapore Market Looks Like
Right Now
Singapore’s wealth management industry
manages US$4.7 trillion — S$6 trillion — in assets under management, up 12 per
cent from S$5.4 trillion in 2023, according to the Monetary Authority of
Singapore’s 2024 Asset Management Survey.
Single family office numbers reached 1,650 in 2024, up from four hundred
just four years earlier. Client assets
at leading private banks grew 9.5 per cent year-on-year in the first quarter of
2024. This growth has triggered a war
for talent at the top. Bank of Singapore
is targeting a place among Asia’s top five private banks at USD145 billion AUM
and has resumed aggressive hiring. UOB
aims to double its private wealth assets by 2026. Julius Baer, DBS, and OCBC are expanding
headcount in parallel.
The paradox is that the pool of licensed
practitioners is shrinking. Life and
composite insurance agents numbered 15,205 in 2021. By 2023, that figure had fallen to 13,934 — a
drop of 1,271 representatives, or 8.4 per cent, in two years. Every firm competing for a share of an
expanding wealth pie is fishing in a contracting talent pool. That dynamic drives sign-on incentives to
levels that attract regulators.
What MAS Did about the Bidding War
In 2017, 300 agents moved from Great
Eastern to AIA Financial Advisers, a newly established distribution arm of
AIA. The departure cut Great Eastern’s
agency force by 10 per cent in one event.
MAS observed similar mass migrations at Manulife in 2015 and Aviva in
2016. The pattern repeated itself with
enough frequency that MAS acted. In
2019, following a consultation process, MAS implemented new measures on sign-on
incentives in financial advisory recruitment.
The key provisions: sign-on incentives
tied to sales targets must be paid over at least six years, with the first-year
payment capped at the representative’s average annual sales over the preceding
three years. Any subsequent increases in
sales targets must be calibrated and justified.
When a firm recruits 30 or more representatives from the same firm
within a rolling 60-day period — a “mass recruitment” trigger — enhanced
safeguards apply, including pre-transaction surveys on all investment and
accident-and-health product sales for at least two years, with no fewer than 50
per cent conducted via independent external call-backs. The firm that the representatives left behind
must track the persistency of policies they had serviced for a further two
years.
This is not a warning. It is architecture. MAS built the regulation because the sign-on
incentive structure was distorting consultant behaviour — and costing clients
outcomes in the form of improper policy switching, elevated premiums, and sales
pressure from quotas that the new firm imposed to recover the sign-on outlay. The representative who moves for a signing
bonus is working to pay it back. Every
client conversation in the first two years is conducted under that pressure.
The Types of Lateral Move and What
Each Costs
Not all lateral moves are equivalent. The term covers three distinct career
decisions that have entirely different risk profiles.
Moving to the back office
— underwriting, policy services, compliance, product development — is a career
change, not a lateral move. The
consultant abandons revenue generation for a fixed salary. They lose client relationships, lose
commission income, and lose the compounding value of a growing book. Some do this because they are exhausted by
sales targets or attracted by the stability of a fixed role. Those are legitimate reasons. Moving to underwriting is not a lateral
move. It is a step out of the front
office, and it is very rarely a step back in.
Moving to another tied agency or
financial advisory firm at the same level is the
classic lateral. A consultant at one
insurer’s tied agency joins a competitor’s distribution arm. The draw is usually a higher grid rate, a
broader product shelf, a larger client acquisition budget, or the freedom to
work without a quota structure that forces inappropriate recommendations. The risk is the client transition loss
quantified above, plus the credibility cost of the move itself.
Moving to independence
— establishing or joining an independent financial advisory practice — is
structurally different from both. The
IFA model in Singapore gives the consultant product-agnostic access to the
market and direct ownership of their client relationships. It trades institutional infrastructure and
brand recognition for economics and autonomy.
For a consultant with a loyal, high-net-worth book, the structural argument
for independence is compelling. For a
consultant whose client base is primarily institutional referrals or tied to
the firm’s platform, the move is far more dangerous than it appears.
The Credibility Problem
HNW and UHNW clients — those with
investable assets above S$1 million and S$10 million respectively — do not
behave like retail investors when their adviser changes firms. They treat stability as a proxy for competence. An adviser who has been with one firm for
fifteen years signals something to that client: either they are good enough
that the firm keeps them, or they are loyal enough to stay when better offers come. Both interpretations favour the adviser.
An adviser who has moved three times in
eight years signals something different.
The client may follow each time.
But the conversation at each transition is a renegotiation of trust. Each renegotiation has a cost — in time, in
relationship capital, and occasionally in AUM when the client uses the
transition as an opportunity to consolidate elsewhere.
Singapore intensifies this dynamic in ways
that do not exist in larger markets.
This is a city of six million people.
The HNW community — family office principals, private equity partners,
founder families, senior professionals — is a network of 10,000 people who know
each other’s names. The trustees,
lawyers, corporate secretarial firms, and accountants who feed an adviser’s
referral pipeline operate in the same network.
A consultant who leaves firm A for firm B, then leaves firm B for firm
C, will find that the pipeline has noticed.
Introductions slow. The benefit
of the doubt narrows. The unspoken
question — “why does this person keep moving?” — is asked before the first
meeting. There is no anonymity in this
city. The reputational cost of a poorly
executed move persists for years.
What Makes a Move Worth Making
A lateral move is worth making when one of
three conditions is met.
The product architecture is
materially better. A consultant who cannot serve their clients
adequately because the current firm’s product shelf is too narrow, too
expensive, or structurally misaligned with client needs has a fiduciary
argument for moving. This is not about
personal economics. It is about whether
the client is better served. If the new
firm offers instruments, platforms, or investment capabilities the current firm
does not, and those gaps are costing clients outcomes, the move is defensible
on its merits.
The economics are materially
different. A
move for a marginal improvement in grid rate is not a lateral move. It is a pay rise with execution risk that the
grid improvement rarely covers. A move
to a platform where the consultant owns their economics — their book, their
brand, their infrastructure — is a structural improvement that compounds over a
career. The difference between a 60 per
cent grid at a tied agency and 90 per cent ownership at an IFA practice, on a
S$30 million book generating S$300,000 annually, is S$90,000 a year. At a standard multiple, that is the
difference between a business worth S$1.5 million and one worth S$3.75 million.
The firm is failing. A consultant at a firm under regulatory
investigation, undergoing management upheaval, or losing institutional
credibility in the market has a different calculus entirely. Staying in a burning building out of loyalty
to the architecture is not admirable. It
is imprudent.
The Assessment
The lateral move question is ultimately a
question about what the consultant is building.
A career or a business. A career
adviser optimises for title, stability, and institutional affiliation. They stay where the brand is strongest, and
the support is most reliable. Lateral
moves carry more risk than reward for this profile. A business builder optimises for economics,
ownership, and client relationship depth.
For this profile, the move to independence — when the book is large
enough, the relationships are loyal enough, and the operational infrastructure
is in place — is not a lateral move. It
is graduation.
Singapore’s AUM grew 12 per cent in a
single year while the licensed adviser population shrank 8.4 per cent in two
years. The wealth is here. The practitioners are leaving. The consultants who remain and build loyal
client books in this environment are not commodities. They are scarce. Scarce assets command their own terms. Move once, for the right reason, to the right
platform, with the right clients behind you.
That is a career decision. Move
because the grass looks greener every three years, and you will spend your life
mowing other people’s lawns — under a MAS-mandated six-year clawback schedule.
Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code

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