The following is
my answer to a Quora question: “What do Singaporeans
think about forced multiculturalism in Singapore?”
You cannot force multiculturalism on a
city-state that was multicultural before it had a government. That is like forcing the tide to be wet. The question is not whether multiculturalism
exists here. The question is whether we
are managing it well — and whether we are candid about what we have yet to fix.
Singapore’s total resident population
stands at 4.2 million, of whom 3.66 million are citizens and 540,000 are
permanent residents. The ethnic
breakdown has been stable for decades: Chinese, 75.5 per cent; Malay, 15.1 per
cent; Indian, 7.6 per cent; Eurasians and others, 1.8 per cent. Non-residents — a category that now
represents 48.7 per cent of people physically present in Singapore — are not
classified under the ethnic system at all.
So, Singapore is simultaneously an ancient trading entrepôt where
multiple civilisations have coexisted for centuries, and a country where nearly
half the people living here on any given day do not officially register as part
of that multicultural story. The gap
between the narrative and the arithmetic is wide enough to drive a container
ship through.
The official story is that
multiculturalism is organic. Ethnic
communities arrived, settled, traded, and built institutions. The Chinese came primarily from Fujian and
Guangdong. The Indians came from Tamil
Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Sri Lanka. The
Malays were the original inhabitants of the archipelago, supplemented by later
migration from Sumatra, Java, and the Riau islands. The Eurasians are a broad grouping — the
descendants of Asians and the various European colonial powers: Portuguese,
Dutch, British, Spanish, and others. My
own community, the Kristang, are specifically the descendants of the Portuguese
who conquered and administered Malacca from 1511. They are the remnant of a colonial society,
with its own internal hierarchy: the Upper Ten, the fidalgo and royal
houses; the Lower Ten, the minor nobility and clergy; and below them, the
common people. That community settled in
Singapore following the British takeover of Malacca in 1824.
The CMIO Box
The British colonial administration needed
to count people. It imposed the
Chinese-Malay-Indian-Others framework in 1956.
Singapore inherited it at independence.
It has been the administrative spine of race policy ever since. The framework is a bureaucratic convenience
dressed up as a cultural fact.
Singaporeans are registered under more than 200 distinct ethnic
identities, all of which are collapsed into four boxes for administrative purposes. Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew, and Hakka become
“Chinese.” Javanese, Bugis, Boyanese,
and Minangkabau become “Malay.” Tamil,
Malayali, Punjabi, and Sinhalese become “Indian.” My community, the Portuguese-descended Kristang,
the Armenian merchants, the Jewish families whose ancestors built the Maghain
Aboth synagogue on Waterloo Street, the Eurasians of Dutch and British
extraction — all of us become “Others.”
The government has claimed that the CMIO
framework does not prescribe one’s racial identity, but helps them to
administer race-based policies. That is
a circular argument. The framework
exists to administer policies that exist because the framework exists. The CMIO system has served to homogenise
social groups and eliminate the diversity and heterogeneity within them. When the government closed dialect radio
stations in the 1980s to promote Mandarin as the official language of the
Chinese community, it erased a rich linguistic heritage — Hokkien, Cantonese,
Teochew — shared by the majority of ethnic Chinese Singaporeans, whose
ancestral languages were not Mandarin.
Multiculturalism was alive.
Official policy silenced it. The
four-box system made sense as a starting point in 1956. It is a poor description of Singapore in
2026.
Policies & Their Consequences
The Ethnic Integration Policy governs HDB
resale flat transactions. Each housing
block and neighbourhood must maintain ethnic proportions within defined limits,
pegged broadly to the national ethnic breakdown. A Chinese family seeking to sell in a block
that has reached its Chinese quota cannot sell to another Chinese buyer. They must sell to a Malay or Indian buyer
instead. This policy has been in place
since 1989. Its stated purpose is to
prevent racial enclaves. Its actual
function is to override the revealed preferences of the population and engineer
outcomes the state considers desirable.
Whether those outcomes are good is a separate question from whether they
are managed. They are, unambiguously,
managed. Singapore is a small, densely
populated, ethnically complex city-state surrounded by neighbours who have, at
various points in history, used ethnicity as a political lever. The 1964 racial riots, instigated in part by
external actors, demonstrated that Singapore’s diversity is a vulnerability as
much as a strength. Residential
engineering that prevents the formation of ethnic enclaves reduces the surface
area for that kind of exploitation. The
EIP is blunt. It is also rational.
The Group Representation Constituency
system ensures that parliamentary teams include at least one minority candidate
— Malay, Indian, or Other — per multi-member constituency. The purpose is to guarantee minority representation
in Parliament. The side effect is that
opposition parties must field ethnically diverse slates, which is structurally
harder when talent pools are smaller.
This has been used as a tool to shield anchor ministers in safe seats by
pairing them with minority candidates under the GRC umbrella, with the effect
that the minority candidate rides in on the majority’s coattails rather than on
the community’s mandate. We have had
some awful minority candidates.
The Maintenance of Racial Harmony Act,
passed by Parliament on 4th February 2025 and in force from
September 2026, gives the Minister for Home Affairs the power to issue
Restraining Orders against individuals for content that prejudices racial
harmony. Those orders take effect immediately,
before any judicial process, and can prohibit a person from addressing certain
audiences or holding editorial roles.
Violations carry up to three years’ imprisonment for repeat offenders. Racial and religious incitement is not
abstract in Singapore. External actors —
state and non-state — have targeted this country’s ethnic fault lines before,
and they will do so again. Legislation
that gives the government a rapid-response tool against destabilising speech is
a reasonable instrument for a country in Singapore’s position. The objection is not to the tool. It is to the assumption that the tool will
always be used proportionately and without political convenience. That assumption requires oversight, and oversight
requires a press and judiciary that can exercise it.
The Data
Singapore presents itself to the world as
a model of multicultural harmony. Racial
Harmony Day is celebrated every 21st July. Schoolchildren wear each other’s traditional
costumes. Politicians speak warmly about
being one people. Then there is the
data. A 2024 survey of 4,000
Singaporeans by the Institute of Policy Studies and OnePeople.sg found that
18.4 per cent of Malay respondents had experienced racial discrimination in a
job application or promotion. The figure
for Indian respondents was 16.7 per cent.
For Chinese respondents, it was 3.7 per cent. In the same survey, 23.7 per cent of Malay
respondents and 23.4 per cent of Indian respondents reported frequent
day-to-day discrimination in the workplace.
For Chinese respondents, the figure was 6 per cent. The state’s response is to pass a Workplace
Fairness Bill, also in January 2025, and to run diversity programmes using “interactive
gaming tools.” The gap between the
magnitude of the problem and the gentleness of the response is not reassuring.
Meanwhile, support for keeping the CMIO
framework unchanged has grown. The same
IPS survey found that 58.1 per cent of respondents in 2024 supported no change
to CMIO — up from 46.2 per cent in 2018.
The majority of Singaporeans have concluded that the box they were born
into is worth preserving. This is what a
framework that has been in place for 70 years does to a population: it makes
the box feel natural.
The People Who Fall Through the
Framework
My community is a useful case study. The Kristang are the descendants of the
Portuguese who conquered and administered Malacca from 1511. Theirs was not a merchant community that
happened to settle — it was a colonial society, with the full internal stratification
that implies: the Upper Ten, the fidalgo and royal houses; the Lower
Ten, the minor nobility and clergy; and below them, the common people. That society maintained its own creole
language — Kristang — its own Catholic religious traditions, and its own distinct
cultural practices across five centuries.
Following the British takeover of Malacca in 1824, significant numbers
settled in Singapore. They are one
strand within the broader Eurasian community, which also includes descendants
of Dutch, British, Spanish, and other European lineages mixed with Asian
heritage. Today, the Kristang number a
few thousand in Singapore, the majority elderly. The language is listed as critically
endangered. The community is classified
as “Others” in the CMIO administrative system — a category that also contains
Armenians, Jews, Germans, Filipinos, Thais, and anyone else who does not fit
neatly into the Chinese, Malay, or Indian box.
The government has, to its credit,
recognised the Eurasian community as a distinct entity in one important
respect. In 1994, the Eurasian
Association was formally designated as a Self-Help Group, placing it on the same
institutional footing as the Chinese Development Assistance Council, Mendaki,
and SINDA. Every CPF-contributing
employee contributes to one of these four funds based on race. The Eurasian Community Fund exists alongside
the other three in statute. Former Prime
Minister Lee Hsien Loong, speaking at the Eurasian Association’s centenary,
described the 1994 designation as formal government acknowledgement that “notwithstanding
your community’s size, you are an important part of Singapore.”
That recognition is real. It is also incomplete. The Self-Help Group structure gives the
Eurasian community institutional standing.
It does not give it CMIO standing.
Under the ethnic quota system that governs HDB flat transactions,
Eurasians fall under the "Indian and Others" category — grouped with
everyone else who does not fit the three primary boxes. There is no Eurasian quota. There is no Eurasian parliamentary seat. Formal recognition, in other words, has a
ceiling. The Eurasian Association
remains structurally the smallest and least resourced of the four self-help
groups. The Kristang language receives
no state funding to speak of. It is disappearing
on the government’s watch, in a country that brands itself as a celebration of
cultural diversity.
CDAC, Mendaki, SINDA, and the Eurasian
Association serve a real function: they direct community resources toward
educational and social uplift within communities that have different starting
conditions. The model is not the
problem. The problem is that the model
does not go far enough. Singapore has
more than 200 registered ethnic identities.
The Kristang are not the only community at risk. A framework that funds four groups and
ignores the rest is a framework that has decided cultural preservation is worth
funding selectively, not universally. If
Singapore believes in the multiculturalism it advertises, it should fund the
preservation of ethnic heritage beyond the four CMIO boxes. Language programmes. Cultural archives. Community arts funding. The cost is modest. The statement it makes is not.
The Malay-Muslim Conflation Problem
There is a structural fault in Singapore’s
management of its Muslim community that the government has not adequately
addressed. The conflation of Malay
ethnicity with Muslim religious identity is pervasive in Singapore’s
institutional architecture. MENDAKI,
formally Yayasan Mendaki, is designated as the self-help group for the
"Malay/Muslim community." Its
mandate is ethnic as much as religious.
The Mosque Building and Mendaki Fund — the MBMF — collects contributions
from all Muslim employees in Singapore, regardless of ethnicity. An Indian Muslim, a Chinese Muslim, a
Eurasian convert — all contribute monthly through CPF. They contribute to a fund whose Mendaki
component serves a community defined by ethnicity, not by faith.
MUIS, the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura,
is the statutory body that administers Muslim law, oversees mosques, manages zakat
and waqf, and governs madrasah education. Its mandate under the Administration of
Muslim Law Act is defined in terms of Muslims.
In practice, the overlap between the Muslim population and the Malay
ethnic community in Singapore is so extensive — 98 per cent of Malays are
Muslim — that the institutions have fused in the public mind and in the
administrative architecture. The
consequence is that minority Muslims — Indian Muslims, Chinese Muslims,
Eurasian converts, Muslim migrants from non-Malay backgrounds — exist in a
gap. They contribute to the MBMF. Their access to Mendaki’s programmes is
conditional on eligibility criteria that are not transparently published. They fund an institution whose cultural
centre of gravity is Malay. They are, in
some meaningful sense, paying for a community they are not part of.
We have a Malay community that takes advantage
of the converts to Islam to fund their own programmes. It is a criticism of an administrative
architecture that has allowed ethnicity and religion to become synonymous in a
way that disadvantages the minority within the minority. A Muslim convert from a Chinese family
contributes to Mendaki through the MBMF.
He may also contribute to CDAC through his registered race. He receives full access to neither. He is doubly taxed and partially served. Singapore does not have a satisfactory answer
to this. The fix is not
complicated. MENDAKI should serve
Muslims. The MBMF should fund Muslim
welfare, not Malay welfare. MUIS already
has the statutory mandate to do this. Institutional
architecture should follow the mandate, not the ethnicity. Singapore’s Muslim community has become more
ethnically diverse. Its institutions
have not kept pace.
The Case for a Post-Racial Civil
Service
There is one area where the managed
multiculturalism model has outlived its usefulness, and where Singapore can and
should move faster. Civil and statutory
appointments — Permanent Secretaries, Heads of Statutory Boards, senior public
servants — should be made on merit. The
government has been cautious about articulating this, in part because the
optics of saying “race no longer matters in appointments” are complicated in a
country where the data show that race very much still matters in employment
outcomes. But the caution is
counterproductive. The continued
informal practice of ethnic balancing in senior appointments — the expectation
that representatives of particular communities will hold certain positions —
does not serve merit. It reinforces the
idea that ethnic identity is a relevant qualification for public office.
Singapore has demonstrated that it can
produce leaders of extraordinary quality from every ethnic community. The country does not need a quota system at
the top of its civil service. What it
needs is a meritocracy that is blind to ethnicity at the point of appointment,
backed by interventions at the bottom — in education, in early-childhood
development, in economic opportunity — that ensure every community has the
platform to compete. The GRC system in
its current form is an obstacle to that aspiration. Guaranteeing minority representation in
Parliament through a team-based system that reduces individual accountability
is not the same as producing minority leaders who have earned a mandate from
their own constituencies. Singapore
should move towards single-member constituencies with reserved seats rotated
across ethnic categories, so that minority MPs win on their own merits rather
than in the shadow of a GRC anchor. That
is a harder political reform. It is
worth having.
What is Multiculturalism in Singapore?
It is three things simultaneously, and it
is important not to confuse them.
It is organic at the street level. Singaporeans of different ethnicities eat
together, work together, live beside each other, and form families across
ethnic lines. The intermarriage trend is
upward. In 2023, 2,326 children of mixed
parentage were registered with double-barrelled races. The social reality of Singapore is one of
real and deep intercommunal familiarity.
It is managed at the policy level. The HDB ethnic quota, the GRC system, the
designated self-help groups, the government-sanctioned language hierarchies —
these are deliberate interventions designed to produce outcomes the state has
decided are desirable. I support the
principle of managed multiculturalism.
Singapore is too small, too diverse, and too exposed to external
interference to treat social cohesion as self-maintaining. But management requires candour about what is
being managed, and why. Some of what
passes for management is engineering.
Some of it is ethnic politics dressed as social policy. Those two things are not the same.
It is policed at the speech level. The Maintenance of Racial Harmony Act gives
the government a tool for rapid intervention against destabilising speech. I support that tool. The concern is not the existence of the legislation. It is whether the oversight mechanisms are
strong enough to ensure it is used for the purpose stated, and not for the
purpose of silencing inconvenient critics.
Singapore’s answer to that concern is not yet fully convincing.
The Assessment
Singapore did not invent
multiculturalism. It inherited it. The variety of peoples who live on this
island is the product of geography and trade, not government planning. The British created the administrative
structure. The People’s Action Party
inherited and deepened it. What
Singapore has built is a system that simultaneously celebrates diversity and
constrains it — that places cultural communities in administrative boxes, funds
them unequally, engineers their residential distribution, and manages discourse
it considers destabilising. Then it
declares this a model for the world.
The model works, by some measures. Singapore has not had a racial riot since
1969. Inter-ethnic trust, while
imperfect, is higher here than in most comparable societies. The country functions. The managed approach to multiculturalism has
produced a more stable society than the alternative might have. I accept that argument. But accepting the argument does not require
accepting the current implementation as final.
Singapore can do more to preserve the cultural heritage of communities
that fall outside the four CMIO boxes.
It can separate ethnicity from religion in its institutional
architecture, so that minority Muslims are not disadvantaged by an
administrative assumption that Muslim means Malay. It can move towards a post-racial framework
for senior civil and statutory appointments.
It can reform the GRC system to produce minority parliamentarians who
hold mandates earned on their own terms.
None of these reforms requires dismantling
what works. They require extending its
logic to communities and individuals the current system serves incompletely. Singapore likes to present itself as a
finished product. It is not. It is a country that has done extraordinarily
well with an imperfect set of tools — and that is capable of doing better. The question is whether it is willing to have
that conversation. The Maintenance of
Racial Harmony Act does not answer that question. It defers it.
Terence
Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The
Billionaire Cheat Code

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