The following
is my answer to a Quora question: “How
could a correction occur when technology companies finance their early
investments through debt?”
Debt does not
prevent a correction. It changes what
the correction looks like. Equity losses
wipe out shareholders. Debt losses wipe
out shareholders, then move on to bondholders, then to the banks holding the
paper. Debt financing does not remove
risk. It relocates it, and widens the
blast radius.
The
Concentration Problem
Seven
companies, Nvidia, Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Tesla, hold
roughly a third of the S&P 500’s total market value. They generate close to 70 per cent of the
index’s economic profit. Strip them out,
and the remaining 493 companies have delivered close to flat returns for long
stretches of the past two years. This is
not a broad market rally. It is seven
balance sheets, wearing an index as a disguise.
Debt carries a
fixed obligation. Interest comes due
whether the underlying revenue arrives or not.
OpenAI has committed roughly US$1.15 trillion across seven vendors
through 2035, while running toward a projected US$14 billion loss in 2026,
nearly triple its loss the year before.
A company can absorb a bad quarter on equity. A company cannot skip an interest payment on
a bond without triggering default, a credit downgrade, or a forced asset
sale. Debt-financed infrastructure
spending does not soften a correction.
It adds a second, harder deadline on top of the first.
The
Circular Financing Problem
Nvidia invests
billions into AI labs such as OpenAI and Anthropic. Those labs sign enormous compute contracts
with cloud providers, including Microsoft, Oracle, and Amazon Web Services. Those providers then spend a large share of
that revenue buying chips from Nvidia.
Cash leaves Nvidia’s balance sheet as an investment. It returns as revenue, having toured through
two or three other balance sheets along the way. Analysts have identified over US$800 billion
moving through this loop. AllianceBernstein’s
own research warned that deals of this scale clearly fuel circular concerns. Critics call this a manufactured appearance
of organic demand, dressed up as genuine growth. Jensen Huang has dismissed the concern as ridiculous. The dismissal does not explain the number.
Telecommunications
firms Lucent Technologies and Nortel Networks ran an almost identical loop
during the dot-com era. They lent their
own customers money to buy their own equipment, booking the loan proceeds as
revenue on both sides of the transaction.
When real demand failed to match the financed demand, both the loans and
the revenue they generated evaporated in the same downturn, taking large parts
of the telecommunications sector down with them. The AI financing loop runs through chips and
cloud contracts instead of routers and fibre.
The mechanism has not changed.
Contagion
Risk
A correction
confined to seven stocks would be painful, not systemic. A correction that reaches the debt underneath
those seven stocks is different.
Bondholders, banks, and pension funds holding that paper absorb losses
alongside shareholders. A sector this
concentrated, financed this heavily through debt, with revenue this dependent
on circular contracts between the same small group of companies, does not
correct quietly. It corrects in a way
that reaches considerably further than the technology sector itself.
Terence
Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The
Billionaire Cheat Code

No comments:
Post a Comment
Thank you for taking the time to share our thoughts. Once approved, your comments will be poster.