The following is my
answer to a Quora question: “How
do you structure a shari’ah-compliant, halal investment
portfolio?”
This is a tricky
question, and most answers to it are wrong for the same reason. They start from a modern invention, the claim
that all interest is automatically riba’, usury, and build an entire
investment philosophy on top of a premise that classical fiqh, jurisprudence,
never settled. We need to address the
underlying contentions before we talk about building any such portfolio.
The Definition of Riba’
is Not Settled
The Qur’an explicitly prohibits
riba’. What riba’ means
has been argued since the earliest generations of Islamic jurisprudence, and
the classical schools did not converge on a single answer. Riba’ al-fadhl, the prohibition on
unequal exchange of the same commodity, is applied specifically to six named
items in ahadits, prophetic narrations: gold, silver, wheat, barley,
dates, and salt. Riba’ an-nasiyyah,
the deferred-payment form, is the one modern discourse collapses into “all
interest,” but classical jurists tied its prohibition to a specific mechanism:
a debt that compounds as a penalty for late payment, extracting more from a
debtor because he could not pay on time.
That is usury. Usury requires an
element of zhulm, oppression, a lender exploiting a debtor’s need or
misfortune to extract wealth disproportionate to any service rendered. Mere interest at the outset of a commercial
arrangement between two consenting parties of roughly equal bargaining power is
the cost of doing business, not exploitation.
Shaykh Nur ad-Din Abu
‘Ubadah ‘Ali ibn Juma’ah, Grand Mufti of Egypt from 2003 to 2013, argued that
the four a’immah – Imam Abu ‘Abdullah Malik ibn Anas, Imam Abu Hanifah
Nu’man ibn Tsabit, Imam Abu ‘Abdullah Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafi’i, and Imam
Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Hanbal – restricted usury to the ribawi commodities,
principally gold and silver as the recognised monetary metals of their
era. Banks deal in fiat currency, a
different category of asset under this classical framework. He argued the relationship between a
depositor and a bank is financing and investment, not a straightforward loan
between two individuals of unequal power.
This is not a fringe modernist improvisation invented to make Western
finance palatable. It is a contention
grounded in the same classical texts the anti-interest position claims sole
ownership of. Shaykh ‘Ali ibn Juma’ah’s
jurisprudential training was from the Shafi'i school.
al-Azhar’s Islamic
Research Institute issued a formal fatwa in December 2002, under Grand
Imam Shaykh Muhammad Sayyid Thanthawy, addressing bank interest on savings
certificates. The fatwa, and the
furious rebuttal from the Islamic Jurisprudence Academy that followed, remains
one of the most documented institutional disputes in modern Islamic finance, because
it exposed that even Al-Azhar’s scholars could not agree among themselves.
The Shafi’i School
Never Developed the Jurisprudential Machinery for This
Hanafi jurisprudence
developed during the Abbasid Caliphate, then reached its administrative
maturity across the Ottoman Empire, an institution running commerce, taxation,
and finance across three continents for six centuries. Maliki jurisprudence did the same across the
Maghreb and West Africa, embedded in states that had to answer commercial
questions at scale. This produced
schools with developed positions on contracts, partnership structures, and
commercial necessity, because the empires applying them needed working answers,
not merely correct ones.
Shafi’i jurisprudence
never had this laboratory. It found
scholarly prestige and demographic reach; it remains dominant across the Malay
Archipelago, including Singapore’s Malay Muslim population, but it was never
the settled law of a single dominant polity administering commerce and finance
at imperial scale over centuries. This
is a school of law refined primarily through scholarly transmission rather than
sustained state administration, so it developed differently from one tested
daily against the demands of running an empire’s treasury. The modern Shafi’i-influenced fatwa
councils inherit that inadequacy.
Modern Islamic
Finance’s Blind Spot on Time Value
Modern Islamic financial
theory largely denies the time value of money as a legitimate concept. Alongside this, inflation and capital gains are
treated as suspect categories rather than economic facts. This is not a minor theoretical quibble. As long as demand outstrips supply, prices
rise. Some inflation signals a growing
economy. Money and the instruments
transferring it will vary in value across time regardless of any jurist’s
ruling on the matter, and treating that natural variance as inherently riba’
conflates a real economic phenomenon with a specific, exploitative lending
practice mentioned in the Qur’an.
Jurists disregarding infrastructure cost and opportunity cost when
declaring all borrowing interest haram have not produced a more pious
economics. They have produced an
economics divorced from how value moves through time, forcing “halal”
product designers into the tortuous semantic workarounds, murabahah
cost-plus sales dressed as trade rather than lending. They are engaging in all this nonsense to
satisfy a label while replicating the same economic substance these labels
claim to avoid. That is hypocrisy.
The Shari’ah
Advisory Board System is a Rating Scam
A portfolio is not made shari’ah-compliant
because a board stamped it so. Most shari’ah
advisory boards are employed by the financial institutions whose products they
assess, a conflict of interest that would disqualify an auditor in any other
regulated industry. The vast majority of
shari’ah-labelled funds underperform broader benchmarks, driven by a
lack of diversification and the double compliance cost, conventional regulatory
overhead stacked on top of shari’ah board fees, passed straight to the
investor. Muslims paying a premium for
underperformance in the name of piety would achieve more religious benefit by giving
that same premium as zakat or swadaqah.
The Focus Should be
Ethical Screening, Not a Label
A properly structured
portfolio requires no third-party halal certification at all. It requires screening on values that already
exist across classical jurisprudence: no investment in explicitly haram
products, pork, alcohol, and intoxicants.
Beyond that, I extend the screen to harm: no defence contractors
profiting from weapons deployed against civilians, no industrial polluters
externalising cost onto communities with no say in the matter, no operations
built on animal cruelty, no predatory lenders extracting wealth from people with
no real alternative. This screen
excludes a considerable share of companies on conduct and business model, not
merely on which sector code they are classified under, and it requires no
certifying board to validate it, only a fund manager willing to read what a
company does.
Shari’ah
compliance begins with niyyah, intent, a principle routinely neglected
once the conversation moves to product structuring. Wealth accumulated through ethical means and
then hoarded, or spent purely on status, fails the spirit of the framework as
thoroughly as wealth accumulated through a technically halal-labelled
but ethically hollow investment vehicle.
Swukuk is
Not a Substitute for a Rated Bond
Swukuk
represents fractional ownership in an underlying asset or venture, generating
returns from that asset’s performance rather than a fixed coupon on borrowed
principal. This structure carries value
where the underlying asset is real and productive. It is not, however, a functional replacement
for a diversified, credit-rated bond allocation. Swukuk markets remain shallower, less
liquid, and more concentrated by issuer and jurisdiction than the global bond
market. A blanket exclusion of
conventional fixed income, based on a reinterpretation of riba’ leaves a
portfolio structurally overweight on equity risk. A correct reinterpretation of riba’
along the lines of Shaykh ‘Ali ibn Juma’ah and the classical commodity-specific
reading of usury supports open conventional, transparently priced fixed income as
part of a properly constructed shari’ah-conscious portfolio. This corrects an imbalance that has cost swukuk-only
investors measurable diversification for decades.
MUIS and PERGAS’s
Position Falls Short
Singapore’s Islamic
Religious Council, MUIS, and the Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious
Teachers Association, PERGAS, both issue guidance operating within this same
underdeveloped framework, inherited through Shafi’i channels given Singapore’s
Malay Muslim demographic base. The
deeper problem is not which school they draw from. It is that fatwa committees staffed
predominantly by scholars trained in classical jurisprudence and theology,
without formal grounding in finance, economics, or portfolio theory, are
answering a technical financial question using purely doctrinal reasoning. A jurist who has never modelled duration
risk, credit spread, or the actual mechanics of a murabahah versus a
conventional term loan is poorly positioned to rule on whether that structure differs
in economic substance, only in form.
Ideological caution substituting for financial literacy produces a
rating system that certifies form, penalises substance, and leaves ordinary Muslim
investors paying a compliance premium for portfolios that underperform, all in
service of a definition of riba’ that the classical schools themselves
never fully agreed on to begin with.
Terence
Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The
Billionaire Cheat Code

No comments:
Post a Comment
Thank you for taking the time to share our thoughts. Once approved, your comments will be poster.