Toastmasters International’s Leadership Has a Credibility Problem, and the Numbers Prove It

Toastmasters International’s August 2026 CEO report is a public relations exercise dressed up as governance.  It is full of manufactured optimism while the underlying data tells a considerably harsher story.  If this were a listed company reporting these numbers, someone would already have lost their job.

The Membership Collapse They Ignore

From 2021 to 2025, Toastmasters International lost 34,945 members, an 11.6% decline.  At its 2020 peak, the organisation counted 364,212 members.  By 2025, that figure had fallen to 265,261.  Club numbers dropped from 15,875 in 2021 to 13,833 in 2025, a loss of over 2,000 clubs.  Global average club size has fallen to 16.38 members, down from a historical average that hovered around 20 for decades.  When we consider unique membership numbers, disregarding people with multiple club ownerships, those numbers are undoubtedly worse.

The August 2025 CEO report highlighted a 3.5% increase in average club size compared to 2023/2024, calling it the largest average club size since before the pandemic, and noted that 37 Districts achieved Distinguished status, a 12.1% year-on-year increase.  This was presented as progress.  It is not progress.  It is arithmetic performed on a shrinking base.  Lose enough clubs and members, and the survivors look healthier by comparison alone.  That is survivorship bias, not recovery.  It is consolidation, dressed up as success.

The organisation’s structural response, introduced in the August 2024 report, was the Club Excellence Initiative: a webinar, a set of resources, and a rebranded checklist called “Moments of Truth.”  The organisation has been losing clubs and members since 2019, accelerated through the pandemic, and the systemic response to a six-year decline was a webinar.

Why the Dues Increase Deserves Scrutiny

Club dues rose from US$45 in 2022 to US$60 in July 2023 to US$72 from August 2026, a 60% increase in four years.  Standard Pathways fees rose 75%, from US$20 to US$35.  Vintage path fees now sit at US$60, introduced in 2025 with no prior comparison point.  New member fees rose 25%, from US$20 to US$25.  Members are paying more across every category; now the organisation has returned to a financial surplus.

Deficits of US$6.02 million in 2023 and US$2.80 million in 2024 gave way to a US$0.57 million surplus in 2025, with net assets holding at US$42.51 million.  That improvement makes the dues increase harder to justify, not easier.  An organisation already back in the black, sitting on tens of millions in cash and investments, does not have an obvious emergency requiring a 20% dues hike on top of the 60% increase already absorbed since 2022.

The Executive Compensation Numbers

Between 2023 and 2024, staff numbers fell from 164 to 160.  Other salaries and wages fell 4.5%, from US$10.77 million to US$10.29 million.  Executive compensation rose 46.3% over the same period, from US$2.05 million to US$3.00 million, according to the organisation’s own IRS Form 990 filings.  Total payroll costs rose only 1.3%.  Staff and general salaries fell.  Executive pay rose by nearly half.  A member paying 60% more in dues since 2022 has directly subsidised a compensation increase that did not extend to the people running the meetings, filing the paperwork, or answering the emails.

District expenses rose 28.9% between 2023 and 2025, the largest increase in the entire expense breakdown.  The organisation’s own stated District Alignment initiative did not take effect until 1^st July 2026 and cannot explain an increase that had already happened before it began.  Information technology spending fell 28.8% over the same period, despite the Board explicitly citing “rising technology and cybersecurity costs” as one justification for the dues increase.  Educational materials spending fell 26.2%.  Marketing spending stayed above US$6 million every single year.  Every one of the Board’s stated justifications for the increase – reduced operating costs, streamlined staffing, rising technology costs, greater regulatory obligations, District Alignment strengthening financial viability – is either unsupported by the published evidence or directly contradicted by it.

Problem One: Pathways is a Bureaucratic Obstacle Dressed as an Education Programme

Pathways replaced the Competent Communicator and Competent Leader manuals, imperfect but immediately comprehensible, with Base Camp, a branching digital architecture of paths, levels, and elective projects, carrying an administrative overhead that disproportionately burdens the members least equipped to manage it: new joiners.

District 25 formed an entire team of “Pathways Guides” specifically to help members navigate the system, because members were experiencing what the organisation itself called “growing pains,” requiring one-on-one coaching, club presentations, and direct intervention from a dedicated support infrastructure.  An education programme requiring a support team to help people use it has a design problem, not a communication problem.

Toastmasters International itself acknowledged the system’s inadequacy by announcing a migration to a new learning management system in 2024, promising mobile support, easier path navigation, and automatic recognition submission, features that should have existed on day one of the Pathways launch in 2018.  October 2025 enhancements added mandatory meeting roles at every level, adding further administrative complexity with no corresponding benefit to a member’s actual speaking development.  The CEO reports describe Pathways as a strength.  For many members, it is the primary reason they disengage.

Problem Two: The Meeting Format Has Not Evolved in a Generation

Toastmasters meetings were designed for a world in which structured, in-person verbal practice was rare, access to a speaking audience required institutional membership, and the overhead of a weekly commitment was justified by the absence of alternatives.  None of those conditions still apply.  A person seeking speaking feedback can post a video and receive detailed critique within hours.  A person seeking practice at improvised speaking has improv classes, debate societies, and online communities offering more immediate, more specific feedback than a Toastmasters meeting structure.  A person seeking leadership development has formal corporate training, executive coaching, and MBA curricula carrying considerably more external credibility than a Toastmasters officer title.

The organisation’s response has been to celebrate Distinguished Club Programme metrics, run more contests, and issue guidance on making guests feel welcome.  None of this addresses the actual question: why would a young professional in 2026 spend two hours on a Tuesday evening at a Toastmasters meeting rather than any of the alternatives now available?  The CEO reports do not ask this question, because they do not like the answer.

Problem Three: Club Quality Variance is Catastrophic and Unaddressed

Toastmasters International’s brand promise is a consistent, high-quality learning experience.  The reality is variance so extreme that two clubs in the same city can deliver experiences that appear to belong to entirely different organisations.  One club runs a tight, intellectually stimulating programme with prepared members and rigorous evaluations.  Another meets with six members, three of them officers, an unprepared evaluator, and a Table Topics session consuming 40 minutes because nobody manages the time.

The Distinguished Club Programme measures ten administrative and numerical goals, dues paid on time, officer lists submitted, member counts above a threshold, and produces clubs that pass every administrative requirement while delivering a programme that would not retain a motivated new member for six months.  The CEO reports celebrate DCP achievement rates.  They say nothing about programme quality beneath the administrative surface.

Problem Four: The Volunteer Leadership Model is Failing under Its Own Weight

Every club runs on volunteer officers serving one-year terms, receiving limited training, then handing the club over with inadequate knowledge transfer, minimal institutional memory, and no accountability for what they leave behind.  Club Officer Training, run twice a year, remains the organisation’s primary investment in officer quality, and it is, in the assessment of most experienced Toastmasters, insufficient for the task.

The March 2025 CEO report itself described clubs whose members were “feeling burned out,” clubs where guests did not return despite members genuinely wanting them to join.  Member burnout in a volunteer organisation is not an individual failing.  It is a systemic signal that the demands placed on volunteers, officer roles, contest organisation, recruitment drives, and administrative compliance have exceeded what the volunteer model can sustain without adequate structural support.  The report identifies the burnout.  It does not address the structural cause.

Problem Five: The Organisation is Managed for World Headquarters, Not for Members

Toastmasters International generated revenue of US$38,571,257 in 2024.  The primary revenue model is membership dues, meaning financial health depends entirely on membership numbers, and those numbers have declined for five consecutive years, with only one brief, subsequently reversed, uptick.  An organisation under this financial pressure has every incentive to report progress rather than diagnose failure, celebrating whichever metrics are improving while quietly contextualising the ones that are not.

The CEO reports are addressed to the organisation’s leadership community: District Directors, Region Advisors, club officers.  They are not addressed to the member who joined six months ago, attended eight meetings, found Pathways confusing, received a generic evaluation on their last speech, and is now deciding whether to renew.  That member’s experience is the organisation’s actual product.  The CEO reports say very little about it.

In Summary

Toastmasters International is not in decline because of the pandemic, though the pandemic accelerated it.  It is not in decline because of competition, though competition has intensified.  It is in decline because the product itself, the meeting experience, the educational curriculum, the volunteer support infrastructure, has not kept pace with the expectations of the audience it is trying to attract and retain.

The organisation knows this.  Its own reports acknowledge average club size has fallen from a historical 20 to 16.38, and call on clubs to “do everything we can” to return to that figure.  They do not explain why the number fell.  They do not detail what programme changes are required to recover it.  They do not explain how an organisation that lost nearly 35,000 members in four years intends to reverse a structural trend through better guest follow-up and a rebranded initiative, while simultaneously raising executive compensation 46.3% and dues 60% in the same window.

The data is there.  The diagnosis is absent.  A CEO report structured this way is not a management document.  It is a morale document, written for people who need to believe things are improving, rather than for people who need to understand why they are not.  Daniel Rex, Chief Executive Officer of Toastmasters International since 2015, and the organisation’s Board of Directors, owe members considerably more than that.  The clubs doing the actual work, building real programmes, developing real leaders, producing real results, deserve leadership willing to tell them the truth, not a Board that raises its own compensation by nearly half while asking the membership to pay for it twice over.

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Terence Nunis, DTM | Division Advisor, District 80 Division M | Club Advisor, AIA Toastmasters | Past President & Founder, Awesome Toastmasters

What Makes a Successful Startup Team: Why a Stellar Resume is Not Enough

What makes a successful startup team?  The common answer is that prior startup experience, product knowledge, and industry skills predict whether a new venture succeeds.  A recent study of 95 new startup teams in the Netherlands tested that assumption, and the answer it produced should trouble every venture capital investor still relying on a resume as a proxy for team quality.  Experience alone was not enough.  While experience broadens a team’s resource pool, sharpens opportunity recognition, and correlates positively with effectiveness, the researchers found that shared entrepreneurial passion and shared strategic vision were required to reach genuinely superior team performance.

When venture capital investors conduct due diligence, they scrutinise the financial side of the business with rigour.  Is the business model interesting?  How large is the addressable market?  What do the growth plans look like?  Firms hire expensive experts and deploy advanced data tools to interrogate every one of these questions.  When it comes to evaluating the human team behind the numbers, gut feel and intuition still dominate.  This is not a minor blind spot.  Data shows 60% of new ventures fail specifically due to problems with the team, and Professor Noam Wasserman of Harvard Business School, in his research underpinning The Founder’s Dilemma, found that 65% of high-potential startups fail due to unresolved tension and conflict among co-founders.  A due diligence process that spends weeks on the spreadsheet and minutes on the people is auditing the wrong risk.

Why Shared Vision Beats Raw Experience

Among the startups studied, the group reporting high previous experience but average to low levels of passion and collective vision demonstrated weak team performance across innovation, customer satisfaction, cost control, and expected sales growth.  The group reporting only average experience, but high passion and collective vision, performed significantly stronger.  Greater team experience only translated into better performance when team members shared a strategic vision for the company.  Where that agreement was absent, the accumulated knowledge and skill on the team contributed only marginally to outcomes.

There is a sweet spot where stellar teams live, combining hard skills and experience with soft skills, passion and alignment.  Super smart, highly experienced team members who do not feel aligned enough to share that knowledge render the knowledge worthless to the business.  Worse, misalignment in passion and vision actively degrades performance rather than merely failing to improve it.  A technically brilliant CTO who disagrees fundamentally with his CEO’s future strategy is less likely to share his full expertise with the team at all, regardless of how deep that expertise runs.

A Case in Point: Clocker

Consider the case of Emma, an investor at a venture capital firm.  Names and institutions in this account have been changed for anonymity, though the underlying dynamic it illustrates is drawn directly from the researchers’ own fieldwork.  Emma was thrilled by a potential investment in a Stockholm software company she called Clocker.  The financials were interesting.  The team’s track record was outstanding on paper: a CEO with deep industry knowledge who had led Salesforce’s product division, a Harvard-educated CFO who had worked at Bain & Company, a VP of Sales who had cut his teeth at Microsoft, and a serial entrepreneur with a successful exit already on her record.  Every hard-skill box was ticked.

The pitch itself unravelled that impression.  The CEO wanted to expand into the United States and become the next Salesforce.  The CTO dismissed the idea outright, arguing the company had no bandwidth for global expansion that year.  The team’s goals diverged visibly under questioning, and their passion diverged with them: the VP of Sales was still running his own separate sales business on the side, while the CTO was quietly interviewing elsewhere.  Weeks later, Emma learned the Clocker team had broken up, their divergent goals having curdled into poor communication, withheld knowledge, and weak decision-making long before any product ever reached the market.

Real Names, Real Consequences

The Clocker story is illustrative, but the pattern it describes has played out repeatedly among companies whose names need no anonymising.  Steven Paul Jobs and Stephen Gary Wozniak co-founded Apple together, and by 1985, strains over leadership style and competing visions for the company had grown severe enough that Jobs was forced out of the company he had built, only returning over a decade later to rescue it from the direction it had taken without him.  Snapchat co-founders Evan Thomas Spiegel, Robert  “Bobby” Cornelius Murphy and Reginald “Reggie” Brown III fractured over a different fault line: Brown claimed he had been unfairly pushed out of the company, filed suit against his co-founders, and the dispute was ultimately resolved only through a legal settlement.  Zenefits co-founders Parker Conrad and Zachary “Zach” Weinberg diverged over company culture and business practice, a disagreement that culminated in Conrad’s resignation amid serious compliance issues the misalignment had allowed to fester.  Embroker’s own survey data confirms the pattern generalises well beyond these headline cases: 43% of entrepreneurs eventually part ways over internal disagreement, with 71% of those splits attributed directly to disagreement over the company's direction, and a further 18% to a co-founder who never shared the venture’s underlying values in the first place.

Previous experience has long been cited as the key ingredient of entrepreneurial success, and the data says plainly that experience alone does not deliver it.  Knowledge, skill, and passion carry equal weight, and experience only translates into performance when team members share their knowledge and hold a common vision for where the company is heading.  Investors evaluating a startup team on the strength of its resume alone are measuring the variable Emma’s Clocker deal, and Jobs, Spiegel, and Conrad’s own companies all proved insufficient on their own.  Building a successful startup is a long, bumpy road, and without entrepreneurial passion and strategic vision genuinely shared across the founding team, a stellar resume remains exactly that.  A piece of paper.

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Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith & Red Sycamore | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code

VUCA Leadership: Why the Old Playbook Gets You Killed in the New World

The acronym was coined by the United States Army War College in 1987 to describe the post-Cold War strategic environment.  The Soviet Union had collapsed.  The bipolar certainty of mutually assured destruction had dissolved.  The world suddenly presented a landscape where threats were harder to identify, alliances were less stable, objectives were less clear, and the consequences of decisions were less predictable.  The military needed a framework.  They called it VUCA — Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity.

Thirty-seven years later, the framework describes not just the geopolitical environment but the operating conditions of every business, every industry, and every leader on earth.  The world the Army War College was describing in 1987 has become the permanent condition of commercial existence in 2024.  If you are leading an organisation without a VUCA framework, you are navigating with a map that was drawn before the terrain changed.

What VUCA Actually Is

Before the leadership competencies, the framework itself deserves precise definition.  These four words are frequently used interchangeably or treated as synonyms for “things are complicated.”  They are not synonyms.  Each describes a distinct category of challenge that requires a distinct response.

Volatility describes change that is rapid, unpredictable in timing, and significant in magnitude.  The characteristic of volatile environments is not that change is bad — it is that change arrives faster than conventional planning cycles can accommodate.  The COVID-19 pandemic produced the most dramatic demonstration of volatility in recent business history.  Global GDP contracted by approximately 3.4% in 2020 — the worst peacetime contraction since the Great Depression — and then rebounded by approximately 5.9% in 2021.  The swing from contraction to expansion in twelve months was not forecast by any major economic institution with accuracy sufficient for planning purposes.  Supply chains that had been optimised for efficiency over decades collapsed in months.  Consumer behaviour shifted in weeks.  Every organisation that had built its strategy around the assumption of continuity discovered that continuity is a planning assumption, not a law of nature.

Uncertainty describes the absence of information sufficient to determine the probability of future outcomes.  Volatile environments are at least moving fast in identifiable directions.  Uncertain environments do not provide enough information to identify the direction at all.  The trade war between the United States and China — initiated in 2018 and subsequently oscillating between escalation and partial de-escalation — produced an uncertainty environment for manufacturers and exporters that made capital allocation decisions extraordinarily difficult.  When tariff policy can change with a single executive order, announced via social media at any hour, the probability distribution of future costs cannot be calculated with sufficient precision for conventional investment analysis.  Uncertainty requires a different response from volatility: not speed of adaptation but tolerance for not knowing, combined with structural flexibility to respond when clarity arrives.

Complexity describes environments where many interconnected variables interact in ways that produce non-linear outcomes.  The financial system is the most studied example of a complex adaptive system — one in which the interactions between participants produce emergent behaviours that cannot be predicted from the individual components.  The 2008 global financial crisis was not caused by a single failure.  It was caused by the interaction of mortgage underwriting standards, securitisation mechanics, credit default swap leverage, repo market dependencies, and regulatory blind spots — each individually manageable, collectively catastrophic.  JP Morgan’s Chief Investment Officer’s office lost approximately US$6.2 billion in 2012 in the London Whale trading scandal — not because the individual positions were obviously wrong, but because the interactions between positions in complex derivative structures produced risks that were not visible at the individual position level.  Complex environments require systems thinking rather than linear analysis.

Ambiguity describes situations where available information admits multiple interpretations and where the correct interpretation is not determinable from the information itself.  A volatile situation is difficult because it moves fast.  An ambiguous situation is difficult because you cannot be sure what you are looking at.  The strategic implications of artificial intelligence for specific industries — law, accounting, radiology, financial advice — are genuinely ambiguous.  The technology is clearly transformative.  Which specific capabilities will be transformed, on what timeline, and with what second-order effects on adjacent industries is not determinable from current information.  Leaders making strategic investments in response to AI must act on ambiguous signals — which requires a tolerance for acting without full information combined with the discipline to revise when new information arrives.

Why VUCA is a Necessity, Not a Framework

The conventional objection to VUCA as a leadership framework is that it describes the problem without solving it.  Naming the four conditions does not make them easier to navigate.  This objection misses the point.  The value of the VUCA framework is not that it provides answers.  It is that it forces leaders to diagnose which type of difficult condition they are facing — because the correct response to volatility is different from the correct response to uncertainty, which is different from the correct response to complexity, which is different from the correct response to ambiguity.

The leader who responds to uncertainty with the speed appropriate to volatility makes premature decisions with insufficient information.  The leader who responds to complexity with the tolerance for ambiguity appropriate to genuinely ambiguous situations delays decisions that the complexity of the system actually permits — because complex systems, unlike ambiguous ones, can be partially mapped and their interactions partially modelled.  The framework’s value is diagnostic precision.  Without it, leaders apply generic responses — “be agile,” “embrace change,” “think strategically” — to conditions that require specific responses.  Generic responses to specific conditions produce generically inadequate results.

The Socioeconomic Case for VUCA Leadership

The argument that VUCA leadership is a necessity rather than a preference rests on three structural shifts in the global socioeconomic environment that have made the four conditions permanent rather than episodic.  The first shift is the acceleration of technological change.  Moore’s Law — the observation by Intel co-founder Gordon Earle Moore in 1965 that the number of transistors on a microchip doubles approximately every two years — describes a compounding process of technological capability growth that has no historical precedent.  The compounding means that the pace of change is itself accelerating.  The smartphone went from non-existence to 6.8 billion users in approximately fifteen years.  Artificial intelligence has moved from academic research to commercial deployment in productively disruptive applications in approximately three years.  Organisations that plan on five-year technology cycles are planning for a world that will not exist when the plan is executed.

The IMF’s 2023 World Economic Outlook found that technological disruption now affects approximately 60% of jobs in advanced economies — a proportion that has risen from approximately 20% in 2000.  The disruption is not evenly distributed.  It concentrates in cognitive tasks — analysis, judgement, communication — that were previously considered safe from automation.  Leaders who have not built organisational capability to absorb and adapt to technological disruption faster than their competitors will find themselves managing institutions whose competitive position is deteriorating continuously.

The second shift is geopolitical fragmentation.  The post-1945 international order — built on multilateral institutions, rules-based trade, and the assumption of progressively deeper economic integration — is in structural retreat.  The World Trade Organisation’s dispute resolution mechanism has been effectively paralysed.  The G20 has produced diminishing policy coordination despite mounting global challenges.  The US-China strategic competition has extended into technology, finance, and supply chains in ways that force companies to make explicit choices about which ecosystem they operate in — choices that were not required when the assumption of global integration held.

McKinsey Global Institute research published in 2023 found that approximately 40% of global goods trade — approximately US$13 trillion annually — now flows between countries with significant geopolitical tensions.  The friend-shoring and near-shoring responses to this fragmentation add cost, complexity, and uncertainty to supply chains that had been optimised for efficiency in a more integrated world.  Every organisation with global supply chains is now navigating geopolitical complexity as a routine operational requirement rather than an occasional risk management challenge.

The third shift is climate-driven physical risk.  The physical consequences of climate change are introducing a category of volatility and uncertainty into economic activity that has no modern precedent in its scale and breadth of impact.  Swiss Re’s 2023 Economic Impacts of Climate Change report estimated that climate-related physical risks could reduce global GDP by approximately 10% by 2050 under current policy trajectories — a reduction equivalent to eliminating the entire economic output of the United States and Germany combined.

For individual organisations, the physical risk dimension introduces supply chain disruptions from extreme weather events, regulatory uncertainty from carbon pricing trajectories, asset stranding risk from physical infrastructure exposed to sea level rise and temperature increase, and competitive pressure from the energy transition that is restructuring the cost basis of production across multiple industries.  The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2024 ranked climate-related risks as the top five most severe risks over a ten-year horizon — a ranking that reflects both the magnitude of the threat and the inadequacy of current institutional responses to it.

The Five VUCA Leadership Competencies

Against this background, five leadership competencies emerge as structurally necessary rather than merely desirable.

Visionary and Strategic Thinking

The visionary leader in a VUCA environment is not the one who predicts the future most accurately.  That definition of visionary was appropriate for stable environments where extrapolation was a reliable planning tool.  In a VUCA environment, the visionary leader is the one who creates an organisational orientation robust enough to navigate multiple possible futures without being paralysed by the uncertainty about which future will arrive.

Satya Narayana Nadella’s transformation of Microsoft from 2014 onward is the most cited contemporary example — and it deserves its citation because it illustrates the competency precisely.  When Nadella became CEO, Microsoft was a declining force in the industry it had once dominated.  Its Windows and Office franchises were being disintermediated by mobile platforms it had failed to capture.  Its search engine and hardware attempts had been costly failures.  The organisation was characterised by internal competition rather than collaboration, and its culture rewarded individual performance over collective innovation.

Nadella articulated a vision — Microsoft as a cloud-first, mobile-first company centred on empowering every person and organisation on the planet to achieve more — that was both directionally clear and technologically robust across multiple scenarios.  The vision did not depend on a specific prediction about which cloud applications would dominate, or which mobile platform would win, or which AI application would become commercially significant first.  It positioned Microsoft as the infrastructure provider for the digital economy across whatever specific form that economy took.

Microsoft’s market capitalisation rose from approximately US$300 billion at Nadella’s appointment to approximately US$3 trillion by early 2024 — a tenfold increase in a decade.  Azure’s cloud revenue grew from negligible in 2014 to approximately US$110 billion annually by 2024.  The strategic vision was vindicated not because it predicted specific outcomes correctly but because it positioned the organisation to benefit from a wide range of outcomes — which is precisely what VUCA-appropriate strategic thinking produces.

Adaptability

Adaptability is the most frequently cited VUCA leadership competency and the most frequently misunderstood.  It is commonly interpreted as the willingness to change direction.  In a VUCA environment, this interpretation is insufficient.  Changing direction in response to every signal produces an organisation that is reactive rather than adaptive — moving constantly but without a coherent trajectory.

True adaptability in a VUCA context is the capacity to maintain strategic coherence while adjusting tactical execution in response to new information.  The distinction between strategic coherence and tactical flexibility is the critical one.  The strategy answers the question of what the organisation is trying to achieve and why.  The tactics answer the question of how, given current conditions.  Adaptability means holding the strategy firm while adjusting the tactics continuously — not adjusting both simultaneously in response to every volatility signal.

Amazon’s evolution from online bookstore to cloud computing provider to logistics network to media company is the canonical example.  Each adaptation — entering a new market, building a new capability, acquiring a strategic asset — was tactically distinct.  The underlying strategic coherence — using scale, data, and logistics infrastructure to reduce friction in commerce and information access — was maintained across every adaptation.  Jeffrey Preston Bezos’ frequently cited statement that he is often asked what will change in the next ten years but rarely asked what will not change — and that the latter is the more important question for strategy — captures the adaptability principle precisely.  The strategic constants are what allow the tactical variables to change without producing organisational incoherence.

Collaboration

The complexity dimension of VUCA makes collaboration structurally necessary in ways that simpler environments do not.  In a low-complexity environment, a sufficiently expert individual or a sufficiently authoritative hierarchy can hold enough information to make good decisions.  In a complex environment, the information required for good decisions is distributed across multiple domains, functions, and external stakeholders in ways that no individual or hierarchy can aggregate effectively.  The response to complexity is therefore structural: building collaborative architectures that allow distributed information to be assembled, synthesised, and acted on faster than competitive alternatives can manage.

Timothy Donald Cook’s Apple illustrates the collaboration competency at the inter-organisational level — the management of a supply chain of unprecedented complexity involving thousands of suppliers across multiple countries, each contributing specialised capability that Apple coordinates rather than owns.  Apple’s competitive advantage in hardware is not primarily in manufacturing — it owns no factories.  It is in the coordination of a collaborative ecosystem of specialised suppliers, software developers, content creators, and retail partners that collectively produces outcomes no single organisation could achieve.

The COVID-19 vaccine development process provides a more acute illustration.  The mRNA vaccine developed by Pfizer-BioNTech was developed in approximately eleven months — a process that had previously taken a decade or more.  The speed was possible because of an unprecedented collaboration between academic researchers, pharmaceutical companies, governments, and regulatory bodies that created information-sharing arrangements and parallel development pathways that conventional sequential processes could not have produced.  The complexity of vaccine development had not changed.  The collaborative architecture for managing that complexity had been radically restructured.

Resilience

Resilience is the most psychologically demanding of the VUCA leadership competencies because it requires leaders to maintain performance under conditions of sustained adversity — not occasional setbacks, but the continuous pressure of operating in an environment where certainty, control, and predictability are structurally absent.  The conventional understanding of resilience as bouncing back from setbacks is inadequate for a VUCA environment.  Bouncing back implies returning to the previous state after a disruption.  In a VUCA environment, the previous state is gone.  The disruption has changed the environment permanently.  What is required is not bouncing back but bouncing forward — using the disruption as a forcing function for the adaptation that the environment already required, but that inertia had prevented.

Mary Teresa Barra’s leadership of General Motors through a period of simultaneous existential challenges — product recalls, regulatory scrutiny, labour disputes, the electric vehicle transition, and the COVID-19 supply chain collapse — illustrates the resilience competency in its most demanding form.  The GM ignition switch recall of 2014, which ultimately led to the recall of approximately 30 million vehicles and the identification of 124 deaths linked to the defect, was the kind of crisis that ends CEO careers.  Barra, who assumed the CEO role just weeks before the recall crisis became public, navigated the regulatory, legal, reputational, and operational dimensions of the crisis while simultaneously pursuing the strategic transformation of GM toward electric vehicles and autonomous driving — a transformation that required long-term investment commitment under conditions of acute short-term pressure.

GM’s EV commitment — targeting 30 new electric models by 2025 and investing US$35 billion in electric and autonomous vehicle development through 2025 — required maintaining strategic investment momentum through conditions that would have justified retreating to the familiar.  The resilience was not in surviving the crisis.  It was in using the crisis as the platform for a strategic transformation that the pre-crisis organisation would have been too comfortable to pursue.

Emotional Intelligence

The ambiguity dimension of VUCA creates specific leadership challenges that technical competencies cannot address.  When the correct interpretation of available information is not determinable from the information itself, the human dimension of leadership — the ability to build trust, maintain motivation, manage anxiety, and align diverse perspectives toward collective action — becomes the primary differentiator between organisations that function effectively under ambiguity and those that freeze or fragment.  Emotional intelligence in a VUCA context is not primarily about being pleasant to work with — though that is not irrelevant.  It is about the capacity to hold complexity and ambiguity in a way that allows others to function effectively under the same conditions.  The leader who projects certainty they do not have produces temporary confidence that collapses when the false certainty is revealed.  The leader who acknowledges uncertainty honestly while maintaining conviction about the organisation’s capacity to navigate it produces the kind of authentic trust that sustains collective effort under genuinely difficult conditions.

Indra Krishnamurthy Nooyi’s leadership of PepsiCo from 2006 to 2018 illustrates the emotional intelligence competency in its most strategically significant form.  Her Performance with Purpose strategy — integrating environmental, social, and financial performance targets into a single strategic framework — was, at the time of its introduction, a genuinely ambiguous proposition.  The financial case for prioritising long-term sustainability investments over short-term margin optimisation could not be established with the precision that conventional investment analysis required.  It required emotional intelligence — the ability to communicate conviction about a direction whose financial outcomes were genuinely uncertain, maintain organisational commitment through periods when the financial results of the strategy were not yet visible, and manage the inevitable internal resistance from those who preferred the clarity of conventional financial optimisation.

PepsiCo’s revenue grew from approximately US$35 billion in 2006 to approximately US$65 billion in 2017 under Nooyi’s leadership — a doubling that vindicated the long-term strategic orientation.  But the vindication arrived after years of uncertainty.  The emotional intelligence that sustained organisational commitment through that uncertainty was as important as the strategic vision that defined the destination.

Failure is Not Necessarily a Catastrophe

“Failure in itself may not be a catastrophe.  Still, failure to learn from failure is.”  This statement has circled the VUCA community without a verified attribution.  Regardless, it is true.  This is not a statement about resilience alone.  It is a statement about the relationship between experience and adaptation that defines VUCA leadership at its most fundamental level.  In a stable environment, failure is a negative outcome to be avoided.  The organisation that avoids failure performs better than the organisation that experiences it.  In a VUCA environment, failure is information.  The organisation that avoids failure by avoiding action generates less information than the organisation that acts, fails, learns, and adapts.  The information generated by failure — about which approaches do not work, about which assumptions were incorrect, about which capabilities require development — is the raw material of the adaptation that VUCA conditions require.

This reframes the entire VUCA leadership problem.  The goal is not to avoid the conditions that VUCA describes.  The conditions are permanent.  The goal is to build organisations whose learning velocity exceeds the rate at which the environment changes — so that each iteration of the adaptation cycle produces an organisation better positioned for the next disruption than the previous one.  The organisations that survive and prosper in VUCA environments are not the ones that are biggest, most established, or most resourced.  They are the ones that learn fastest.  Amazon has spent twenty years deliberately building a culture of experimentation — its “two-pizza team” structure, its Working Backwards product development methodology, its practice of writing six-page narratives before making significant decisions — specifically to maximise the rate at which the organisation generates and learns from experience, including failed experience.

The result is an organisation that treats failure not as a cost to be minimised but as a mechanism for generating the information that adaptation requires.  In 2014, the Amazon Fire Phone was one of the most prominent product failures in the history of the technology industry.  Jeff Bezos’s response is not bravado: “I’ve made billions of dollars of failures at Amazon.  Literally billions of dollars of failures.  You might remember Pets.com or Kosmo.com ... none of those things are fun.  But they don’t matter.”  It is a precise statement about the information value of failure in an organisation that treats learning velocity as its primary competitive advantage.

The Contention

VUCA leadership is not a framework that organisations can choose to adopt or decline based on preference.  It is the only framework adequate to the conditions that the current socioeconomic environment has permanently established.  The accelerating pace of technological change, the fragmentation of the geopolitical order, and the physical consequences of climate change have collectively produced conditions of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity that are structural rather than episodic.  They will not resolve.  They will intensify.  The organisation led by a conventional command-and-control hierarchy, with a fixed five-year strategic plan, optimised for efficiency in a stable environment, and staffed by specialists who avoid rather than learn from failure, is not a resilient organisation navigating difficult conditions.  It is a declining organisation that has not yet received the news.

VUCA leadership — visionary strategic thinking robust to multiple futures, adaptability that maintains strategic coherence while adjusting tactical execution, collaborative architectures that assemble distributed information for complex decisions, resilience that uses adversity as a platform for transformation, and emotional intelligence that maintains collective commitment under genuine uncertainty — is not a competitive advantage in the current environment.  It is the minimum viable leadership capability for survival.  Everything else is a more comfortable way of losing more slowly.

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Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code

Nobody Elected You to Try Your Best

 Most new Toastmasters club officers will fail.  This is not because they lack goodwill or enthusiasm.  They will fail because they mistake the title for the job.  Seventy per cent of Toastmasters clubs miss Distinguished Club Programme status every single year.  Roughly forty per cent of clubs that lapse do so within three years of charter.  The cause, in the overwhelming majority of cases, is not member apathy.  It is officer failure.  It is not the members who let the club down.  It is the people who put “President” or “Vice-President” on their LinkedIn profile and then discovered that a title is not a competency.

The structural problems of a Toastmasters Executive Committee are the structural problems of every organisation.  Leadership does not change character because the stakes are smaller.  It changes scale.  The failure modes stay the same.

The Illusion of Competence

Dr. David Alan Dunning and Dr. Justin Kruger published their landmark study in 1999.  The finding still embarrasses people twenty-five years later.  Incompetent individuals overestimate their own competence, precisely because they lack the metacognitive machinery to see the gap.  In a Toastmasters club, this shows up as the member who attended meetings for two years and concludes they understand how the club runs.  They do not.  Watching a meeting and running one occupy entirely different cognitive territory.  The member discovers this the moment they take office.  By then, the damage has usually started.

Aristotle made a related point in the Nicomachean Ethics, two thousand four hundred years before Dunning and Kruger got their names on a bias.  A person is not virtuous because they once acted virtuously.  Virtue is a disposition, sustained across time and pressure. Leadership works the same way.  You are not a leader because you hold a title.  You are a leader when you exercise leadership consistently, particularly on the days you would rather not.

Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli offered a diagnostic tool for spotting this early. “The first method for estimating the intelligence of a ruler is to look at the men he has around him,” he wrote in The Prince.  Apply that to a club.  The first method for judging a Toastmasters club is to look at who stood for office and who the membership elected.  A club that routinely elects the unprepared has a culture problem.  Training will not fix a culture problem.  Only the membership can.

Three Tiers, Constantly Confused

Every officer operates at one of three levels — strategic, tactical, or operational.  Confusing them is expensive.  The President sets direction, owns the relationship with the sponsoring organisation, and builds the succession pipeline from day one.  The Vice-Presidents translate that direction into term plans, recruitment pipelines, and educational programmes.  The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms keep the machine running week to week — records, funds, the room.

Plato drew this same tripartite structure in the Republic two millennia before anyone wrote an organisational chart.  Philosopher-kings direct.  Auxiliaries execute.  Craftsmen sustain.  Break any one layer and the whole structure collapses.  A President who personally sets up chairs has not demonstrated humility.  He has demonstrated that nobody trained the Sergeant-at-Arms, and that he does not trust anyone else to do it properly.  That is not devotion.  That is a governance failure wearing a modest smile.

Xenophon’s Cyropaedia makes the same point through Cyrus the Great, who delegated deliberately and held each tier accountable for outcomes, not effort.  Cyrus did not run the Persian imperial administration personally.  He built a structure where each level was resourced and accountable, then left it alone to function.  A President who is everywhere has not built a team. He has built a dependency, and dependencies collapse the moment he takes a fortnight off.

Role ambiguity is not a soft, forgivable failing either.  Dr. Susan E. Jackson’s and Dr. Randall S. Schuler’s 1985 meta-analysis, covering thirty-five years of role stress research, found that ambiguity about what a position actually requires directly impairs performance, raises anxiety, and reduces commitment.  In a volunteer organisation, where the rewards are intrinsic and patience for frustration is thin, ambiguity is corrosive faster than in any paid workplace.  This is why the training session exists.  It is not a courtesy.  It is damage control performed in advance.

The President: On the Spot, Not in the Room

Arthur Wellesley, 1^st Duke of Wellington, did not win at Waterloo through inspirational speeches.  He won because, in the weeks before June 1815, he personally reviewed supply lines and officer dispositions with an obsessiveness his peers found excessive.  “I was always on the spot,” he said afterwards, without a trace of false modesty.  The Toastmasters President who delegates everything and then vanishes until the annual awards night is not exercising trust.  He is discovering that the position he assumed he held has quietly eroded while he was not looking.

Contrast that with Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, who served under six French regimes — the Ancien Régime, the Revolution, the Directory, Napoleon, the Restoration, and the July Monarchy — and outlasted every one of them.  He did not survive through ideological flexibility alone.  He survived because he was genuinely, reliably good at his job.  Competence, not charm, is the only form of job security that no regime change can take away from you.  Officers who chase popularity over competence should remember that popularity has never once paid Toastmasters International's dues on time.

Talleyrand also understood restraint.  “Too much zeal offends where indirection works,” he warned.  Apply that to the micromanaging President who corrects every Vice-President’s every decision.  Constant intervention does not signal high standards.  It signals distrust, and it destroys the initiative of the very officers you are supposedly developing.  If you appointed the wrong people, that is your failure at selection.  If you appointed the right people and still cannot let them work, that is a different failure, and it is entirely yours as well.

Vice-President, Education: Building Habits, Not Counting Speeches

Aristotle’s concept of telos — the natural end towards which an activity is directed — cuts straight through the most common failure of this role.  The purpose of the educational programme is not speeches delivered.  It is members developed.  A Vice-President, Education, who fills the schedule without asking whether each speech advances a member’s actual goals, has confused busyness with effectiveness.  “We are what we repeatedly do.  Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit,” Aristotle wrote, and the educational programme is, at bottom, a habit-formation system — for prepared delivery, for constructive evaluation, for listening.

Dr. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s 1990 work on flow states adds the calibration mechanism.  Human beings perform best at the boundary between current capability and the next level up.  Too easy, and boredom sets in.  Too difficult, and anxiety takes over.  A new member thrown into an advanced Pathways project will panic and quietly disappear.  A veteran member handed nothing, but Ice Breaker-level roles will get bored and drift.  The Vice-President, Education, who does not know exactly where each member sits in their journey, cannot calibrate anything.  They are guessing, and guessing is not a programme.

The Prussian General Staff, refined under Field Marshal Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, ran on a principle called Auftragstaktik — mission-based tactics.  Commanders issued clear intent, the what and the why, and left the how to subordinates trusted to exercise judgement.  The Vice-President, Education, should run the same model.  Communicate the goal — the Pathways target, the DCP contribution — clearly.  Then collaborate on the how, rather than dictating it.  A member who understands why they are doing a project prepares for it properly.  A member who has simply been handed a slot does not.

Vice-President, Membership: Guarding the Ones You Already Have

Plato’s guardians in the Republic were charged with preserving the existing community, not merely acquiring new territory.  Apply that to membership.  A club known for the quality of its member experience recruits based on reputation.  A club known for losing people recruits against its own reputation, and no amount of enthusiastic prospecting fixes that . The member who attended three months ago and quietly stopped deserves as much attention as the prospect who might attend next month.

Prof. Abraham Harold Maslow’s hierarchy places belongingness above physiological and safety needs, and below esteem and self-actualisation.  Members join Toastmasters for belonging as much as for skill.  They leave when belonging disappears, quietly, without drama, and usually without telling anyone why.  Dr. Teresa M. Amabile’s and Dr. Steven J. Kramer’s 2011 research, The Progress Principle, found that the single strongest driver of workplace motivation is visible progress on meaningful work.  It translates directly here.  Members who see themselves completing Pathways levels and taking on new roles do not need retention campaigns.  They stay because the experience itself rewards them.  Which means the Vice-President, Membership, and Vice-President, Education, are not separate departments.  They are the same retention mechanism, wearing two different hats.

The Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 BC, recorded by Thucydides, remains the definitive case study in acquisition without consolidation.  Athens poured enormous resources into conquering new territory while neglecting the political cohesion and logistics needed to sustain the campaign.  The result was total destruction — not because recruitment of soldiers failed, but because nothing existed to sustain them once they arrived.  A Vice-President, Membership, who recruits aggressively while ignoring onboarding and mentorship is running the same experiment, with a marginally lower body count.

Vice-President, Public Relations: Reputation Is Not Decoration

Talleyrand again, this time at the Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815, representing a defeated France and somehow restoring its standing as a major European power — not through military recovery, but through the deliberate management of perception.  Perception is not a substitute for substance.  It is the vehicle that carries the substance to people who have never experienced it directly.

Asch's 1946 experiments on impression formation showed that information received first carries disproportionate weight in the final judgement — the primacy effect.  Dr. Edward Lee Thorndike’s Halo Effect, documented in 1920, showed that a positive impression in one domain bleeds into unrelated domains. A club whose first external touchpoint — a LinkedIn post, a web page — is polished and specific benefits from that halo.  Prospects assume the meetings themselves are equally professional.  A shoddy first touchpoint produces the identical effect in reverse, and no amount of quality inside the room will undo the damage of a bad first impression outside it.

The British SAS maintains a formal policy of never confirming or denying specific operations, and its global reputation remains unchallenged regardless, built on a small number of precisely chosen disclosures rather than volume.  Data from 2024 confirms the same principle at the Toastmasters scale.  LinkedIn posts featuring genuine member spotlights generate three times the engagement of generic club announcements.  A Vice-President, Public Relations, who posts once a month and calls it done has not done the job.  Specificity is the currency.  Noise is not a substitute for it.

Club Secretary: The Custodian Nobody Thanks

Roman administrators called this function the custos — the keeper. Rome’s extraordinary administrative durability across centuries rested on accurate, accessible records.  The Toastmasters Secretary occupies the same function on a smaller stage.  The charter, the Constitution, the minutes, the correspondence with World Headquarters — these are not bureaucratic trivia.  They are the documentary foundation of the club’s legal standing and institutional memory.

Napoleon Bonaparte dictated to multiple secretaries simultaneously and left behind over 22,000 letters and dispatches, preserved in the 32-volume Correspondance de Napoléon Ier.  He understood that an order unwritten is an order unverifiable, and an unverifiable order invites misunderstanding and evasion.  A motion passed in an Executive Committee meeting and never recorded in the minutes has the same practical effect as a motion never passed.  It cannot be enforced.  It cannot be appealed.  It cannot be built upon.

Dr. Murray R. Barrick’s and Dr. Michael K. Mount’s 1991 meta-analysis of over one hundred studies identified Conscientiousness as the single strongest personality predictor of job performance across nearly every occupational category.  The Secretary role demands it above every other trait.  A candidate who tends toward disorganisation and procrastination will fail in this role regardless of intelligence, charm, or enthusiasm.  Clubs that lose their charter rarely cite Secretary failure as the headline cause.  Check the timeline anyway.  The collapse almost always started there.

Club Treasurer: The Barings Problem in Miniature

In February 1995, a single trader in Singapore brought down Barings Bank — Britain’s oldest merchant bank, in business since 1762.  Nicholas William Leeson accumulated losses of £827 million because he controlled both the trading desk and the back-office settlement function simultaneously.  Nobody was watching the watcher.

The constitutional rule barring a Toastmasters Treasurer from serving two successive terms is not bureaucratic pedantry.  It is a direct, unsentimental response to exactly this failure pattern.  Long incumbency breeds comfort.  Comfort breeds informal shortcuts. Informal shortcuts, left unchecked long enough, breed catastrophe.  John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, 1^st Baron Acton, put the underlying principle more elegantly than I ever could in his 1887 letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”  A club that lets one person control the books indefinitely, without independent review by the Club Auditors, is not showing loyalty.  It is running the Barings experiment on a smaller, marginally less expensive scale.

Sergeant-at-Arms: The Environment Is the Message

The Broken Windows theory, proposed by criminologists Dr. James Quin Wilson and Dr. George L. Kelling in a 1982 Atlantic Monthly article, argued that visible disorder — broken windows, graffiti — signals the absence of social control and invites more of it.  A meeting room with a crooked banner, scattered chairs, and no one at the door sends the identical signal, and prospective members read it instantly, without needing to hear a single speech.

Xenophon’s Anabasis records his leadership of ten thousand Greek mercenaries retreating through hostile Persian territory in 401 BC after their generals were murdered. Strategic brilliance would have meant nothing if the army had starved on the march.  Survival depended entirely on operational execution — food, discipline, logistics.  The Sergeant-at-Arms is the club’s Xenophon.  Nobody applauds a straight banner.  Everybody notices, instantly and unforgivingly, when the room is a shambles.

The British Household Division inspects ceremonial uniforms to the nearest millimetre and rehearses drill movements thousands of times before a single public performance.  The purpose is not aesthetic vanity.  It is reputational signalling — every correct detail communicates that the institution takes itself seriously.  A Sergeant-at-Arms who sets the room to that same standard, thirty minutes before the meeting, rather than at the same time as it, is performing the identical function on a smaller stage.

How the Roles Interlock, and Why Systems Thinking Beats Talent

Dr. Donella Hager Meadows, in Thinking in Systems (2008), described the characteristic failure of any system run by people who understand their individual components but not the feedback loops connecting them.  Each officer optimises their own patch rationally, while the combined effect quietly degrades the whole.  A Vice-President, Membership, who recruits aggressively to hit a personal target, without checking programme capacity with Vice-President, Education, is creating a systemic problem while hitting an individual one.

The 1986 Challenger disaster remains the definitive case study.  The immediate cause was an O-ring failure.  The real cause was a communication breakdown between engineers who knew about the O-ring’s cold-weather limitations and a launch decision made without that knowledge crossing the organisational boundary in time.  The knowledge existed.  The mechanism to transmit it did not. Every Executive Committee runs the identical risk, on a mercifully lower-stakes stage, whenever officers stop talking to each other between meetings.

Attribution theory, developed by Dr. Fritz Heider and extended by Dr. Harold Harding Kelley and Dr. Bernard Weiner, shows that people systematically credit outcomes either to internal factors — their own effort and competence — or external ones, circumstances and bad luck.  Underperforming officers reliably reach for the external explanation.  “The members did not engage enough.”  “The timing was difficult.”  Distinguished Club Programme goals are specific, internal, and entirely within an officer's control.  They do not respond to market conditions.  An officer who misses a goal and blames the weather has learned nothing, and has simply protected their own ego at the club’s expense.

The Standard Has Not Changed, and It Isn't Going To

Plato’s ship of state offers the closing image.  A ship navigated by someone who does not understand celestial navigation will founder, regardless of how hard the navigator tries. Passengers do not care about effort.  They care about arriving.  An officer who tries hard and still misses the outcome has, from the members’ perspective, delivered the same result as an officer who never tried at all.  That is an uncomfortable sentence.  It is meant to be.

You were not elected to try your best.  You were elected to deliver a specific, measurable outcome.  Generalmajor Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz called the discipline required to see that through Entschlussigkeit — resoluteness of character, the courage to act decisively through friction and the thousand small difficulties that erode weaker commanders before the first real test arrives.  Resolution on the first day of term is easy.  Resolution sustained through the eleventh month, when nobody is watching, and the energy has drained out of the room, is the only version that counts.

The seven officer roles are not seven equal contributions to be graded on a curve.  They are seven necessary functions.  Remove one, and the whole degrades visibly and immediately, in front of the very members you were elected to serve.  An officer who does not understand their role has not merely failed themselves.  They have failed everyone who trusted them with it.

Aristotle’s eudaimonia — flourishing, not mere happiness — describes what's actually on offer here, if you take the role seriously.  The officer who publishes the programme on time, tracks the DCP goals, retains members, manages the accounts with precision, and sets the room before anyone else arrives is not simply doing a job competently.  They are exercising their full capacities in service of something worthwhile, which is as close to a definition of flourishing as Aristotle ever gave us.  The alternative — holding a title and exercising none of its responsibilities — is not a lesser version of the same thing.  It is a different thing entirely, and a considerably poorer one.

Know your role.  Own your role.  Execute your role.  There genuinely is no fourth option, however much certain officers wish there were.

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Terence Nunis, DTM | Division Advisor, District 80 Division M | Club Advisor, AIA Toastmasters | Past President & Founder, Awesome Toastmasters