There is a certain kind of strategic
vanity that mistakes military capability for strategic wisdom. It is the vanity of the man who mistakes a
loaded weapon for a plan. Israel and the
United Arab Emirates have both spent the better part of a decade confusing the
two. The contrast with Singapore’s
approach is the point.
Israel: Winning the Battle, Losing the
Balance Sheet
Let us start with the numbers, because the
numbers are brutal. Israel’s direct war
cost from October 2023 is ₪220 billion — around US$67 billion and
counting. The defence budget for 2026 is
₪143 billion, around US$45 billion, representing close to 38 per cent of the
entire government budget. SIPRI
estimates cumulative military spending over the conflict has risen 59 per cent
above pre-war levels, reaching around US$190 billion in total. The government ran a 6.8 per cent of GDP
deficit in 2024, against a 0.6 per cent surplus in 2022. Fitch and S&P both rate Israel with a negative
outlook. The 5-year credit default swap
spread sits at 75.5 basis points. Moody’s
shifted its outlook on Israel from negative to stable in February 2026, which
the more optimistic commentators described as a vote of confidence. It was not.
It was a pause before the next downgrade. Moody’s had already cut the rating during the
conflict. The debt-to-GDP ratio, which was
60 per cent before the war, is projected to reach 70.5 per cent by the end of 2026. Every percentage point of that rise
represents structural fiscal deterioration that will outlast whatever military
outcome eventually emerges from Gaza.
None of this was inevitable. It was chosen. The choices stretch back further than October
2023. For years, successive Israeli
governments under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chose to manage Gaza rather
than resolve it — funding Hamas indirectly through Qatari transfers,
fragmenting Palestinian political leadership to prevent a viable negotiating
partner from emerging, and treating a military deterrence doctrine as a
substitute for a political strategy. The
7th October attack was the consequence of that strategic negligence
meeting catastrophic intelligence failure.
The subsequent military campaign has consumed resources on a scale that
makes the initial deterrence calculation look almost comically wrong. At peak mobilisation, Israel called up
300,000 reservists. Each costs ₪50,000
per month to maintain. At current levels
of 60,000 to 100,000 reservists still deployed, the monthly cost is between ₪3
billion and ₪5 billion — before a single shell is fired or a single hospital
rebuilt.
The regional consequences compound the
fiscal damage. Tourism, which
contributed US$7.3 billion to the Israeli economy in 2019, has collapsed. Northern communities near the Lebanese border
remain largely evacuated. The technology
sector, which had been Israel’s most credible growth engine — 42 unicorns and
rising — now faces capital flight as investors reprice geopolitical risk. Foreign direct investment slowed sharply
through 2024. Israel is a small, open
economy that depends on external confidence.
Military adventurism, even when framed as existential necessity,
corrodes that confidence. The 10-year
government bond yield at 4.0 per cent reflects a market that is not entirely
convinced.
The UAE: The Boutique Regional Power
with an Expensive Habit
If Israel’s strategic misjudgement is
rooted in miscalculation, the UAE’s is rooted in ambition. Abu Dhabi has spent fifteen years building
the infrastructure of a regional military power — not to defend itself in any
conventional sense, but to project influence across a geography that spans
Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Chad. The stated logic is counterterrorism and the
suppression of political Islam. The
operational reality is a systematic effort to install friendly strongmen,
secure maritime chokepoints, and extract economic rents from strategically
valuable territories.
The scale of the commitment is
striking. A United Nations panel
documented 458 heavy transport flights from UAE-linked locations to eastern
Libya alone between October 2024 and the end of 2025, delivering military supplies
to Khalifa Belqasim Haftar’s forces. The
UAE was, per UN experts, the primary foreign backer of Haftar’s 2019 offensive
on Tripoli. In Sudan, the Rapid Support
Forces — responsible for atrocities documented by multiple international bodies
— received military, logistical, and financial support from Abu Dhabi, including
the recruitment of several hundred Colombian mercenaries through UAE-based
firms. In Ethiopia, Emirati drones were
supplied to the government during the 2021 Tigray offensive. None of this comes without cost, though the
UAE has until recently managed to insulate itself from the consequences with
remarkable skill.
The Yemen adventure is instructive. The UAE entered the conflict in 2015,
withdrew its main forces in 2019, then tried to maintain influence through the
Southern Transitional Council. By late
2025, the gains Abu Dhabi had backed in Yemen were being rolled back by
Saudi-aligned forces in what amounted to an open proxy confrontation between
two nominal allies. The Houthis, who had
been the original target, struck Emirati infrastructure on UAE soil in January
2022 — oil facilities at Mussafah and near Abu Dhabi International
Airport. Three people died. Oil prices spiked. The Gulf’s supposed model of stability
suddenly looked less stable.
The OPEC+ exit in April 2026, which the
SWP Berlin analysis describes as likely to further strain Saudi-UAE relations,
is not an isolated event. It is the
culmination of a decade-long drift in which Abu Dhabi increasingly pursued its
own strategic agenda at the expense of Gulf solidarity. Saudi Arabia closed its airspace to UAE
supply flights to the RSF — an extraordinary act between supposed partners. Egypt and Somalia did the same.
The reputational costs are becoming
economic costs. The DP World executive
chairman resigned following a Canadian pension fund intervention linked to
reputational concerns. The UAE was
removed from the FATF grey list in 2024 — a list it had been placed on partly
because of the financial opacity surrounding its various proxy conflicts. Civil society organisations called the
removal premature. Western financial
institutions paying attention to ESG pressures noticed both the listing and the
controversy over the removal.
Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth institutions
— Mubadala, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the Investment Corporation of
Dubai — hold positions worth US$1.4 trillion in US commitments alone. They depend on the UAE being perceived as a
stable, law-abiding partner. The gap
between that perception and the operational reality documented by UN panels
grows wider each year. The UAE has
committed US$110 billion to Africa from 2019 to 2023. It has pledged US$35 billion to develop Egypt’s
Mediterranean coast. It has signed a
30-year port concession in Tanzania and a US$80 million logistics hub near the
Suez Canal. These are real investments,
and they reflect real commercial acumen.
They also depend on the stability of the very regions the UAE’s military
interventions are actively destabilising.
Abu Dhabi is simultaneously funding the fire brigade and the
arsonist. At some point, the insurance
premiums become unbearable.
The Singapore Doctrine: What Strategic
Discipline Looks Like
Singapore watches these developments with
the quiet satisfaction of a country that learned its lessons in advance. Singapore’s defence architecture rests on
three principles that Israel and the UAE have both violated, in different ways,
with predictable results.
The first is strategic hedging over
alliance. Israel made the error of
treating Washington as a permanent guarantor.
When Washington’s internal consensus shifted toward transactional
isolationism under successive administrations, Tel Aviv found its options
narrowing in real time. The lesson is
not that alliances are worthless. It is
that dependence on a single external guarantor is a liability that compounds at
the worst possible moment. Singapore has
never made this mistake. The city-state
hosts American naval assets at Changi Naval Base while simultaneously
maintaining substantive diplomatic, economic, and defence dialogues with China. It anchors its primary security identity
within ASEAN, where no single external power holds a veto. Singapore does not practise superpower
monogamy. It practises strategic
promiscuity of the most deliberate and disciplined kind.
The second principle is technology
sovereignty. The United States used its
defence leverage over Israel to push for the reshoring of dual-use technologies
and venture capital — a reminder that high-technology dependence on a single
patron creates exposure that shows up in moments of political friction. Singapore’s Defence Science and Technology
Agency and DSO National Laboratories treat the domestic defence science
ecosystem as a strictly sovereign asset.
When Singapore purchases advanced foreign platforms, including its forthcoming
fleet of F-35 jets, it retains the independent capability to maintain,
integrate, and secure its own systems.
No foreign entity holds a kill switch over Singapore’s technology or
intellectual property.
The third principle is fiscal discipline
as strategic reserve. Israel is
discovering what happens when a small, open economy funds a prolonged
high-intensity conflict through deficit spending and foreign confidence. The debt rises. The ratings drift lower. The cost of capital increases. Foreign policy options narrow as fiscal space
shrinks. Singapore runs no deficit. It has never borrowed to fund consumption in
its history as an independent nation.
Its reserves, managed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore, GIC, and
Temasek, exceed US$900 billion. That
fiscal position is not a vanity project.
It is a strategic buffer that lets Singapore weather prolonged external
shocks—a global recession, a supply chain crisis, a regional conflict—without
trading its foreign policy autonomy for financial survival. When Singapore was expelled from Malaysia in
1965, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew wept on television. He then spent the next thirty years building
the set of capabilities that would make Singapore impossible to coerce. He understood, as small-state leaders rarely
do, that survival is not a function of military projection. It is a function of making yourself too
costly to attack and too useful to alienate.
Israel and the UAE both forgot this.
Or perhaps they never knew it.
The Reckoning
Military adventurism is seductive because
its costs are deferred. You spend the
money now, and the bills arrive later.
You project strength today and discover the exposure tomorrow. For Israel, the exposure is now fully
visible. US$67 billion in direct war
costs. A 70.5 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio
by year-end. A negative outlook from two
of the three major rating agencies. A
defence burden consuming 38 per cent of the government budget. A technology sector that was the country’s
most credible engine of long-term growth, now navigating capital flight. And a political leadership, as Fitch noted,
whose “fractious domestic environment may hinder fiscal consolidation” — which
is credit agency language for a government too dysfunctional to fix what it has
broken.
For the UAE, the reckoning is slower but
structural. An OPEC+ exit that strains
the most important regional partnership it has.
Saudi and Egyptian airspace closed to its supply flights. UN panels documenting arms transfers to
forces committing atrocities. Sovereign
wealth positions worth trillions of dollars dependent on a reputational
credibility that Abu Dhabi’s operational behaviour is steadily eroding. And a set of African investments predicated
on regional stability, being pursued simultaneously with military interventions
that undermine that stability.
The Singapore model offers no
guarantees. Small states can be coerced,
isolated, or overrun by forces larger than themselves. Singapore’s survival is not inevitable. What the Singapore model offers is a
framework for making the worst outcomes less likely — by not creating enemies
unnecessarily, by not allowing fiscal weakness to constrain strategic choice,
and by not mistaking the capacity for military action with the wisdom to use
it. There is a reason Singapore spends
around 3 per cent of GDP on defence and faces no existential threats. There is a reason Israel spends around 6 per
cent and faces nothing else. The
difference is not geography. It is
doctrine. The lesson from the Middle
East is not that small states should not defend themselves. It is that the distinction between defence
and adventurism matters enormously — and that the states which confuse the two
end up paying for both.
Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman,
Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code

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