20 November, 2026

The Price of Swagger: How Israel & the UAE Traded Security for Adventure

There is a certain kind of strategic vanity that mistakes military capability for strategic wisdom.  It is the vanity of the man who mistakes a loaded weapon for a plan.  Israel and the United Arab Emirates have both spent the better part of a decade confusing the two.  The contrast with Singapore’s approach is the point.

Israel: Winning the Battle, Losing the Balance Sheet

Let us start with the numbers, because the numbers are brutal.  Israel’s direct war cost from October 2023 is ₪220 billion — around US$67 billion and counting.  The defence budget for 2026 is ₪143 billion, around US$45 billion, representing close to 38 per cent of the entire government budget.  SIPRI estimates cumulative military spending over the conflict has risen 59 per cent above pre-war levels, reaching around US$190 billion in total.  The government ran a 6.8 per cent of GDP deficit in 2024, against a 0.6 per cent surplus in 2022.  Fitch and S&P both rate Israel with a negative outlook.  The 5-year credit default swap spread sits at 75.5 basis points.  Moody’s shifted its outlook on Israel from negative to stable in February 2026, which the more optimistic commentators described as a vote of confidence.  It was not.  It was a pause before the next downgrade.  Moody’s had already cut the rating during the conflict.  The debt-to-GDP ratio, which was 60 per cent before the war, is projected to reach 70.5 per cent by the end of 2026.  Every percentage point of that rise represents structural fiscal deterioration that will outlast whatever military outcome eventually emerges from Gaza.

None of this was inevitable.  It was chosen.  The choices stretch back further than October 2023.  For years, successive Israeli governments under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chose to manage Gaza rather than resolve it — funding Hamas indirectly through Qatari transfers, fragmenting Palestinian political leadership to prevent a viable negotiating partner from emerging, and treating a military deterrence doctrine as a substitute for a political strategy.  The 7th October attack was the consequence of that strategic negligence meeting catastrophic intelligence failure.  The subsequent military campaign has consumed resources on a scale that makes the initial deterrence calculation look almost comically wrong.  At peak mobilisation, Israel called up 300,000 reservists.  Each costs ₪50,000 per month to maintain.  At current levels of 60,000 to 100,000 reservists still deployed, the monthly cost is between ₪3 billion and ₪5 billion — before a single shell is fired or a single hospital rebuilt.

The regional consequences compound the fiscal damage.  Tourism, which contributed US$7.3 billion to the Israeli economy in 2019, has collapsed.  Northern communities near the Lebanese border remain largely evacuated.  The technology sector, which had been Israel’s most credible growth engine — 42 unicorns and rising — now faces capital flight as investors reprice geopolitical risk.  Foreign direct investment slowed sharply through 2024.  Israel is a small, open economy that depends on external confidence.  Military adventurism, even when framed as existential necessity, corrodes that confidence.  The 10-year government bond yield at 4.0 per cent reflects a market that is not entirely convinced.

The UAE: The Boutique Regional Power with an Expensive Habit

If Israel’s strategic misjudgement is rooted in miscalculation, the UAE’s is rooted in ambition.  Abu Dhabi has spent fifteen years building the infrastructure of a regional military power — not to defend itself in any conventional sense, but to project influence across a geography that spans Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Chad.  The stated logic is counterterrorism and the suppression of political Islam.  The operational reality is a systematic effort to install friendly strongmen, secure maritime chokepoints, and extract economic rents from strategically valuable territories.

The scale of the commitment is striking.  A United Nations panel documented 458 heavy transport flights from UAE-linked locations to eastern Libya alone between October 2024 and the end of 2025, delivering military supplies to Khalifa Belqasim Haftar’s forces.  The UAE was, per UN experts, the primary foreign backer of Haftar’s 2019 offensive on Tripoli.  In Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces — responsible for atrocities documented by multiple international bodies — received military, logistical, and financial support from Abu Dhabi, including the recruitment of several hundred Colombian mercenaries through UAE-based firms.  In Ethiopia, Emirati drones were supplied to the government during the 2021 Tigray offensive.  None of this comes without cost, though the UAE has until recently managed to insulate itself from the consequences with remarkable skill.

The Yemen adventure is instructive.  The UAE entered the conflict in 2015, withdrew its main forces in 2019, then tried to maintain influence through the Southern Transitional Council.  By late 2025, the gains Abu Dhabi had backed in Yemen were being rolled back by Saudi-aligned forces in what amounted to an open proxy confrontation between two nominal allies.  The Houthis, who had been the original target, struck Emirati infrastructure on UAE soil in January 2022 — oil facilities at Mussafah and near Abu Dhabi International Airport.  Three people died.  Oil prices spiked.  The Gulf’s supposed model of stability suddenly looked less stable.

The OPEC+ exit in April 2026, which the SWP Berlin analysis describes as likely to further strain Saudi-UAE relations, is not an isolated event.  It is the culmination of a decade-long drift in which Abu Dhabi increasingly pursued its own strategic agenda at the expense of Gulf solidarity.  Saudi Arabia closed its airspace to UAE supply flights to the RSF — an extraordinary act between supposed partners.  Egypt and Somalia did the same.

The reputational costs are becoming economic costs.  The DP World executive chairman resigned following a Canadian pension fund intervention linked to reputational concerns.  The UAE was removed from the FATF grey list in 2024 — a list it had been placed on partly because of the financial opacity surrounding its various proxy conflicts.  Civil society organisations called the removal premature.  Western financial institutions paying attention to ESG pressures noticed both the listing and the controversy over the removal.

Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth institutions — Mubadala, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the Investment Corporation of Dubai — hold positions worth US$1.4 trillion in US commitments alone.  They depend on the UAE being perceived as a stable, law-abiding partner.  The gap between that perception and the operational reality documented by UN panels grows wider each year.  The UAE has committed US$110 billion to Africa from 2019 to 2023.  It has pledged US$35 billion to develop Egypt’s Mediterranean coast.  It has signed a 30-year port concession in Tanzania and a US$80 million logistics hub near the Suez Canal.  These are real investments, and they reflect real commercial acumen.  They also depend on the stability of the very regions the UAE’s military interventions are actively destabilising.  Abu Dhabi is simultaneously funding the fire brigade and the arsonist.  At some point, the insurance premiums become unbearable.

The Singapore Doctrine: What Strategic Discipline Looks Like

Singapore watches these developments with the quiet satisfaction of a country that learned its lessons in advance.  Singapore’s defence architecture rests on three principles that Israel and the UAE have both violated, in different ways, with predictable results.

The first is strategic hedging over alliance.  Israel made the error of treating Washington as a permanent guarantor.  When Washington’s internal consensus shifted toward transactional isolationism under successive administrations, Tel Aviv found its options narrowing in real time.  The lesson is not that alliances are worthless.  It is that dependence on a single external guarantor is a liability that compounds at the worst possible moment.  Singapore has never made this mistake.  The city-state hosts American naval assets at Changi Naval Base while simultaneously maintaining substantive diplomatic, economic, and defence dialogues with China.  It anchors its primary security identity within ASEAN, where no single external power holds a veto.  Singapore does not practise superpower monogamy.  It practises strategic promiscuity of the most deliberate and disciplined kind.

The second principle is technology sovereignty.  The United States used its defence leverage over Israel to push for the reshoring of dual-use technologies and venture capital — a reminder that high-technology dependence on a single patron creates exposure that shows up in moments of political friction.  Singapore’s Defence Science and Technology Agency and DSO National Laboratories treat the domestic defence science ecosystem as a strictly sovereign asset.  When Singapore purchases advanced foreign platforms, including its forthcoming fleet of F-35 jets, it retains the independent capability to maintain, integrate, and secure its own systems.  No foreign entity holds a kill switch over Singapore’s technology or intellectual property.

The third principle is fiscal discipline as strategic reserve.  Israel is discovering what happens when a small, open economy funds a prolonged high-intensity conflict through deficit spending and foreign confidence.  The debt rises.  The ratings drift lower.  The cost of capital increases.  Foreign policy options narrow as fiscal space shrinks.  Singapore runs no deficit.  It has never borrowed to fund consumption in its history as an independent nation.  Its reserves, managed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore, GIC, and Temasek, exceed US$900 billion.  That fiscal position is not a vanity project.  It is a strategic buffer that lets Singapore weather prolonged external shocks—a global recession, a supply chain crisis, a regional conflict—without trading its foreign policy autonomy for financial survival.  When Singapore was expelled from Malaysia in 1965, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew wept on television.  He then spent the next thirty years building the set of capabilities that would make Singapore impossible to coerce.  He understood, as small-state leaders rarely do, that survival is not a function of military projection.  It is a function of making yourself too costly to attack and too useful to alienate.  Israel and the UAE both forgot this.  Or perhaps they never knew it.

The Reckoning

Military adventurism is seductive because its costs are deferred.  You spend the money now, and the bills arrive later.  You project strength today and discover the exposure tomorrow.  For Israel, the exposure is now fully visible.  US$67 billion in direct war costs.  A 70.5 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio by year-end.  A negative outlook from two of the three major rating agencies.  A defence burden consuming 38 per cent of the government budget.  A technology sector that was the country’s most credible engine of long-term growth, now navigating capital flight.  And a political leadership, as Fitch noted, whose “fractious domestic environment may hinder fiscal consolidation” — which is credit agency language for a government too dysfunctional to fix what it has broken.

For the UAE, the reckoning is slower but structural.  An OPEC+ exit that strains the most important regional partnership it has.  Saudi and Egyptian airspace closed to its supply flights.  UN panels documenting arms transfers to forces committing atrocities.  Sovereign wealth positions worth trillions of dollars dependent on a reputational credibility that Abu Dhabi’s operational behaviour is steadily eroding.  And a set of African investments predicated on regional stability, being pursued simultaneously with military interventions that undermine that stability.

The Singapore model offers no guarantees.  Small states can be coerced, isolated, or overrun by forces larger than themselves.  Singapore’s survival is not inevitable.  What the Singapore model offers is a framework for making the worst outcomes less likely — by not creating enemies unnecessarily, by not allowing fiscal weakness to constrain strategic choice, and by not mistaking the capacity for military action with the wisdom to use it.  There is a reason Singapore spends around 3 per cent of GDP on defence and faces no existential threats.  There is a reason Israel spends around 6 per cent and faces nothing else.  The difference is not geography.  It is doctrine.  The lesson from the Middle East is not that small states should not defend themselves.  It is that the distinction between defence and adventurism matters enormously — and that the states which confuse the two end up paying for both.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code



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