The following is my answer to a Quora
question: “What is inherent risk in
investment?”
Inherent risk is one of three risk
categories that auditors and compliance professionals assess. The other two are control risk and detection
risk. Understanding the distinction
between them is not merely academic. It
is the difference between a portfolio that survives a crisis and one that
discovers its vulnerabilities at exactly the wrong moment.
The Three-Risk Framework
Inherent risk is the risk embedded in a
financial statement, transaction, or instrument that exists independently of
any control system. It arises from the
nature of the asset, the complexity of the transaction, or the environment in
which it operates — not from a failure to manage it. A futures contract on an agricultural
commodity carries inherent risk because crop yields cannot be predicted with
certainty. That risk exists whether the
risk management department has three layers of approval processes.
Control risk is the risk that the control
systems in place fail to detect or prevent a misstatement or error. This is the second layer. The controls exist. They have failed. A bank with a risk management framework, an
internal audit team, and a compliance function that still manages to accumulate
US$6.2 billion in losses through a single London-based trading desk — as JP
Morgan Chase did in 2012 in the London Whale scandal — has experienced control
risk at an institutional scale.
Detection risk is the risk that the
auditor or compliance manager fails to identify the problem even after it has
occurred. This is the third layer and,
in many ways, the most dangerous — because by the time detection risk
materialises, the inherent risk has already converted into actual loss, and the
controls have already failed.
The auditor assesses the level of inherent
risk in a portfolio or financial statement and calibrates detection effort and
reporting standards accordingly. The
higher the inherent risk, the more intensive the audit process should be. The Subprime Crisis demonstrated what happens
when this calibration fails at systemic scale.
The Subprime Crisis as a Case Study
in Inherent Risk
A single failure did not cause the 2008
global financial crisis. It was caused
by the systematic mispricing of inherent risk across an entire asset class —
and the subsequent failure of control risk and detection risk at every
institutional level simultaneously.
Collateralised Debt Obligations — CDOs —
were bundles of mortgage-backed securities of varying credit quality, from
investment grade to junk, packaged together and sold as diversified fixed
income instruments. The inherent risk in
each mortgage was the possibility of default by the borrower. The inherent risk in the CDO was the
correlation between those individual defaults — specifically, whether they
would occur independently or simultaneously.
The rating agencies — Standard & Poor’s,
Moody’s, Fitch — assessed this inherent risk using models that assumed mortgage
defaults were largely uncorrelated: that a borrower defaulting in Florida did
not significantly increase the probability of a borrower defaulting in
California. This assumption was
wrong. When the US housing market
declined nationally, defaults correlated precisely because they shared the same
underlying cause: falling house prices across all markets simultaneously.
The CDOs that had been rated AAA — the
highest possible credit quality — turned out to contain inherent risk that the
models had not identified. The secondary
market for CDOs collapsed. The banks
holding CDOs on their balance sheets discovered that the mark-to-market value
of these instruments had fallen to a fraction of their face value. Bear Stearns collapsed in March 2008. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in
September 2008. The US government
deployed US$700 billion through the Troubled Asset Relief Programme.
The inherent risk had always been
there. The models had not found it. The controls had not caught it. The auditors had not detected it. All three layers failed simultaneously —
which is the worst-case scenario the three-risk framework is designed to
prevent.
Futures Contracts and the
Quantification Problem
The futures contract example illustrates
inherent risk in its most common commercial form. A company that sells agricultural commodities
enters futures contracts to lock in the price of its expected future
harvest. The futures contract is a
financial commitment based on an estimated future quantity — the harvest — that
cannot be known with certainty at the time of contracting. If the harvest is smaller than projected due
to weather, disease, or supply chain disruption, the company is committed to
deliver a quantity it cannot produce. It
must either purchase at spot prices to fulfil the contract or default. The difference between the contracted price
and the spot price — in a market that has moved against the company — is the
inherent risk that the futures contract was supposed to hedge but instead
amplified.
This is not a failure of controls. The futures contract was executed correctly,
documented properly, and reported accurately.
The inherent risk was the uncertainty in the quantity of the underlying
commodity — an uncertainty that no control system can eliminate because it is
embedded in the nature of agricultural production. The options market introduces a further
dimension: the inherent risk of estimating volatility. An option’s price is determined partly by the
implied volatility of the underlying asset — the market’s expectation of how
much the price will move. When actual
volatility significantly exceeds implied volatility, options sellers face
losses that were not captured in the premium they charged.
In March 2020, the VIX — the Chicago Board
Options Exchange’s Volatility Index, commonly called the “fear index” — reached
82.69, its highest level in history.
Options sellers who had written contracts based on implied volatility of
15 to 20 discovered that actual volatility was four to five times their model
assumptions. The inherent risk of
volatility estimation — which was always present — materialised at a scale that
models built on historical data had not anticipated.
Beneficial Ownership and the KYC
Dimension
In the investment context, inherent risk
extends beyond the financial instrument to the beneficial ownership
relationships underlying it. The auditor
or compliance manager examining a large investment transaction — particularly
one involving bundled products, tranched structures, or multiple jurisdictions
— looks for the beneficial ownership chain: who ultimately owns what, who
benefits from which arrangement, and where the conflicts of interest reside.
This is the KYC — Know Your Client —
dimension of inherent risk assessment.
It became critical in the context of 1Malaysia Development Berhad — the
Malaysian sovereign development fund that accumulated US$4.5 billion in
fraudulent transactions between 2009 and 2014.
The beneficial ownership of the entities receiving the funds was
obscured through a network of shell companies, offshore accounts, and complex
transaction structures that passed through Goldman Sachs, Standard Chartered,
and other major financial institutions. The
inherent risk in 1MDB’s transactions was the opacity of the beneficial
ownership structure. The controls at
each participating institution — KYC procedures, AML checks, transaction
monitoring — failed to pierce that opacity.
The detection failure was compounded when the auditors signed off on
accounts that did not reflect the fund’s actual financial position.
The Malaysian government has to date
recovered RM29.7 billion in 1MDB-related funds.
Goldman Sachs paid US$2.9 billion in settlements. Several other institutions reached their own
settlements. The inherent risk that the
KYC and compliance frameworks were supposed to identify had been present from
the beginning of the transactions. It
was not detected until the scale of the fraud made concealment impossible.
The Investment Implication
For the investor rather than the auditor,
inherent risk manifests as the gap between the marketed risk of an instrument
and its actual risk. The marketed risk
of a CDO rated AAA was essentially zero default risk. The actual inherent risk was the correlation
of the underlying mortgages in a national housing market downturn — a risk the
rating model did not capture.
The marketed risk of a structured product
linked to a basket of commodities futures might be described as diversified
commodity exposure with downside protection.
The actual inherent risk includes the correlation between commodities in
a risk-off environment, the liquidity of the secondary market for the product,
the counterparty risk of the issuing institution, and the basis risk between
the hedge and the underlying exposure.
The investor who reads the brochure is
reading the marketed risk. The investor
who understands inherent risk assessment reads the term sheet, traces the
beneficial ownership of the underlying assets, models the correlation
assumptions under stress scenarios, and assesses what the instrument does when
every assumption in the base case fails simultaneously. This is not paranoia. It is the lesson that 2008 taught, that 2020
reinforced, and that the next crisis — whatever form it takes — will teach
again to the investors who forgot. Inherent
risk does not announce itself. It waits.
Terence Nunis |
Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The
Billionaire Cheat Code

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