19 August, 2020

Quora Answer: What is Inherent Risk in Investment?

The following is my answer to a Quora question: “What is inherent risk in investment?”

Inherent risk is one of three risk categories that auditors and compliance professionals assess.  The other two are control risk and detection risk.  Understanding the distinction between them is not merely academic.  It is the difference between a portfolio that survives a crisis and one that discovers its vulnerabilities at exactly the wrong moment.

The Three-Risk Framework

Inherent risk is the risk embedded in a financial statement, transaction, or instrument that exists independently of any control system.  It arises from the nature of the asset, the complexity of the transaction, or the environment in which it operates — not from a failure to manage it.  A futures contract on an agricultural commodity carries inherent risk because crop yields cannot be predicted with certainty.  That risk exists whether the risk management department has three layers of approval processes.

Control risk is the risk that the control systems in place fail to detect or prevent a misstatement or error.  This is the second layer.  The controls exist.  They have failed.  A bank with a risk management framework, an internal audit team, and a compliance function that still manages to accumulate US$6.2 billion in losses through a single London-based trading desk — as JP Morgan Chase did in 2012 in the London Whale scandal — has experienced control risk at an institutional scale.

Detection risk is the risk that the auditor or compliance manager fails to identify the problem even after it has occurred.  This is the third layer and, in many ways, the most dangerous — because by the time detection risk materialises, the inherent risk has already converted into actual loss, and the controls have already failed.

The auditor assesses the level of inherent risk in a portfolio or financial statement and calibrates detection effort and reporting standards accordingly.  The higher the inherent risk, the more intensive the audit process should be.  The Subprime Crisis demonstrated what happens when this calibration fails at systemic scale.

The Subprime Crisis as a Case Study in Inherent Risk

A single failure did not cause the 2008 global financial crisis.  It was caused by the systematic mispricing of inherent risk across an entire asset class — and the subsequent failure of control risk and detection risk at every institutional level simultaneously.

Collateralised Debt Obligations — CDOs — were bundles of mortgage-backed securities of varying credit quality, from investment grade to junk, packaged together and sold as diversified fixed income instruments.  The inherent risk in each mortgage was the possibility of default by the borrower.  The inherent risk in the CDO was the correlation between those individual defaults — specifically, whether they would occur independently or simultaneously.

The rating agencies — Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch — assessed this inherent risk using models that assumed mortgage defaults were largely uncorrelated: that a borrower defaulting in Florida did not significantly increase the probability of a borrower defaulting in California.  This assumption was wrong.  When the US housing market declined nationally, defaults correlated precisely because they shared the same underlying cause: falling house prices across all markets simultaneously.

The CDOs that had been rated AAA — the highest possible credit quality — turned out to contain inherent risk that the models had not identified.  The secondary market for CDOs collapsed.  The banks holding CDOs on their balance sheets discovered that the mark-to-market value of these instruments had fallen to a fraction of their face value.  Bear Stearns collapsed in March 2008.  Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008.  The US government deployed US$700 billion through the Troubled Asset Relief Programme.

The inherent risk had always been there.  The models had not found it.  The controls had not caught it.  The auditors had not detected it.  All three layers failed simultaneously — which is the worst-case scenario the three-risk framework is designed to prevent.

Futures Contracts and the Quantification Problem

The futures contract example illustrates inherent risk in its most common commercial form.  A company that sells agricultural commodities enters futures contracts to lock in the price of its expected future harvest.  The futures contract is a financial commitment based on an estimated future quantity — the harvest — that cannot be known with certainty at the time of contracting.  If the harvest is smaller than projected due to weather, disease, or supply chain disruption, the company is committed to deliver a quantity it cannot produce.  It must either purchase at spot prices to fulfil the contract or default.  The difference between the contracted price and the spot price — in a market that has moved against the company — is the inherent risk that the futures contract was supposed to hedge but instead amplified.

This is not a failure of controls.  The futures contract was executed correctly, documented properly, and reported accurately.  The inherent risk was the uncertainty in the quantity of the underlying commodity — an uncertainty that no control system can eliminate because it is embedded in the nature of agricultural production.  The options market introduces a further dimension: the inherent risk of estimating volatility.  An option’s price is determined partly by the implied volatility of the underlying asset — the market’s expectation of how much the price will move.  When actual volatility significantly exceeds implied volatility, options sellers face losses that were not captured in the premium they charged.

In March 2020, the VIX — the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Volatility Index, commonly called the “fear index” — reached 82.69, its highest level in history.  Options sellers who had written contracts based on implied volatility of 15 to 20 discovered that actual volatility was four to five times their model assumptions.  The inherent risk of volatility estimation — which was always present — materialised at a scale that models built on historical data had not anticipated.

Beneficial Ownership and the KYC Dimension

In the investment context, inherent risk extends beyond the financial instrument to the beneficial ownership relationships underlying it.  The auditor or compliance manager examining a large investment transaction — particularly one involving bundled products, tranched structures, or multiple jurisdictions — looks for the beneficial ownership chain: who ultimately owns what, who benefits from which arrangement, and where the conflicts of interest reside.

This is the KYC — Know Your Client — dimension of inherent risk assessment.  It became critical in the context of 1Malaysia Development Berhad — the Malaysian sovereign development fund that accumulated US$4.5 billion in fraudulent transactions between 2009 and 2014.  The beneficial ownership of the entities receiving the funds was obscured through a network of shell companies, offshore accounts, and complex transaction structures that passed through Goldman Sachs, Standard Chartered, and other major financial institutions.  The inherent risk in 1MDB’s transactions was the opacity of the beneficial ownership structure.  The controls at each participating institution — KYC procedures, AML checks, transaction monitoring — failed to pierce that opacity.  The detection failure was compounded when the auditors signed off on accounts that did not reflect the fund’s actual financial position.

The Malaysian government has to date recovered RM29.7 billion in 1MDB-related funds.  Goldman Sachs paid US$2.9 billion in settlements.  Several other institutions reached their own settlements.  The inherent risk that the KYC and compliance frameworks were supposed to identify had been present from the beginning of the transactions.  It was not detected until the scale of the fraud made concealment impossible.

The Investment Implication

For the investor rather than the auditor, inherent risk manifests as the gap between the marketed risk of an instrument and its actual risk.  The marketed risk of a CDO rated AAA was essentially zero default risk.  The actual inherent risk was the correlation of the underlying mortgages in a national housing market downturn — a risk the rating model did not capture.

The marketed risk of a structured product linked to a basket of commodities futures might be described as diversified commodity exposure with downside protection.  The actual inherent risk includes the correlation between commodities in a risk-off environment, the liquidity of the secondary market for the product, the counterparty risk of the issuing institution, and the basis risk between the hedge and the underlying exposure.

The investor who reads the brochure is reading the marketed risk.  The investor who understands inherent risk assessment reads the term sheet, traces the beneficial ownership of the underlying assets, models the correlation assumptions under stress scenarios, and assesses what the instrument does when every assumption in the base case fails simultaneously.  This is not paranoia.  It is the lesson that 2008 taught, that 2020 reinforced, and that the next crisis — whatever form it takes — will teach again to the investors who forgot.  Inherent risk does not announce itself.  It waits.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code


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