22 September, 2015

A Short Explanation about MediShield Life

MediShield Life is as close to universal healthcare that Singapore has ever had.  It is the basic health insurance administered by the CPF Board.  It is a replacement for MediShield, the low-cost basic medical insurance introduced in 1990.

MediShield and MediShield Life coverage is for subsidised treatment in Class B2 and C wards of public hospitals.  It is the bare basic coverage.  Staying in a B1 or A class ward, or in a private hospital, you are still covered by MediShield but because the bills are higher since there is minimal government subsidy.  If people can afford it, it is advisable for them to get an integrated plan.

Features
MediShield Life began replacing MediShield coverage from November 2015.  The new premiums are in force from the next premium anniversary.  It has the following features, distinct from MediShield.

It covers all Singaporeans and Permanent Residents.  The current MediShield does not.  This coverage is automatic.  There is no need to apply for it.

It is specific for B2 / C class wards.  There is another plan to be introduced in 2017 for B1 wards.

It covers pre-existing conditions.  The current MediShield does not.  This coverage for pre-existing conditions is provided even if you have previously been rejected for that exact same condition.  This coverage does not extend to the private insurance portion of an integrated plan.

Covering pre-existing conditions for all Singaporeans and Permanent Residents is expensive.  Those with pre-existing conditions pay 30% extra for their premiums for the next decade.  The government stressed that this does not reflect the actual cost of coverage.  Additionally, insurance companies have pledged not to raise their premiums for one year.    As to what constitutes a pre-existing condition serious enough to warrant this extra 30% loading, MoH will release that at a later date.

Younger people will pay a slightly higher premium to compensate for a lower premium in their old age.

The coverage is for the entire natural life.  The current MediShield terminates at age 92 next birthday.

All of the MediShield Life premiums are now payable by Medisave.  Previously, there were claim limits ranging from $800 to $1,400.

The policy year claim limit has been raised to $100,000.  Previously, it stood at $70,000 per policy year.

The lifetime claim limits have been removed.  Previously, the maximum lifetime claim limit was $300,000.

The daily claim limits for normal wards and Intensive Care Units have been raised by up to 55%.

There is an increase in the claim limits for surgical procedures by between 25% and 93%.

There is an increase the daily claim limit for Community Hospitals by 40% from $250 to $350.

There is an increase in the claim limits for outpatient chemotherapy and radiotherapy treatments.  This covers more of the cost of subsidised cancer treatment.

The co-insurance rates have been lowered from the current 10 to 20%, to 3 to 10%.  This means MediShield Life can be used to cover a larger proportion of the medical bill.

Premium rebates are supposed to begin from age 66 next birthday, instead of the previous age 71.

Subsidies
There are four types of premium subsidies.  This is needed because in some cases, the premiums go up substantially. 

The first type is the Pioneer Generation Subsidies.  Their subsidies are between 40-60% regardless of their household per capita income or the Annual Value of their home.  After the subsidies and top-ups, Pioneers pay lower premiums for MediShield Life than they would have paid under MediShield.  Pioneers will receive $200 to $800 a year in Medisave top-ups for the rest of their life.  This will be used to pay for their MediShield Life premiums.

The second type is the Transitional Subsidies.  This is for all Singapore Citizens whose net premiums, after Pioneer Generation Subsidies or Premium Subsidies, increase after the introduction of MediShield Life, regardless of their household income or the Annual Value of their home.  It is only available for the first 4 years of MediShield Life.

In the first year, the Government pays 90% of the net increase in MediShield Life premiums, less other premium subsidies, above MediShield premiums.  This means that we pay 10% of the net increase in premium for the first year.  The subsidy decreases to 70%, 40% and 20% of the net premium increase in the second, third and fourth years of MediShield Life respectively.

The third type is Premium Subsidies for lower- to middle-income families.  They must have a household monthly income of $2,600 and below per person, and living in residences with an Annual Value of $21,000 and below.  Simply getting enough people such as your parents to stay with you will do this.  Those eligible can receive subsidies of up to 50% of their premiums.  Permanent Residents receive half the subsidy rate applicable to citizens.  This is a permanent feature of the Scheme.

The final type is the Additional Premium Support for families who require assistance with their premiums even after the above subsidies and Medisave use.

Analysis
It is estimated that covering pre-existing illnesses will cost just over $1 billion in the next five years.  Insurance companies will see the claim history for a year before deciding how much to raise the premium of the integrated portion of their respective Shield Plans.  The 30% loading over the next 10 years is definitely not enough to cover the cost.  As such, the government has to raise that funds elsewhere.  That would likely be found in an increase in the GST.

Based on data on deductible, withdrawal and co-insurance breakdown, the pay out of the plan as a percentage of the hospital bill is about 44%.  In contrast, the average increase in premium is close to 90%.  This is double the percentage pay out.  This is very high for a national health insurance.

The current system is also running at a surplus since it is the practice of the administration.  The national health insurance should not be seen as another profit centre.  What it means is that even though the features are attractive, and MediShield Life has merit, it is actually still expensive and not as cost-effective as it should be.  Also, once the one-year moratorium on the raising of premiums for the private health portion of the integrated plan is over, the premiums are likely to rise substantially.  What we will see is that cost-wise, the cost of health insurance will still rise faster than the lower to middle income can likely afford. 


21 September, 2015

Some Thoughts about the Minimum Wage

The following are some of my thoughts about the minimum wage.  By minimum wage, we are referring to a living wage, meaning wages that are not exploitative, and by which people are not reduced to being working poor.  In calculating a minimum wage, the challenge is not to price the lowest skill levels out of the market, thus increasing net unemployment.  The government is against a minimum wage.  Here are some of the points that opponents of a minimum wage have raised.

According to the government, a minimum wage is not an effective means of alleviating poverty; rather, it will produce a net increase in poverty due to the higher cost of hiring.  They then invoke the fear that jobs will be outsourced to countries with lower labour costs.  This will then result in higher long-term unemployment.

They also claim that it excludes low-cost competitors from the labour market.  This would hurt SMEs more than corporations.  They would compensate by reducing the number of hours worked by individuals, or eliminating a number of jobs.  SMEs are hampered from offering their more valuable employees attractive wages due to the cost of workers paid a minimum which businesses may view as artificially high.  They project that this may cause price inflation because businesses will try to compensate by raising the prices of the goods and services.

One of the examples that are used against a high minimum wage is the United States.  There, it is arguable that a high minimum wage has not done much to reduce social inequality.  Or they would cite studies that show that in many EU countries, high minimum wages have been accompanied by high unemployment, affecting people with the lowest skill sets the most severely.  They could point out that in Western Europe, the average jobless rate is twice as high in countries with a minimum wage.  They could cite Hong Kong as an example, and they would seem to have an iron clad case.  Mind you, this is the common line by NTUC.

What a minimum wage is supposed to do, is to alleviate the stress of an insufficient income so that people are not forced to work two or more jobs simply to make ends meet.  This helps the economy by lowering healthcare costs in the long term.  With that added time, people can actually attend skills training.  The NTUC model does not work since workers on poverty wages cannot afford skills training, or if they are sponsored, they cannot attend because they are working to make ends meet.  Or, even if they do attend, they would be too tired to actually learn anything.

The Singapore economy is not labour-intensive.  It was never meant to be.  Our focus has always been high technology and innovation since we recognised very early that we could never compete with countries such as Indonesia, India, Philippines and China with their deeper labour pool.  A business model based on low-cost labour is already not a major component of our economy.  How would it greatly impact the labour market?  If, after 50 years of economic development, we are competing with Malaysia for labour costs, then something is seriously wrong with the structure of our economy and these companies.

All these arguments about the minimum wage not being effective in alleviating poverty and lowering the GINI coefficient are false.  Firstly, a minimum wage is merely a tool in an entire programme for poverty alleviation.  Its immediate impact is providing people a working wage.  It provides an immediate increase in the standard of living for the poorest and most vulnerable class in society.  This eventually creates a new consumer base by stimulating consumption and has a long term positive impact on small business owners and industry.  This will then lead to increased job growth and job creation since there is an actual incentive to take jobs.  Other methods of transferring income to the poor such as food subsidies or welfare payments are not tied to employment.  Because people are incentivised to work, they are less likely to pursue illegal avenues of earning.  This has a direct positive impact on society.  This also decreases the cost of government social welfare programmes.

The government’s use of the US and Hong Kong as examples of why the minimum wage does not work is disingenuous.  The US has serious institutional problems, and the minimum wage is both inadequate and offset by other measures designed specifically to defend corporate interests.  Hong Kong has to deal with a serious internal migration issue, being part of China.  They have complications Singapore does not have.

The case of the EU and Western Europe is an example of omission of facts.  It is true, that the average jobless rate is twice as high in countries with a minimum wage than those without.  It cites the fact that countries such as Switzerland, Austria, Germany and all the Nordic countries do not have a minimum wage.  What they omit to mention is that they have very strong independent trade unions who negotiate collective agreements that function as a minimum wage for specific groups.  In effect, they have several categories of minimum wages.

None of the reasons cited by the government in opposing a minimum wage actually stand up to scrutiny.  I can only speculate here, but we have to consider the fact the government is the largest single employer, directly or indirectly.  The government and the GLCs employ a substantial proportion of the workforce in Singapore.  Some estimate that there is more than 50% ownership of all major Singapore corporations, either directly, through investment vehicles or stakes that government owned entities take in other companies.  The STI is an index of the 30 largest listed companies, and over half have the Singapore government as the largest shareholder.  A rough estimate based on the value of these companies adds up to over US$100 billion, and this is certainly conservative since our sovereign wealth funds are secretive about their investments.

There is no minimum wage to keep business costs down, so as to make Singapore more attractive to foreign investment, and rise GDP.  This is not inherently wrong.  And when much of that business operating cost is tied directly to government entities, it is our money paid out.  However, we need some balance.  Keynesian economics applied means that setting a minimum wage will address the GINI coefficient, while putting more purchasing power in the lower middle class and lower class.  This still contributes to our GDP and economic growth.  Our system is unsustainable when some benefit our progress far more than others.  We cannot afford to have a segment of the population disenfranchised.


19 September, 2015

Temasek Holdings & Olam International: Our Money at Work

Olam International Limited is a global processor and trader of soft commodities.  It was established in 1989 as the Kewalram Chanrai Group.  Olam Nigeria Plc was set up as a non-oil based export operation to secure hard currency earnings in order to meet the foreign exchange requirements of other group companies operating in Nigeria.  The success of this resulted in Olam establishing an independent export company.  The agribusiness was headquartered in London and operated as Chanrai International Limited.  They began with the export of cashews from Nigeria and expanded into cotton, cocoa and sheanuts.

Between 1993 and 1995, they grew from a single operation into multiple origins, spreading from West Africa to East Africa, and then back to India.  This move into multiple origin countries coincided with the deregulation of the agricultural commodity markets.  This deregulation was one in a series that lead to the next two financial crises.

On the 04th July 1995, Olam International Limited was incorporated in Singapore.  In 1996, the then Trade Development Board, now International Enterprise Singapore, invited Olam to relocate their entire operations from London to Singapore. In exchange, the Singapore Government awarded Olam the Approved International Trader status, now called the Global Trader Programme; this granted Olam a concessionary tax rate of 10%.  This was reduced in 2004 to 5%.

In 2003, Temasek Holdings, through its wholly owned subsidiary, Seletar Investments, took a stake in Olam.  On 11th February 2005, Olam International Limited was listed on the Main Board of the Singapore Exchange.  In 2009, Temasek Holdings made a strategic investment in Olam in 2009.

In November 2012, Carson Block of Muddy Waters Research accused Olam of “deciding to take huge leverage and invest in illiquid positions”, and asked difficult questions about its accounting practices.  Muddy Waters Research also accused Olam’s board of an “abject failure of leadership”.  Olam responded that the allegations were “baseless rumour-mongering” and unsuccessfully sued Block for libel; its shares fell 21%.  In response to this, in December 2012, Olam raised S$1.2 billion selling bonds and warrants in a right issue backed by Temasek Holdings.  Temasek Holdings then became Olam’s largest shareholder, with a 24.6% stake.

Muddy Waters responded to Olam CEO, Sunny Verghese and the Board of Directors with the following open letter: “In the two and one-half years Muddy Waters, LLC has been openly criticising publicly-traded companies, we have not seen a response as defensive as yours – not even from Sino-Forest.  On Monday, our Director of Research gave a brief talk on Olam at a well-respected charity event.  He presented facts about Olam along with Muddy Waters’ opinion that Olam is at risk of collapsing due to multiple factors, including its debt load.  As Olam has since said, his comments were not overly substantive.  But based on this alone, Olam halted its stock, scheduled two conference calls, discussed buying back shares, and issued statements that included saying it is not a ‘fly-by-night company’.  It has further evidenced a bizarre fixation on baseball caps.

Olam’s disproportionate reaction is extraordinary in our experience.  Should Olam come to collapse (as we believe it will), its use of much-needed cash to buy back shares at this time should give rise to questions about whether fiduciary responsibilities have been breached – particularly given the possible existence of individual motivations that are not necessarily aligned with those of Olam’s lenders.  We also note Olam’s attempts to impugn our credibility.

You and your investors should note that attempting to silence critics is not a plan of corrective action.  In no way does it make Olam stronger.  The February 2011 CLSA report, which raised far fewer concerns than we have identified internally, and that Olam itself made so controversial, should have caused you to work toward repairing what ails your business and your balance sheet.  Instead, Olam has since increased its a) debt load by approximately S$900 million, b) cumulative investment cash burn by approximately S$2 billion, and c) cumulative operating cash burn by approximately S$500 million.  In other words, you did the exact opposite of what you should have done.  Your actions have been an abject failure of leadership.

Companies that attack criticism the way Olam does fail to understand that raising money from the public is a privilege.  Because Olam has received significant investment from the government of Singapore, Olam’s mismanagement of the public trust is that much less forgivable.  Know this: You voluntarily came to the market, you subjected yourselves to its forces, and you must bear the consequences of your ineptitude.

We do not work for an investment bank, and cannot be bullied the way other analysts can.  Our research into Olam has been exhaustive, and we plan to resolutely stand by it, regardless of any attempts you might make to discredit it or us.

We therefore suggest you find better uses of your time than focusing on criticism. For instance, you might want to work on plans to reign in your CapEx and de-leverage.  The clock is likely ticking.”

Muddy Waters Research Group is a private equity research company.  The company is known for spotting fraudulent accounting practices, specialising in Greater Chinese companies.  Muddy Waters Research Group came to fame when it released reports on Sino-Forest Corporation’s timber holding.  Sino-Forest eventually filed for bankruptcy in Canada and is facing a massive investor lawsuit.

Olam’s behaviour in this case raised further suspicion.  It is also similar to the way that Temasek Holdings and the Singapore government react, and that is not a coincidence.  Some of their accounting practices can be described as similar to Temasek Holdings’ in opacity.

On the 13th March 2014, a consortium led by Temasek Holdings said it would put up S$2.53 Singapore billion to buy the remainder of commodity trader Olam International.  Temasek Holdings’ consortium partners were actually Olam’s founding shareholders, and 10 members of Olam’s executive committee; together they already owned 52.5% of the shares.  In their filing to the Singapore Exchange, the consortium said it intended to pay S$2.23 per share, a 12% premium over the last traded price.  Temasek Holdings’ offer valued Olam at S$5.33 billion, about 1.3 times book value.  Temasek Holdings had already been quietly increasing its stake since listed Olam was called into question by Muddy Waters in November 2012,

Prior to the Muddy Waters’ report, Olam’s debt level was already a source of concern for investors.  The company completed 10 sale transactions in from the middle of 2011 to the end of 2012, selling assets to raise cash.  Olam aimed to sell S$1.5 billion in assets from 2011 to 2014.  This was necessary, as Nomura Securities analyst Tanuj Shori wrote in a note, “Olam has long struggled to justify its balance sheet and growth plans.”

The deal was done through Temasek Holdings’ Breedens Investments unit.  As of now, Temasek Holdings is the majority shareholder of Olam.  It owns 1.4 million shares through Breedens Investments and Aranda Investments.  This represents 51.4% of the total issued share capital of Olam.

What was never really asked, and this is important, considering that Temasek Holdings is using our money, is why was it willing to pay a 12% premium on a stock that had already appreciated almost 33% since the beginning of 2014?  And this was in a period where the company in question was facing a loss of equity value as investors fled it.  If this was a strategic decision and an opportunity, they could have driven down the price and got it cheaper.  That could mean the management of Temasek Holdings are not very good at estimating the value within their own portfolio, let alone without.  In the last quarter of 2013, Olam shares traded around the S$1.5 range.  It was announced at the end of their financial year, on the 30th June 2013, that profit had declined 13%.  If Temasek Holdings saw something in the longer investment horizon for Olam, they should have bought then.  Instead, they waited for the stock to appreciate by over 30% months later and then offered a 12% premium on top of it.  As of today, Olam’s shares are still trading well below what Temasek Holdings paid for them.

Or, if I were to be a bit more suspicious, and all this is only speculation, this normally happens when the people within the company already knew there was going to be an eventual buy out, and they were building their positions prior to this.  Olam’s debt to asset ratio were alarming enough to be flagged by many analysts.  There is no rational reason for the price of the stock to increase by a third.  To further compound it, the STI was flat for the year because of concerns in major markets.  And it is awfully convenient that Temasek Holdings’ consortium partners were actually Olam’s founding shareholders, and 10 members of Olam’s executive committee.  Personally, I think we could have done better.


17 September, 2015

Confusing Numbers: Singapore & Our Sovereign Wealth Funds

The following are some points about Singapore and our Sovereign Wealth Funds.  The numbers are estimates and rounded off.  They are taken from whatever is available online at the respective sites.

The official balance sheet of the government of Singapore, as at 31st March 2015, has a total income at $150 billion, and net surplus at $111 billion.  Our cash and cash assets are at $256 billion out of our total assets of $1.366 trillion.  Temasek Holdings assets as of this date is $256 billion.  It has since been claimed at $266 billion as of the current date.  Given the cash holdings and the stated portfolio of Temasek Holdings, that would add up to $512 billion.

The outstanding Singapore government borrowing since 31st March 2015, which is the latest I could get, is $396 billion.  It is undoubtedly larger now.  But taking that as the outstanding debt, if Singapore were a giant corporation, which is arguable, then our shareholder equity is $970 billion.

In the 20 years since 1975, our debt has risen by almost $350 billion.  And the IMF has given our operational surplus as $280 billion.  Temasek Holdings have claimed a return of 17% in that time, and 19% this year alone.  GIC itself has claimed a 5% rate of return in that same 20-year period.

If we count backwards, based on these claimed returns, how is it that as of 31st March 2015, our total assets are only $1.366 trillion?  That would mean that in 20 years, our actual return was less than 1%.  The numbers released by the MoF and MAS on one hand, and Temasek Holdings and the GIC on the other hand, are incongruent.  And what we can get from the IMF only makes things more confusing.


Typos Can be Deadly

Typos can be deadly for companies.  All limited liability companies in the United Kingdom are required to register with a government agency called Companies House, which records financial statements and other corporate information.  This is their equivalent to Singapore's Accounting & Corporate Regulatory Authority.

In 2009, Companies House reported that Taylor & Sons Ltd., a 124-year-old engineering company, had been declared insolvent.  That was news to the management and employees of Taylor & Sons, a very much functioning company.  Almost immediately, they were plunged into crisis.  Believing the company had collapsed into bankruptcy, customers cancelled orders, contracts were declared void, and suppliers stopped offering credit.  To compound matters, the company’s managing director was on vacation, causing clients and creditors to believe he had fled the country.  Operations slammed to a halt, and Taylor & Sons found itself forced to close for real.  All 250 employees were laid off.

As it turned out, Companies House actually meant to record the closure of Taylor & Son, an entirely different company from Taylor & Sons.  The now-liquidated Taylor & Sons sued Companies House and won; the judge ruling the agency completely responsible for the collapse of the £8.8 million company.  Now, if they had some form of liability protection, they could have mitigated this immediately.


16 September, 2015

Our GDP to Public Debt Relationship with Our CPF

This is a short explanation on why the Singapore government has embarked on a growth at all cost economic strategy that has increased our GINI coefficient and diminished our social safety net.  It also gives an insight into why they are so firm on the Population White Paper.

One of the issues that should concern Singaporeans is the nature of our public debt.  The public debt, also known as government debt, national debt and sovereign debt, is the cumulative debt owed by our government.  This is distinct from the annual government deficit or surplus, which is the difference between government receipts and spending in a single year.  A deficit is the increase of debt over a particular year, and a surplus is a decrease.

Public debt is a method of financing the government operations.  Our government can also monetise its debts by creating money.  This removes the need to pay interest on the debt, but it actually reduces interest costs rather than outright cancelling the debt.  There are limits to this, otherwise it might lead to hyperinflation.  Governments borrow by issuing securities, bonds and bills.  Our public debt consists largely of Singapore Government Securities (SGS) and Special Singapore Government Securities (SSGS), which is issued to assist the payments on the Central Provident Fund.  Singapore does not borrow from international financial institutions, therefore, we have no external public debt.

Here are some points about our public debt.  Singapore has amongst the highest public debt to GDP ratio.  This is because Singapore does not borrow externally to fund its fiscal policy.  According to MOF, “The Singapore Government operates on a balanced budget policy and does not need to finance her expenditures via the issuance of Government bonds.  It has enjoyed healthy budget surpluses over terms of Government in the past decades.”

Singapore only borrows domestically, the Singapore Government does not have any external debt.  Why do we have such a large public debt?  SGS are issued to develop the domestic debt market.  There are three principal objectives of SGS issuance.  Firstly, it is to build a liquidity in order to provide a risk-free benchmark against which other private debt securities are priced off.  Secondly, to grow an active secondary market for cash transactions and derivatives.  And finally, to enable efficient risk management; and encourage both domestic and international issuers and investors, to participate in the Singapore bond market.  It has succeeded to an extent.  As at December 2011, SGS stock is valued at S$79 billion, while the stock of Treasury-Bills is valued at S$59 billion.  Being government bonds, the yield is extremely low.

SSGS, on the other hand, are non-tradable bonds specifically issued to address the investment needs of the CPF.  CPF monies are invested in these special securities, fully guaranteed by the Government.  These securities earn the CPF Board a coupon rate pegged to CPF interest rates that members receive.  As at December 2011, SSGS stock is valued at S$216 billion.  In the 3rd quarter of 2014, the amount of outstanding SGS bills and bonds, which account for 52% of total government bonds, was S$101 billion.  It was up 1.0% quarter on quarter, but declined 20.9% year-on-year.  New issuance of SGS bonds fell 26.9% quarter on quarter, and 66.5% year-on-year in the 3rd quarter of 2014.  These numbers do not include the SSGS.  Singapore’s public debt was 106.7% of GDP in 2014, 104.7% of GDP the year before.

What Singaporeans must be cognisant of is the fact that public debt is an indirect debt upon us as taxpayers.  A broader definition of our public debt includes all government liabilities, including future payments, and payments for goods and services contracted but not yet paid.  This includes the money that is supposed to be paid into our CPF as a guaranteed interest.

In general, it can be said that Singapore practices Keynesian economics, where there is a tolerance for high levels of public debt to pay for public investment, which can then be paid back from tax revenues.  Our high public debt is not in itself a concern as long as we can generate GDP growth.  And that is why the Singapore government has embarked on this economic policy.  They need that growth to sustain the high public debt.

To understand the nature of our of public debt and analysing its risk, we need to estimate the projected value of our public assets being constructed, in future tax terms or direct revenues.  This is especially difficult for Singapore because a lot of our assets are held through Temasek Holdings, and they are not transparent.  As such, it is a challenge to determine whether much of our public debt is being used to finance consumption.

Because of the CPF, the government has implicit debt, which is the promise by a government of future payments from the state at a fixed rate on all deposits into the CPF.  A major problem with these implicit public insurance liabilities is that it is hard to cost accurately.  The amounts of future payments depends on so many factors.

Firstly, claims are unpredictable.  Population projections predict that when the current generation retires, the working population is insufficient to fund future payments.  Our total fertility rate as per the Population White Paper is 1.19.  We need a TFI of about 2.1 to adequately replace the population.  One way that the Singapore government is going around it is by drastically increasing the population.  And secondly, there is no maturity limit for payments of this nature.  As long as there are CPF accounts, and as long as the owners of these accounts live, the interest has to be paid.

Now, if the population by which revenues are raised to sustain these payments has a much lower TFI, the population will shrink without another form of growth.  And that means, the government will have increasing difficulty keeping up with payments and allowing withdrawals.  And that could also be a reason why the withdrawal age and the minimum sum is going up: they might not have the money to pay up on withdrawals.

In summary, these are relatively quick fixes to problems that have developed over the last few decades.  On hindsight, Lee Kuan Yew’s stop at two policy worked far too well, and we are now having to pay an expensive price to reverse this.  It either means we all have to work at having larger families, or we have to accept the reality of increased immigration.


15 September, 2015

Some Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) on Singapore

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed trade agreement between Singapore and several nations across the Pacific Rim.  It is a comprehensive agreement concerning many aspects of economic policy.  The TPP seeks to lower trade barriers such as tariffs, enforce common standards for labour law, avoid double taxation, establish a common intellectual property framework, and organise a common investor-state dispute resolution mechanism.  The TPP is an expansion of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEP or P4) signed by Brunei, Chile, Singapore, and New Zealand in 2006.  From 2008, 8 additional countries joined for a broader agreement: Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the United States, and Vietnam.

The original goal of wrapping up negotiations was in 2012.  However, agriculture, intellectual property, and services and investments were some of the contentions that are still being negotiated.  The latest round of negotiations was schedule to take place in July 2015.  That has been delayed due to events in member countries.  After the Election victory, the PAP are in a stronger position domestically to push ahead with the TPP.  And with no significant Opposition presence in Parliament, they can rush through the reading of the bill as they have always done.  To date, there have already been 19 rounds of negotiations.

The negotiations have been conducted in secrecy and the text of the treaty has not been made public.  This means that by the time domestic opposition can build, the treaty would likely have been ratified in most member countries.  WikiLeaks has published several leaked documents pertaining to the TPP since 2013.  Controversial clauses in drafts leaked to the public do not give us much confidence that it is actually to our best interests.

So what are the main points being negotiation?  There is nothing on the official sites of the Singapore government.  However, on the website of the Office of the United States Trade Representative has a list of chapters there.  Of interest to us are the chapters on competition, cross-border services, customs, e-commerce, financial services, government procurement, intellectual property, investment, labour, legal issues, market access for goods, rules of origin, technical barriers to trade, telecommunications, temporary entry, and trade remedies.  The USTR further that the contents of the TPP seek to promote comprehensive market access, facilitate the development of production and supply chains among TPP members, create regulatory coherence and promote “comprehensive and robust market liberalisation”, amongst other things.

One of the most controversial agreements is the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS).  Based on the draft agreement from WikiLeaks, the treaty essentially elevates a corporation to equal status with the sovereign state in enforcing sections of the treaty.  This means foreign investors in a company can sue the member state governments for any sort of infringement.  This presents a major problem since governments, even the newly elected governments that were not yet in office at the ratification of the TPP are constrained from enacting domestic laws and regulations that might contravene the treaty.  This puts the interests of companies over the interests of citizens.  This provision is at the expense of our sovereignty.  A more aggressive interpretation means that corporations and foreign interests can force the repeal of laws that contravene the free flow of trade and persons.  To put this in a way Singaporeans can understand, this means that the Singapore government cannot limit, for example, the flow of foreign workers and enact laws to protect Singapore jobseekers.

This treaty allows corporations to challenge domestic legislation of public interest.  On the 26th March 2015, WikiLeaks released the TPP’s Investment Chapter.  According to the documents released, under this treaty, global corporations have the power to sue governments in international tribunals and obtain taxpayer compensation for loss of expected future profits due to government actions.  That means, if a future government of Singapore were to enact a legislation protecting, say, the interest of Singapore PMETs and require companies to hire a certain percentage of them, a corporation based here can sue the government for loss of profits, and they will win.  The tribunal will decide damages and that money will come from our taxes.  That is not ideal.

Joseph Eugene Stiglitz, the Nobel prize-winning economist said, based on leaked drafts, it “serves the interests of the wealthiest.”  Organised labour groups in the U.S., New Zealand, Australia, and Canada have come out against it.  Economic policy think tanks oppose it, including the Economic Policy Institute and the Center for Economic and Policy Research, arguing that it could result in further job losses and declining wages.  Other renowned economists against it include Avram Noam Chomsky, Paul Robin Krugman, and Robert Bernard Reich.

What does it mean for Singaporeans in a nutshell?  It is a mechanism to depress wages, while manipulating currency through massive movement of bank instruments.  In the long term, in its default state, this will shrink the middle class and create an entrenched lower class over the long term.  It will significantly affect our GINI coefficient, meaning that the gap between the wealthy elite and the rest of us will widen, and eventually become insurmountable.  It is not a recipe for a stable economy.  In summary, in the hope of future profits brought about by increased trade, we have made a calculated bet.  The only people who will benefit greatly from the TPP are major corporation in the banking, pharmaceutical and technology sectors.  Of course, now that the US has declined to sign it, under a Trump presidency, it can be argued that the TPP will be modified.  This does not mean, in future, a government having the same policy philosophy would not attempt a similar deal.


CECA between Singapore & India: Why Our PMETs are Losing Their Jobs

On the 29th June 2009, Singapore concluded the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement with India.  This strategic agreement would become a concern for ordinary Singaporeans.  The primary area of concern pertains to the articles on the movement of natural persons.  This agreement will open a flood of Indian PMETs into the Singapore market, squeezing Singaporeans out of 127 specific occupations mentioned in the agreement, mainly in areas of middle management, and cause a direct adverse impact for Singaporean PMETs.

This agreement also allows intra-corporate transferees.  What this means is that a company can open an office in India and Singapore, and taking advantage of this loophole, parachute professionals, technicians and managers into Singapore since they are guaranteed an approval of short term stay.  And this is just one such agreement.

However, in light of the backlash due to the increased numbers of foreign workers, the Singapore government has been put in an unpleasant position of backpedalling from a binding agreement.  The government made changes to its Employment Pass Framework law to reduce the inflow of foreign workers significantly.  There were too many PMETs out of work.

Understandably, the Indian government was displeased.  Indians did not get the preferential treatment incorporated into the CECA between them.  There is a possibility that India might take up the issue with the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement body.  The Indian government rightfully considers this a violation of the CECA.  There are about 200,000 non-resident Indians in Singapore working, and there is a possibility that some of them would lose their jobs.

According to Chapter 9: Movement of Natural Persons, under Article 9.5: Long-Term Temporary Entry, the paragraph on Professionals, it states clearly “Each Party shall grant temporary entry and stay for up to one year or the duration of contract, whichever is less, to a natural person seeking to engage in a business activity as a professional, or to perform training functions related to a particular profession, including conducting seminars, if the professional otherwise complies with immigration measures applicable to temporary entry, on presentation by the natural person concerned of:

(a) Proof of nationality of the other Party;

(b) Documentation demonstrating that he or she will be so engaged and describing the purpose of entry, including the letter of contract from the party engaging the services of the natural person in the host Party; and

(c) Documentation demonstrating the attainment of the relevant minimum educational requirements or alternative credentials.”

The “professional” here refers to anyone employed in an occupation listed in Annex 9A, List of 127 Professionals.  These are all jobs that Singaporeans find themselves locked out of.  As per this agreement, Singapore is legally bound to allow the free flow of Indian nationals under the list of “professionals” into Singapore without any border controls.  It is specifically written that we may not enact legislation that “requires labour market testing, economic needs testing or other procedures of similar effects as a condition for temporary entry”.  Any such law enacted to protect Singaporeans would be a violation of the agreement.  The agreement also allows Indian nationals who come to Singapore to work to bring in their spouses or dependents, and the Singapore government is required to grant these accompanying spouses or dependents the right to work as managers, executives or specialists.

It is no coincidence that the “other work passes” category experienced a growth rate of about 22% in 2012 and in 2013.  By the middle of 2014, this had grown 30%; that is, in 6 months.  In response to the Singapore electorate’s disgruntlement, in 2013, the Singapore government introduced the Fair Employment Consideration framework.  This is to supposedly ask for employers to consider Singaporeans for employment first.  Most employers paid lip service and the framework is a failure since here is no real check and no teeth in legal enforcement.  It is this framework that made the Indian government consider bringing the issue to the WTO.

In May 2010, CECA was up for a second review.  However, it was held up because of two main issues.  The first is that the Indian government wanted more Indian banks to operate here.  And they are unlikely to hire Singapore management personnel.  And secondly, it wanted Singapore to continue to allow the free flow of Indian professionals into Singapore.

In 2012, Prof. Tommy Koh Thong Bee said, “The truth is that we pay these workers such low wages not primarily because their productivity is inherently low, but largely because they are competing against an unlimited supply of cheap foreign workers.  Because cheap workers are so plentiful, they tend to be employed unproductively.  In the Nordic countries, unskilled workers are relatively scarce and thus deployed more productively, with higher skills, mechanisation, and better organisation.”  He further added, “What is the solution?  The solution is for the State to reduce the supply of cheap foreign workers or introduce a minimum wage or to target specific industries, such as the hospitality industry, for wage enhancement.”

Singapore is India’s 10th largest trade partner globally, the 2nd largest in ASEAN, accounting for 25.9% of India’s overall trade with ASEAN in 2013-14.  India was Singapore’s 12th largest trade partner globally in 2014.  Bilateral trade expanded after the conclusion of CECA from US$6.65 billion in 2004-05 to US$25.2 billion in 2011-12.  It declined to US$19.27 billion in 2013-14.  Bilateral trade stood at US$17.1 billion in 2014-15.  India’s imports from Singapore were US$7.1 billion, and exports from India to Singapore were US$10 billion.  These numbers are from the Indian government.  In 2003-04, just before the signing of the CECA, bilateral trade between India and Singapore was US$4.2 billion.  Singapore is the 2nd largest source of FDI, at US$32.2 billion from April 2000 to March 2015.  This is 13% of total FDI inflow.  Singapore was the largest source of FDI into India for 2013-14, with US$5.98 billion.  This accounted for about 25% of FDI inflows in the year.  Our FDI grew about 15 times.  The trade surplus favours India.

Clearly, the people who are in business, who run the corporation and the companies, have profited greatly from the CECA.  In terms of pure business, it was an excellent deal.  It also allows us to diversify away from dependence on the performance of the China markets.  From a nation building perspective, however, it is not ideal.  The CECA was not well thought out.  Evidently, the people who sign these deals and plan our trade policies have little contact with the ground.  The needs of Singaporeans do not factor greatly in this.

It is true that Singapore does need this agreement for market access, for creating trade and investment growth avenues, and to balance other developments in the region, including the Chinese strategy in the South China Sea.  For India, the agreement fits her political priorities regarding her interest in the broader international context, and with her need for trade and political alliances with other developing countries.  But political and economic considerations are fluid, and particularly for Singapore, it has mortgaged sort term gain for long term prosperity.  If the PAP government were planning for the next 20, then incremental convergence is likely the most prudent action.  Instead, the PAP found themselves locked in an untenable situation with a disgruntled population.  Hopefully, there will be tweaks in the policy to address these issues.