The following is my answer to a Quora question: “How will ISIS evolve after being pushed out of control in Syria and
Iraq?”
Unfortunately, ISIS has not been pushed out of the region
entirely. It lost territory, manpower,
and material. The ideology remains
active, and the wider ecosystem of state and non-state sponsorship that allowed
groups like it to grow has not disappeared.
Starting a war, and turning a rebel group into a force that can
threaten conventional armies even in a limited capacity, takes substantial money
and logistics support. State sponsorship
may become politically inconvenient at any given moment. Ideology, once lit, is not easily stamped
out.
Fighters disperse rather than disappear. Some return home carrying the experience of a
conflict that evolved from low-intensity insurgency into full conventional
warfare. Some embed within local
populations. Detention facilities in
Iraq and Syria lack the infrastructure to hold this many people indefinitely,
and executing all of them is both expensive and politically untenable. A small fraction gets made an example
of. Others fill the vacuum they leave
behind.
When the geopolitical situation turns convenient again, another
incarnation appears, under a different name, adhering to the same core
ideology. Non-state actors remain a
convenient tool in regional rivalries, and the concern is the same pattern
spawning elsewhere. The siege of Marawi
in the Philippines in 2017 remains a stark example of this.
A Historical Parallel
Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab an-Najdi entered a pact with tribal
leader Muhammad ibn Sa’ud in 1744, fusing a strict reform theology with tribal
military power. That alliance eventually
produced the modern Saudi state, with Wahhabi doctrine adopted as its official
religious framework. A once-marginal
theological reform movement became state ideology through political
convenience, not universal doctrinal appeal.
Wahhabism is still considered heretical in traditional Islamic theology,
but there is neither political will nor convenience in addressing it
directly. The Saudis control the Haramayn
– the holiest mosques of Islam, so they have leverage.
History shows how a fringe interpretation can gain state backing
when it serves a power’s interest, and that same interpretation can later
fracture. The overwhelming majority of
Muslims influenced by this tradition, including the modern Saudi state itself
under its own post-2017 reforms, practise it without violence. A distinct, minority current within this
broader tradition, Salafi-jihadism, legitimises violence and rejects the modern
state system. This is the current that
produced al-Qa’ida and later ISIS. They
are the fruits of Saudi Wahhabi evangelism.
Most Radical Ideologies Soften with Time – Not Traditional Wahhabism
Most radical movements moderate once their leadership ages, their
funding dries up, or political incorporation becomes more attractive than
continued violence. The Provisional IRA’s
political wing, Sinn Féin, entered mainstream Northern Irish politics following
the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, trading an armed campaign for a seat at the
table. The Salafi-jihadist current has
shown no comparable softening, because its theology explicitly rejects the
compromise that made those other transitions possible. This is why it remains a live security
concern.
Terence
Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The
Billionaire Cheat Code

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