These are my thoughts on business development and management issues. I worked for years as a consultant and in various positions in the logistics and maritime industry. We have handled projects from training and development to corporate imaging and branding.
29 October, 2019
Four Closings for Financial Advisors
26 October, 2019
Quora Answer: Why Does Warren Buffett Live Like a Poor Person?
Quora Answer: Why are Women Exempted from Caning in Singapore, No Matter How Heinous the Crime?
The following is my answer to a Quora
question: “If
caning, in Singapore, is meant to be a deterrent for severe crime, then how can
a woman be exempted from this even if she has committed a heinous act such as
torturing and killing her children?”
It is usually posed with an air of moral
outrage: if caning is meant to deter, why do women get away with it? The word “exemption” is used as though women
have somehow gamed the legal system. As
though some feminist lobby slipped a clause past Parliament whilst the men were
distracted. The reality is far less
dramatic. The exemption is a colonial
inheritance; it is codified in statute, and it comes with a compensating
sentence that makes “getting away with it” a phrase that belongs nowhere near
the actual legal position.
Where the Law Comes From
Judicial caning in Singapore is governed
by sections 325 to 332 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010. The provision is not a Singapore
invention. It is a direct inheritance
from British colonial practice, carried over through the Indian Penal Code and
the Straits Settlements legal framework that preceded independence. The British drew the line at caning
women. This was not progressive
feminism. It was Victorian paternalism —
the operative assumption being that women, on account of their supposed weaker
constitutions, should not be subjected to the same level of corporal punishment
as men. The language of the age used
words like “uncivilised.” Singapore
inherited the provision, retained it, and has never found a compelling reason
to revisit it.
The rationale has since evolved. The contemporary position rests on a
combination of physiological concerns — the risk of complications in future
pregnancies from severe caning — and the broader principle that any change to a
provision of this weight requires a legislative consensus that has never
materialised, because the existing framework functions adequately without it. For those who find this unsatisfying: the law
does not require your satisfaction. It
requires a coherent basis.
The “Exemption” is Not a Discount
A woman convicted of an offence that
carries mandatory caning does not simply walk away from the caning component
with a cheerful wave. Under the Criminal
Procedure Code, courts may impose up to twelve months of additional
imprisonment in lieu of caning for offenders who cannot be caned — whether due
to age, medical unfitness, or sex. The
woman serves a longer custodial sentence.
The punishment is substituted, not waived. The question frames this as an injustice
against society. The correct frame is
substitution of equivalent severity. The
goal of the sentence is punishment and deterrence. Additional imprisonment achieves both. The vehicle differs. The destination does not.
To reiterate, a woman convicted of
murdering her children faces the death penalty.
Caning does not apply to those sentenced to death. The question is moot before it begins. If the offence falls short of a capital
charge — grievous hurt causing death, for instance — she will face the maximum
custodial sentence available, with additional imprisonment substituted for the
caning strokes she cannot receive. She
is not spared punishment. She is
punished differently. The law does not
and cannot calibrate its categories to individual acts of heinousness. It sets frameworks. Within those frameworks, judges exercise
discretion on sentence. The exemption
for women from caning is a category rule, not a moral judgement about whether
this particular woman deserves to be caned.
Collapsing the two is a category error dressed up as an ethical
question.
The law is what it is. The rationale is colonial in origin,
physiological in its contemporary defence, and consistent in its
application. It is not an injustice. It is a framework. Whether it should be changed is a policy
question. The answer requires a
legislative debate weighing the medical evidence on caning’s physiological
effects on women, the adequacy of custodial substitution, and the social
consensus on corporal punishment in the twenty-first century. That debate has not happened, because no one
in Singapore who matters has concluded that the existing framework produces
unjust outcomes. There is no public clamour. Nobody cares enough to put this at the top of
any legislative priority. When someone
does, Parliament will convene. Until
then, the cane remains a male-only instrument in the hands of the Singapore
Prison Service, the law remains internally coherent, and the question will
continue to be asked by people who have not read the Criminal Procedure Code.
Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code







