The following is my answer to a Quora
question: “What
happened to Malaysia’s sovereign wealth funds?”
Corruption first. Mismanagement second. A recovery since, though one still dwarfed by
global peers. Malaysia runs two entities
that people conflate constantly.
1Malaysia Development Bhd., 1MDB, was a state investment fund founded in
2009 by then Prime Minister Dato’ Sri Mohammed Najib Tun Abdul Razak. Khazanah Nasional Bhd. is Malaysia’s actual
sovereign wealth fund, founded on 3rd September 1993, a separate
entity with a separate mandate. 1MDB is
the reason “Malaysia’s sovereign wealth fund” became global shorthand for
kleptocracy. Khazanah inherited that
reputational damage anyway, and had its own crisis to answer for besides. Understanding what happened requires
separating the two, then tracing how each one collapsed and recovered on its
own terms.
How 1MDB Worked
Malaysian businessman Low
Taek Jho, known as Jho Low, was not a banker.
Educated at Harrow and Wharton, he founded his own investment firm,
Jynwel Capital, after graduating in 2005, and built his early standing by connecting
Najib Razak to Gulf sovereign funds such as Mubadala. That access, not a banking career, is what
put him at the centre of 1MDB. He
operated as a fixer and architect rather than a financier deploying his own
capital, orchestrating the offshore structures, and directing where the money
went, while Goldman Sachs supplied the institutional cover his operation
lacked.
Goldman raised US$6.5
billion for 1MDB through three bond offerings between 2012 and 2013, earning
close to US$600 million in fees, twenty times the standard rate for
underwriting of that size. Ng Chong Hwa,
known professionally as Roger Ng, Goldman’s former head of investment banking
for Malaysia, and Timothy Leissner, the bank’s former Southeast Asia Chairman,
both took part in the scheme. Leissner
later testified that he personally transferred US$35 million in kickbacks to
Ng, and both men faced criminal prosecution.
US and Malaysian authorities determined that US$4.5 billion was diverted
from 1MDB into offshore shell companies.
Low spent it on a US$250 million yacht, luxury real estate in New York,
Beverly Hills, and London, paintings by Claude Monet and Vincent van Gogh, and
financing for the 2013 film The Wolf of Wall Street.
Goldman ultimately paid
close to US$6 billion in combined settlements with Malaysian and US
authorities, one of the largest penalties in Wall Street history. Najib Razak was convicted and imprisoned. Low remains a fugitive, believed to be in
China, a claim Beijing denies. Low
himself has disputed being the sole mastermind, telling The Straits Times in
2020 that he is “an easy target for all of those above given the fact that I am
not a politician,” a claim that carries some weight given Najib’s own conviction,
even if it also reads as self-serving deflection from a man still avoiding
trial.
Khazanah’s Separate
Collapse
Khazanah Nasional posted
a pre-tax loss of RM6.27 billion in 2018, against a pre-tax profit of RM2.89
billion the year before. Net worth
adjusted fell 21.6 per cent to RM91 billion, from RM116 billion at the end of 2017. Realisable asset value fell to RM136 billion
from RM157 billion over the same period.
Even in the year Khazanah claimed a profit, its adjusted asset value had
already fallen by more than a fifth.
Despite this, the fund still declared a RM1.5 billion dividend for 2018,
a decision that called its management's credibility into serious question. This was not 1MDB-style theft. It was years of weak investment discipline
and governance drift, arriving at the same moment Malaysia’s global reputation
was already in ruins from a scandal Khazanah had no direct hand in.
Khazanah’s assets sat at
just over US$20 billion during this period.
Temasek Holdings, Singapore’s sovereign fund, held an estimated US$250
billion at the same time, more than ten times the size, from a smaller country
with fewer natural resources and a smaller domestic market. A resource-rich nation running a fund
one-tenth the size of its neighbour’s was not a funding problem. It was the compounded cost of weak governance
layered on top of a national scandal.
The Recovery, and What It
Rests On
Khazanah has turned
itself around since, under Managing Director Dato’ Amirul Feisal Wan
Zahir. Net asset value grew from RM85
billion in 2023 to RM103.6 billion in 2024, a 22 per cent increase, reaching
total assets of RM176.2 billion by 2025, with net income of RM7.14 billion. The fund’s one-year rolling return hit 24.6
per cent in 2024, its best on record, up from 5.7 per cent the year
before. Moody’s and S&P Global
Ratings assigned Khazanah its inaugural investment-grade credit rating, A3 and
A- respectively, citing a sound track record of investment and funding
discipline.
The recovery is not
confined to the balance sheet. Khazanah
holds controlling or major stakes in Telekom Malaysia, Tenaga Nasional,
Malaysia Airports, Malaysia Airlines, and UEM Group, the backbone of the
country’s telecommunications, power, aviation, and infrastructure sectors, and
continues actively managing them rather than treating them as passive
holdings. It has positioned Malaysia as
a leader in Islamic finance, issuing the world’s first exchangeable swukuk. It launched Jelawang Capital in October 2024
as a national fund-of-funds to grow Malaysia’s venture capital ecosystem, and
has allocated RM1 billion toward mid-tier companies in semiconductors and
advanced manufacturing, alongside RM1.5 billion for energy transition projects
including large-scale solar. This is
diversification, still early relative to Singapore’s own investment in the same
sectors through Temasek Holdings and EDBI, but progress against a fund that
was, a decade ago, defending a dividend it could not justify.
None of this recovery
closes the gap against the rest of the world’s sovereign capital. Global sovereign wealth fund assets crossed
US$15 trillion for the first time in December 2025. Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global leads
that table at US$1.6 to US$2.2 trillion, holding stakes in over 7,200 companies
worldwide. China runs two funds in the
top five, CIC at US$1.24 trillion and SAFE Investment Company at US$1.08
trillion. Abu Dhabi’s ADIA sits close to
US$1 trillion, Saudi Arabia’s PIF near US$925 to US$930 billion, and Kuwait’s
KIA between US$846 billion and US$1 trillion.
Singapore’s GIC manages somewhere between US$769 billion and US$936
billion, and Temasek Holdings trails at US$288 billion.
Khazanah's total assets,
converted from its 2025 figure, sit at US$38 billion, well outside the top
thirty funds tracked globally, closer in scale to Turkey’s TVF or Kazakhstan’s
Samruk Kazyna than to any of the trillion-dollar funds above it. A country with Malaysia’s oil, palm oil, and
manufacturing base sitting this far down the global table is the price for a
decade of failure.
Corruption at the scale
1MDB reached does not merely cost the money that was stolen. It costs a country its standing for years afterwards,
regardless of what its actual sovereign wealth fund does to rebuild in the
meantime. To be fair, Khazanah’s
post-2019 leadership has done real work: an investment-grade rating, record
returns, genuine diversification, and continued stewardship of the national
assets it was built to manage. What it
has not done, and cannot do quickly, is close a scale gap against Norway, the
Gulf funds, China, and Singapore that took a decade of scandal and drift to
open. Malaysia had the resources to have
built one of the largest sovereign funds in the world. What it built instead was a cautionary tale,
and a slow, genuine climb back out of it.
Terence
Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The
Billionaire Cheat Code