24 October, 2026

The Capital Structure Has Inverted — & Founders Still Pitching for Equity Have Not Noticed

Southeast Asia’s venture ecosystem has undergone a structural shift so significant that the word “correction” no longer adequately describes it.  This is not a market cooling.  This is a capital structure inversion — and the founders who are still pitching for equity as if it is 2021 are pitching into a market that has moved on without them.

The data is unambiguous.  Equity funding across Southeast Asia fell from US$8.4 billion in 2023 to US$6.2 billion in 2025.  Over the same period, debt funding surged from US$487.8 million to US$6.1 billion — a twelve-fold increase in two years.  By mid-September 2026, a further US$3.4 billion in debt had been deployed.  Seed-stage funding collapsed from US$810.9 million in 2023 to US$443.2 million in 2025 — a 45 per cent reduction.

Equity is contracting.  Debt is expanding.  Early-stage capital is disappearing.  The funding architecture of Southeast Asian venture has been rebuilt around debt — and most founders discovered this only after they needed to raise.

Why This Happened

The 2021 vintage of venture funding was built on a specific set of conditions: near-zero interest rates, abundant global liquidity, and an investor appetite for growth at any price.  All three conditions reversed simultaneously.  The Federal Reserve’s rate-hiking cycle — which took the Federal Funds Rate from near zero to 5.25 per cent between March 2022 and July 2023 — repriced risk assets globally.  Venture capital is a risk asset.  It repriced.

The consequence was predictable.  Equity investors became selective to the point of paralysis.  Valuations compressed.  The founder who raised at a 20x revenue multiple in 2021 and needed a follow-on round in 2024 discovered that the market was now offering 8x — or nothing.  The down-round was not merely dilutive.  It was a public signal of distress that affected every subsequent fundraising conversation, every partnership negotiation, and every recruitment pitch.

Founders responded rationally.  They turned to debt — specifically venture debt and private credit — to extend runway and bridge the gap between their current valuation and the milestones required to justify the next equity round at a defensible price.  The lender base responded to this demand by expanding.  Traditional banks, including HSBC and DBS, entered the space.  Venture capital firms launched affiliated private credit vehicles: Openspace Capital’s Onyx Growth Credit and Granite Asia’s Libra Hybrid are the regional examples — VC firms acknowledging that their portfolio companies need debt capital and deciding to provide it themselves rather than watch the margin go elsewhere.  This is the institutionalisation of private credit.  It is a structural development, not a cyclical one.  The infrastructure now exists.  The demand is structural.  The lender base is established.

The Problem of Cost

The data shows the growth in venture debt deployment.  It does not show the cost.  Venture debt in Southeast Asia currently carries coupon rates of 12 to 18 per cent per annum, depending on the credit profile of the borrower and the structure of the facility.  Most facilities include warrant coverage — typically 10 to 20 per cent of the loan principal in equity warrants — which dilutes the founder’s equity regardless of how the facility is structured.  Financial covenants restrict operational decisions: minimum cash balance requirements, restrictions on additional debt, and performance triggers that can accelerate repayment at the worst possible moment.

The founder who takes venture debt to avoid a dilutive equity round discovers, approximately eighteen months later, that the warrant coverage has diluted them anyway, the covenant package has constrained their operational flexibility, and the 15 per cent coupon has consumed cash that was supposed to fund growth.

This is not a criticism of venture lenders.  They are pricing the risk correctly.  The problem is structural: the founder who depends on external liquidity in a tight market will always pay the price that the market sets for that liquidity — which is highest when the founder’s need is greatest.

The Southeast Asian Precedent

The structural risk of venture debt dependency is not hypothetical.  It has a regional case study.  Zilingo — the Singapore-headquartered fashion technology platform — raised venture debt alongside equity to fund its expansion across Southeast Asia.  By 2022, the company had taken on debt obligations it could not service when its growth assumptions failed to materialise.  Its financial position deteriorated, its board relationships collapsed, and the company entered creditor proceedings that ultimately destroyed a business that had once been valued at US$970 million.

The debt covenants that were designed to protect the lenders became the mechanism by which the company’s options were progressively eliminated.  When the equity market closed, and the operational performance missed projections, the debt structure — which had seemed manageable when the equity market was supportive — became the instrument of the company’s dissolution.  Zilingo is not an isolated case.  It is the extreme expression of a structural vulnerability that every founder carrying venture debt faces to varying degrees.

The Sales Proposition

The venture debt market has created exactly the conditions that the L.I.O.N.’s Vault architecture was designed to address.  The founder facing a 15 per cent coupon rate on a US$5 million venture debt facility is paying US$750,000 per year in interest — before warrant coverage, before covenant compliance costs, before the management time consumed by lender relationship management.  Over a three-year facility, the all-in cost of that capital — including the equity dilution from warrant coverage — routinely exceeds 25 to 30 per cent of the principal.

A founder who had, two years earlier, warehoused US$2 million in corporate reserves within a Singapore-domiciled IUL structure has access to US$1.6 to US$1.8 million in policy loan capital at 4 to 5 per cent per annum — with no warrant coverage, no financial covenants, no lender board representation, and no acceleration risk.  The differential in cost, terms, and operational impact between these two positions is not marginal.  It is the difference between a capital structure that compounds the company’s options and one that progressively narrows them.

The founders who built internal liquidity reserves before the market tightened are not negotiating venture debt terms in 2026.  They are watching their competitors negotiate them.  The founders who have not yet built internal reserves face a straightforward decision: begin building them now, or continue paying the market’s price for external liquidity — a price that reflects the market’s assessment of their risk at the moment of their greatest need.  The time to build the vault is before the market closes.  The market has been closed for four years.

The Proposition

The L.I.O.N.’s Vault architecture is not an insurance product.  It is a capital infrastructure decision.  For the Southeast Asian founder managing a growth-stage company in the current environment — carrying venture debt, facing a valuation gap between the current round and the next milestone, watching seed-stage funding disappear, and private credit terms tighten — the question is not whether internal capital reserves are valuable.  The question is why they do not already exist.  The answer, in most cases, is that nobody offered them before the company needed them.  The offer is here now.  The timing, as usual, depends on when the founder decides to act.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code



No comments:

Post a Comment

Thank you for taking the time to share our thoughts. Once approved, your comments will be poster.