27 October, 2026

Quora Answer: How Do Venture Capital Firms Make Money If 90% of Investments Fail?

 The following is my answer to a Quora question: “How do venture capital firms make money if 90% of investments fail?”

The question contains its own answer.  Venture capital does not need 90 per cent of investments to succeed.  It needs one to succeed spectacularly enough to make the other nineteen irrelevant.  This is not a flaw in the model.  It is the model.

The Mathematics

The standard venture capital fund structure assumes a portfolio of 20 investments.  The fund manager — the general partner — raises capital from institutional investors and high-net-worth individuals — the limited partners — and deploys it across the portfolio over a three- to five-year investment period.  The power law of venture returns dictates the outcome.  Assume a US$100 million fund deployed across 20 companies at US$5 million each.  Of 20 investments, 10 fail and return zero.  6 return between 0.5x and 2x — they do not fail outright, but they do not generate meaningful returns.  3 return between 2x and 5x — modest successes.  One returns 100x.

The one company that returns 100x on a US$5 million investment returns US$500 million.  The three modest successes return between US$10 million and US$25 million each, contributing US$50 million.  The six mediocre performers return US$30 million.  The ten failures return zero.  Total fund return: US$580 million on a US$100 million fund — a 5.8x return before fees.  The general partner takes a 20 per cent carried interest — the “carry” — on profits above the hurdle rate, typically 8 per cent.  The limited partners receive the remainder.  This is why the 100x outcome is not a bonus.  It is the entire thesis.  Without it, the fund returns 0.8x — a loss after fees and the cost of capital.

The Return Expectations by Market

The expected return profile varies significantly by stage and sector.

Seed-stage technology startups — the earliest bets, typically US$500,000 to US$2 million — carry the highest failure rate and the highest potential multiple.  The venture firm expects to lose its investment in 60 to 70 per cent of cases.  It expects 30x to 100x returns from the survivors.  Y Combinator’s early investments in Airbnb (US$20,000 for 6 per cent, now worth billions) and Dropbox (similar structure) represent the archetype.

Series A technology — US$5 million to US$20 million — carries a lower failure rate but a compressed multiple.  The expectation is 10x to 30x on the winners, with a 40 to 50 per cent failure rate.  The fund needs fewer enormous outliers to generate returns.

Growth-stage venture — US$20 million to US$100 million — operates on a 5x to 15x return expectation with a lower failure rate still.  At this stage, the company has product-market fit.  The question is execution, not survival.  The failure rate drops to 20 to 30 per cent.

SaaS specifically — Software-as-a-Service companies are the preferred venture category because of their recurring revenue model, high gross margins (typically 70 to 80 per cent), and the compounding nature of their customer acquisition.  A SaaS company growing at 100 per cent annually doubles its revenue each year.  At year five, it is 32 times its original size.  The multiple expansion from entering at a 5x revenue multiple and exiting at a 10x revenue multiple on a company that grew 32x produces a return of 64x.

Deep tech and biotech — longer development cycles, binary outcomes (FDA approval or not; the technology works or it does not), and capital-intensive development produce a specific return profile: higher failure rate, longer time to exit, but potentially unlimited upside if the technology succeeds.  Returns of 50x to 300x are documented for successful biotech exits.  The failure rate exceeds 80 per cent.

Real-World Cases

Sequoia Capital invested US$60 million in WhatsApp across multiple rounds.  Facebook acquired WhatsApp for US$19 billion in 2014.  Sequoia’s return: US$3 billion — a 50x return on its investment.  That single investment covered the losses of an entire fund.

Benchmark Capital invested US$5 million in Uber in 2011 for 20 per cent of the company.  Uber’s IPO in 2019 valued Benchmark’s stake at US$7 billion — a 1,400x return.  One investment.  One fund.  One outcome that defines the firm’s entire history.

Andreessen Horowitz invested US$250,000 in Instagram in 2010.  Facebook acquired Instagram for US$1 billion in 2012.  Andreessen Horowitz’s return: US$78 million on a US$250,000 investment — a 312x return in 18 months.

Accel Partners invested US$12.7 million in Facebook’s Series A in 2005 at a valuation of US$100 million.  Facebook’s IPO in 2012 valued Accel’s stake at US$9 billion.  That investment funded Accel’s operations for a decade.

The common thread is not diversification.  It is concentration in the one or two companies within a portfolio that the fund manager correctly identified as having the potential for category-defining scale.

How a Venture Fund is Constituted

The general partner — the venture firm — establishes a limited partnership structure.  The general partner contributes 1 to 2 per cent of the fund’s capital — the GP commitment — which aligns their interests with the limited partners.  The limited partners contribute the remaining 98 to 99 per cent.  The fund has a defined life — typically 10 years, with two one-year extension options.  Years 1 to 5 are the investment period.  Years 5 to 10 are the harvesting period — the general partner works the portfolio toward exits.

The general partner charges a management fee — typically 2 per cent of committed capital annually during the investment period, declining to 1.5 per cent thereafter.  On a US$100 million fund over 10 years, this generates US$17 million in management fees regardless of performance.  This is how venture firms pay their staff, rent their offices, and fund their operations.  The carry is how they get wealthy.  The carry — 20 per cent of profits above the hurdle rate — is the primary incentive mechanism.  On a US$100 million fund generating US$580 million in returns, the profit above the 8 per cent hurdle rate is US$400 million.  The general partner’s 20 per cent carry is US$80 million, split among the partnership’s principals.

How the Fund is Disbursed

Capital calls rather than upfront disbursement characterise the LP experience.  The limited partners do not transfer all committed capital on day one.  The general partner issues capital calls — requests for a portion of committed capital — as investments are made.  A LP who commits US$10 million to a fund may receive capital calls of US$1 to US$2 million per year over five years.  This structure allows limited partners to manage their liquidity.  It also means that venture funds operate with uncalled capital — committed but not yet deployed — that represents a contingent liability for the limited partner rather than an immediate cash outlay.

How the Fund Recovers Its Investment

The exit mechanisms are three: initial public offering, merger and acquisition, and secondary sale.

The IPO — listing the portfolio company on a public exchange — provides the most liquid exit but also the longest timeline.  The venture fund receives shares in the public company, subject to a lock-up period typically of 180 days, after which it can sell into the public market.  Uber, Airbnb, DoorDash, and Snowflake are examples of venture-backed companies that provided IPO exits.

The M&A exit — the portfolio company is acquired by a larger company — provides the most certain exit but at a negotiated valuation.  Instagram, WhatsApp, YouTube, and LinkedIn are examples of venture-backed companies acquired before IPO.  M&A exits tend to be faster, more certain, and at lower multiples than IPO exits — but in a market where IPO windows close, they represent the pragmatic alternative.

The secondary sale — the venture fund sells its stake to another investor, typically a growth equity firm or a sovereign wealth fund, before a public exit — has become an increasingly important mechanism as companies stay private longer.  The average time from founding to IPO for a US technology company increased from 4 years in 1999 to 12 years by 2020.  Secondary sales allow early-stage investors to realise returns without waiting for a public exit that may be a decade away.

The Assessment

Venture capital is the only asset class where the professional’s primary job is to be wrong 90 per cent of the time and still generate superior returns.  The model works because the mathematics of power law distributions — where one outcome dominates the entire distribution — is structurally different from the bell curve distributions that govern most asset classes.  In a bond portfolio, no single bond can return 100x.  In a public equity portfolio, no single stock can return 1,400x in 8 years.  In a venture portfolio, both are documented outcomes.

The failure rate is not a problem to be managed.  It is a feature of the model — because the companies willing to take the risks that produce 100x returns are the ones that might fail.  A company unwilling to take those risks is unlikely to return more than 3 to 5x — insufficient to justify the illiquidity, the management cost, and the risk premium that venture capital commands.  The 90 per cent failure rate and the 100x return are the same phenomenon, viewed from different vantage points.  The venture capitalist who refuses to invest in companies that might fail will never invest in companies that might return 100x.  This is why venture capital is not an investment model that most investors should attempt to replicate — and why the ones who do it well are considerably wealthier than the ones who merely attempt it.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code



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