The
following is my answer to a Quora question: “What
are the various factors that led to the financial crisis in the US in 2008?”
The
2008 financial crisis did not arrive without warning. It arrived after decades of deliberate
choices — regulatory rollbacks, manufactured complexity, and a financial
industry that had concluded the rules did not apply to it. The result was the worst economic collapse
since the Great Depression, a US$700 billion taxpayer bailout, and 8.7 million
jobs destroyed in the United States alone.
This is not a complicated story.
It is a story about greed, negligence, and the remarkable human capacity
to believe that this time is different.
In short, typical American politics.
The
Foundation: Deregulation
The
collapse did not begin in 2008. It began
in 1999. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
signed by President William Jefferson Clinton on 12th November 1999,
repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.
Glass-Steagall had been enacted after the Great Depression specifically
to separate commercial banking from investment banking. Its repeal allowed banks to merge
deposit-taking with securities trading under one roof. Senator William Philip Gramm, one of the act’s
architects, promised it would give Americans a financial services industry the
world would envy. Within nine years,
that industry required the largest government rescue in American history.
The
Commodity Futures Modernisation Act of 2000 followed. It exempted over-the-counter derivatives —
including credit default swaps — from regulatory oversight. The market for credit default swaps grew from
US$920 billion in 2001 to US$62 trillion by 2007. Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the United
States Federal Reserve, testified before the Senate Banking Committee in 2003
that derivatives were an extraordinarily useful vehicle for transferring risk
from those who could not handle it to those who could. In 2008, he admitted before Congress that his
entire framework had a fundamental flaw.
That flaw cost the global economy an estimated US$22 trillion.
The
Mechanism: Mortgage-Backed Securities
The
vehicle for the collapse was the mortgage-backed security. Banks originate mortgages. Investment banks purchase those mortgages,
pool them, and sell them as bonds. The
buyers of those bonds receive the mortgage payments as income. Simple enough. The problem was who was getting mortgages. By the mid-2000s, lenders had moved
aggressively into sub-prime lending — mortgages issued to borrowers with poor
credit histories, low incomes, or no documented income at all. Between 2003 and 2006, sub-prime mortgage
originations in the United States rose from US$332 billion to US$685 billion
annually. Sub-prime loans as a share of
total mortgage originations rose from 8 per cent to 20 per cent in the same
period.
The
names tell the story. NINJA loans: No
Income, No Job, No Assets. Liar loans: stated-income
mortgages where no verification was required.
Teaser-rate mortgages: low initial interest rates that reset sharply
upward after two or three years. Countrywide
Financial Corporation, the largest mortgage lender in the United States at its
peak, wrote US$97.2 billion in sub-prime loans in 2006 alone. Its chief executive, Angelo Ralph Mozilo,
sold US$141.5 million of company stock before the collapse. The United States Securities and Exchange
Commission later charged him with insider trading and securities fraud. He settled for US$67.5 million without
admitting wrongdoing.
The
Amplifier: Collateralised Debt Obligations
The
mortgage-backed security was bad enough.
Then Wall Street created the collateralised debt obligation. Investment banks took the lower-rated
tranches of mortgage-backed securities — the portions most likely to default —
and repackaged them into new instruments.
The rating agencies, most prominently Moody’s Investors Service and
Standard and Poor’s Financial Services, assigned these new instruments triple-A
ratings. Between 2000 and 2007, Moody’s
rated nearly 45,000 mortgage-related securities as triple-A. By 2010, 73 per cent of those ratings had
been downgraded to junk. The business
model of the rating agencies produced this outcome. Issuers paid the agencies to rate their
products. The higher the rating, the
more product the issuer could sell. An
agency that issued a harsh rating lost business to a competitor willing to
issue a generous one. This is not a
conflict of interest. It is a system
designed to produce inflated ratings, and it performed as designed.
The
collateralised debt obligation market reached US$503 billion in issuance in
2006. Banks sold these instruments to
pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies, and other banks
worldwide. When the mortgages inside
them began to default, every institution holding them took losses
simultaneously. The complexity of the
instruments meant that nobody knew exactly what was inside them or how exposed
they were.
The
Detonator: The Housing Market
US
house prices had risen 124 per cent between 1997 and 2006. The assumption underwriting the entire
structure was that they would continue to rise.
If a borrower defaulted, the bank could foreclose and sell the property
at a profit. The model required
perpetual appreciation. In 2006, house
prices peaked. In 2007, they began to
fall. By 2012, the S&P/Case-Shiller
Home Price Index had fallen 34.4 per cent from its peak — the largest decline
since the Great Depression. As house
prices fell, borrowers with teaser-rate mortgages could not refinance — the
standard escape route when rates reset.
Defaults rose. By 2008, one in
every 54 US households had received a foreclosure filing. Sub-prime mortgage delinquencies reached 25
per cent.
The
mortgage-backed securities lost value.
The collateralised debt obligations lost value. The institutions holding them faced
write-downs. The institutions that had
written credit default swaps — insurance-like contracts against default — faced
claims they could not pay.
The
Cascade: 2007 to 2008
The
sequence moved quickly once it started.
February
2007: HSBC Holdings announced US$10.5 billion in losses
from its US sub-prime mortgage portfolio — the first major institution to
disclose the scale of the problem.
June
2007: Two Bear Stearns hedge funds heavily exposed to
sub-prime mortgage securities collapsed.
Bear Stearns, one of Wall Street’s oldest investment banks, injected
US$3.2 billion to stabilise them. It did
not work.
August
2007: BNP Paribas SA suspended three investment funds,
citing its inability to value their assets.
The European Central Bank injected €95 billion into money markets
overnight. The United States Federal
Reserve injected US$24 billion.
September
2007: Northern Rock plc, a British mortgage lender,
experienced the first bank run in the United Kingdom since 1866. Depositors queued outside branches to
withdraw their savings. The British
government eventually nationalised the bank at a cost of £1.4 billion to
taxpayers.
March
2008: Bear Stearns collapsed. The Federal Reserve arranged an emergency
sale to JPMorgan Chase at US$2 per share — a bank that had traded at US$170 per
share eighteen months earlier. The
Federal Reserve provided US$29 billion in financing to facilitate the sale.
July
2008: IndyMac Bancorp, one of the largest savings
institutions in the United States, failed.
It was the second-largest bank failure in US history at that point. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
took over US$32 billion in assets.
September
2008: The crisis reached its peak in a single month.
07th
September: The United States government placed the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac) into conservatorship.
The two entities held or guaranteed US$5.4 trillion in mortgage debt —
about half of all outstanding US mortgages.
15th
September: Lehman Brothers Holdings filed for bankruptcy. It was the largest bankruptcy in US history:
US$639 billion in assets. The Federal
Reserve and Treasury Department had declined to arrange a rescue. Global credit markets froze overnight. The LIBOR-OIS spread — a measure of banking
stress — shot from 24 basis points to 364 basis points within days.
16th
September: American International Group received a US$182
billion government rescue. Its Financial
Products division had written US$440 billion in credit default swaps it could
not cover. Goldman Sachs Group received
US$12.9 billion from that rescue.
25th
September: Washington Mutual was seized by the Office of Thrift
Supervision and sold to JPMorgan Chase for US$1.9 billion. It was the largest bank failure in US
history: US$307 billion in assets.
October
2008: The United States Congress passed the Emergency
Economic Stabilisation Act, authorising US$700 billion in Troubled Asset Relief
Programme funding. The United Kingdom
announced a £500 billion bank rescue package.
Iceland’s banking system collapsed entirely — three banks with assets
ten times the country’s GDP had failed.
November–December
2008: General Motors and Chrysler requested government
bailouts. US unemployment rose to 7.3
per cent by year-end. The Federal
Reserve cut interest rates to near zero.
The
Reckoning: What It Cost
The
United States lost US$19.2 trillion in household wealth between 2007 and 2009,
according to the Federal Reserve. The
economy contracted 4.3 per cent from peak to trough — the worst contraction
since World War Two. 8.7 million jobs
were eliminated. The global impact was
wider. The International Monetary Fund
estimated total global losses from the financial crisis at US$4.1
trillion. World trade fell 12 per cent
in 2009 — the largest single-year decline since the Great Depression.
TARP
ultimately disbursed US$431.3 billion.
The government recovered most of it — a fact frequently cited by those
who wish to minimise the scale of the intervention. Recovery of principal does not account for
the cost of near-zero interest rates maintained for seven years, the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet expansion from US$900 billion to US$4.5 trillion, or
the economic activity permanently destroyed.
The
Accountability: Almost None
This
is the United States, one of the most corrupt economies in the world. Only one senior banker went to prison. Kareem Serageldin, a Credit Suisse trader,
was sentenced to 30 months in 2013 for manipulating bond prices. He was not a senior executive. He was not a decision-maker. He was, in the context of the crisis, a
footnote. Mozilo of Countrywide settled
without admitting wrongdoing. Richard
Severin Fuld Jr., the Chief Executive Officer of Lehman Brothers, walked away
with an estimated US$300 million in compensation over his tenure. Daniel Herbert Mudd, former Chief Executive
Officer of Fannie Mae, settled a civil case with the SEC in 2015 for
US$100,000.
The
institutions paid fines. JPMorgan Chase
paid US$13 billion to settle mortgage securities claims. Bank of America paid US$16.65 billion. Goldman Sachs paid US$5 billion. The fines were large in absolute terms. They were fractions of the profits generated
during the period of misconduct. The
2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act imposed new
capital requirements, created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and
introduced oversight for over-the-counter derivatives. In 2018, President Donald John Trump signed
the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, rolling
back portions of Dodd-Frank for smaller banks.
The deregulation cycle had resumed.
The
Lesson: Unlearned
The
2008 crisis was not a black swan. It was
not unforeseeable. It was not an act of
God or a random market event. Economist
Robert James Shiller of Yale University had been warning of a housing bubble
since 2005. The International Monetary
Fund had flagged systemic risk in its Global Financial Stability Report in
2006. Dr Raghuram Govind Rajan, then
Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund, presented a paper at the
2005 Jackson Hole conference warning that financial innovation had increased
systemic risk. Lawrence Henry Summers —
then President of Harvard University and former United States Secretary of the
Treasury — dismissed him as an enemy of progress who did not understand modern
finance.
The
warnings were there. The incentives to
ignore them were larger. A system that
rewards risk-taking with bonuses and socialises the losses through taxpayer
bailouts will always produce the same result.
The structure creates the outcome.
Blaming individuals — however deserving — without addressing the
structure is theatre. The question is
not what caused the 2008 financial crisis.
The question is what will cause the next one. The architecture is still in place. The incentives have not changed. The ratings agencies still issue
ratings. The derivatives markets are
still opaque. The compensation
structures still reward short-term risk.
History does not repeat. But it
rhymes loudly enough that only the wilfully deaf cannot hear it. Because we are dealing with American predatory
capitalism, we are likely to see something similar on schedule – probably the
AI debt cliff.
Terence
Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The
Billionaire Cheat Code
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