The following is my answer
to a Quora question: “Is it true that passive ETFs could trigger a bubble,
given that they fuel zombie or potentially failing companies?”
Every few years, someone
with a large platform and a compelling backstory declares that passive index
funds are the next subprime mortgage crisis.
The argument has surface appeal.
It is also wrong. An
exchange-traded fund is not a bucket of money that buys stocks
indiscriminately. It is a financial
instrument with a price-discovery mechanism built into its architecture. When investors buy shares of an ETF on the
exchange, they buy from other investors — not from the fund itself. The fund’s share price tracks its net asset
value through a mechanism called creation and redemption, operated by
authorised participants: large institutional trading firms granted the right to
create and destroy ETF shares in bulk.
If an ETF trades at a
premium to its underlying basket, an authorised participant buys the underlying
stocks, delivers them to the fund manager, and receives new ETF shares in
return — which it then sells on the exchange at the premium. The arbitrage profit closes the gap. If the ETF trades at a discount, the reverse
happens: the authorised participant buys ETF shares cheaply, redeems them for
the underlying basket, and sells the stocks.
The price gap closes again. This
mechanism does not eliminate price discovery.
It enforces it continuously, in real time, by giving large professional
traders a financial incentive to correct any mispricing. The ETF is not floating above the underlying
market. It is tethered to it by
arbitrage.
Passive investors still set
prices through one mechanism the bubble theorists ignore: capital allocation
decisions. Every investor who chooses a
US equity index fund over a European equity index fund allocates capital to US
markets. Every investor who moves from
equities to bonds changes relative asset prices. The passive investor does not select stocks
within an index. The passive investor
absolutely selects which indices receive capital.
The Burry Argument
In 2019, Dr Michael James
Burry — the investor who correctly called the 2008 subprime collapse and was
portrayed in The Big Short — compared index funds to collateralised debt
obligations. His argument: passive funds
buy all constituents regardless of quality, pushing up prices for weak
companies alongside strong ones, and when redemptions come, liquidity will
collapse because the underlying stocks — particularly small-caps — cannot
absorb the selling. It is a clever
argument. It has one problem: it
describes a risk that requires a condition Burry never specified.
Index funds held 52 per cent
of US long-term fund assets at year-end 2025, up from 19 per cent in 2010. US$19.1 trillion sat in passive vehicles
versus US$16.2 trillion in active. ETFs
alone attracted US$1.1 trillion in inflows in 2024 and nearly US$1.49 trillion
in 2025. By any measure, passive
dominates the landscape. And yet. General Electric’s stock lost 75 per cent of
its value between 2016 and 2018 as its accounting problems became public. Boeing fell 25 per cent in the weeks
following the 737 MAX groundings in 2019 and further in 2020. WeWork never made it to index inclusion
before its collapse. Evergrande was
removed from indices before the market had finished pricing in its failure, not
after.
If passive investment were
suppressing price discovery, weak companies would hold inflated valuations
indefinitely until a simultaneous redemption triggered a cascade. Instead, weak companies fall in price
continuously — which is how index committees remove them, since index inclusion
is typically based on market capitalisation thresholds, not on the committee’s
affection for the business. A company
whose price collapses gets removed. The
index is self-cleaning. It does not
require an active manager to identify the problem. The market does that. Index funds hold 10 per cent of the global
investable market and 5 per cent of daily trading volume, per Vanguard’s own
research. Active managers and
arbitrageurs conduct the overwhelming majority of price discovery. The passive fund rides the price
signals. It does not set them.
The Zombie Company Problem
The zombie company argument
is the strongest version of the ETF critique, and it still misses the
mechanism. A zombie company — one that
earns enough to service its debt but not enough to repay principal or fund
growth — survives because it can refinance continuously in a low-rate
environment. Japan’s Lost Decade
produced an entire generation of them.
The Bank of Japan held rates near zero from 1999 onwards. Banks rolled over loans to insolvent firms
rather than recognising losses. The
economy stagnated. Passive index
investing had nothing to do with this.
The zombies survived because central bank policy and bank balance sheet
management kept credit flowing to them.
An index fund that holds a zombie company’s shares does not fund the
zombie’s operations. It does not extend
it credit. It does not prevent the
market from pricing the equity lower.
The zombie survives on debt, not on equity support from index investors.
The 2022 rate cycle
demonstrated this. When the United
States Federal Reserve raised rates from near zero to 5.25 per cent in fourteen
months, zombie companies across the high-yield universe began to fail — not
because passive investors sold their shares, but because their refinancing
costs became unserviceable. The equity
index merely reflected the credit market’s verdict. Index funds tracking these companies marked
down their NAVs accordingly. The price
discovery that the bubble theorists claimed was absent showed up immediately
when the underlying economics changed.
What are the Real Risks?
The serious risks in passive
investing are not bubbles. They are
three structural issues that deserve attention.
Concentration. The S&P 500 is not 500 equally weighted
companies. At the end of 2024, the top
ten constituents — led by Apple, Microsoft, Nvidia, Amazon, and Alphabet —
accounted for 36 per cent of the index by weight. An investor who buys the S&P 500 index
has concentrated 36 per cent of their equity allocation into ten
technology-adjacent businesses. That is
a concentration risk. It is not a bubble
mechanism. It is a portfolio
construction problem the investor needs to understand.
Correlated selling. In a liquidity crisis, redemptions from
passive funds will sell all constituents simultaneously. This is not unique to passive funds — active
fund redemptions do the same. But the scale
of passive ownership means the selling pressure during a panic will be broad
and simultaneous. This is a liquidity
risk during extreme stress events. The
2020 COVID-19 sell-off tested this.
Markets recovered in weeks. The
mechanism held.
Governance abdication. Large passive fund managers — BlackRock,
Vanguard, and State Street together hold significant stakes in almost every
major public company in the United States — exercise proxy votes on behalf of
their shareholders. Whether they
exercise that voting power well is a legitimate governance question. It is not a price bubble question.
The Position
The bubble thesis is
intellectually lazy in a satisfying way.
It takes a real phenomenon — the extraordinary growth of passive
investing — and attributes to it consequences that require a different causal
mechanism. Zombie companies need cheap credit,
not index investors. Bubbles require
leverage, narrative momentum, and a catalyst.
Price discovery requires active traders with financial incentives, not
an absence of passive ones. Michael
Burry called the 2008 crisis correctly.
He has also called the index fund bubble since 2019. The bubble has not arrived. Seven years of waiting is not a track
record. It is a thesis looking for a
data point.
Passive ETFs are a
cost-efficient, tax-efficient, and structurally sound vehicle for capturing
market returns. They are not a
retirement plan. They are not a
substitute for asset allocation, liability matching, or the insurance
architecture that holds a portfolio together when the market decides to have a
bad Thursday. The question is not
whether the ETF will explode. The
question is what sits beneath the ETF when it goes down.
Terence
Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The
Billionaire Cheat Code

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