05 November, 2026

Quora Answer: Is It True That Passive ETFs Could Trigger a Bubble?

The following is my answer to a Quora question: “Is it true that passive ETFs could trigger a bubble, given that they fuel zombie or potentially failing companies?”

Every few years, someone with a large platform and a compelling backstory declares that passive index funds are the next subprime mortgage crisis.  The argument has surface appeal.  It is also wrong.  An exchange-traded fund is not a bucket of money that buys stocks indiscriminately.  It is a financial instrument with a price-discovery mechanism built into its architecture.  When investors buy shares of an ETF on the exchange, they buy from other investors — not from the fund itself.  The fund’s share price tracks its net asset value through a mechanism called creation and redemption, operated by authorised participants: large institutional trading firms granted the right to create and destroy ETF shares in bulk.

If an ETF trades at a premium to its underlying basket, an authorised participant buys the underlying stocks, delivers them to the fund manager, and receives new ETF shares in return — which it then sells on the exchange at the premium.  The arbitrage profit closes the gap.  If the ETF trades at a discount, the reverse happens: the authorised participant buys ETF shares cheaply, redeems them for the underlying basket, and sells the stocks.  The price gap closes again.  This mechanism does not eliminate price discovery.  It enforces it continuously, in real time, by giving large professional traders a financial incentive to correct any mispricing.  The ETF is not floating above the underlying market.  It is tethered to it by arbitrage.

Passive investors still set prices through one mechanism the bubble theorists ignore: capital allocation decisions.  Every investor who chooses a US equity index fund over a European equity index fund allocates capital to US markets.  Every investor who moves from equities to bonds changes relative asset prices.  The passive investor does not select stocks within an index.  The passive investor absolutely selects which indices receive capital.

The Burry Argument

In 2019, Dr Michael James Burry — the investor who correctly called the 2008 subprime collapse and was portrayed in The Big Short — compared index funds to collateralised debt obligations.  His argument: passive funds buy all constituents regardless of quality, pushing up prices for weak companies alongside strong ones, and when redemptions come, liquidity will collapse because the underlying stocks — particularly small-caps — cannot absorb the selling.  It is a clever argument.  It has one problem: it describes a risk that requires a condition Burry never specified.

Index funds held 52 per cent of US long-term fund assets at year-end 2025, up from 19 per cent in 2010.  US$19.1 trillion sat in passive vehicles versus US$16.2 trillion in active.  ETFs alone attracted US$1.1 trillion in inflows in 2024 and nearly US$1.49 trillion in 2025.  By any measure, passive dominates the landscape.  And yet.  General Electric’s stock lost 75 per cent of its value between 2016 and 2018 as its accounting problems became public.  Boeing fell 25 per cent in the weeks following the 737 MAX groundings in 2019 and further in 2020.  WeWork never made it to index inclusion before its collapse.  Evergrande was removed from indices before the market had finished pricing in its failure, not after.

If passive investment were suppressing price discovery, weak companies would hold inflated valuations indefinitely until a simultaneous redemption triggered a cascade.  Instead, weak companies fall in price continuously — which is how index committees remove them, since index inclusion is typically based on market capitalisation thresholds, not on the committee’s affection for the business.  A company whose price collapses gets removed.  The index is self-cleaning.  It does not require an active manager to identify the problem.  The market does that.  Index funds hold 10 per cent of the global investable market and 5 per cent of daily trading volume, per Vanguard’s own research.  Active managers and arbitrageurs conduct the overwhelming majority of price discovery.  The passive fund rides the price signals.  It does not set them.

The Zombie Company Problem

The zombie company argument is the strongest version of the ETF critique, and it still misses the mechanism.  A zombie company — one that earns enough to service its debt but not enough to repay principal or fund growth — survives because it can refinance continuously in a low-rate environment.  Japan’s Lost Decade produced an entire generation of them.  The Bank of Japan held rates near zero from 1999 onwards.  Banks rolled over loans to insolvent firms rather than recognising losses.  The economy stagnated.  Passive index investing had nothing to do with this.  The zombies survived because central bank policy and bank balance sheet management kept credit flowing to them.  An index fund that holds a zombie company’s shares does not fund the zombie’s operations.  It does not extend it credit.  It does not prevent the market from pricing the equity lower.  The zombie survives on debt, not on equity support from index investors.

The 2022 rate cycle demonstrated this.  When the United States Federal Reserve raised rates from near zero to 5.25 per cent in fourteen months, zombie companies across the high-yield universe began to fail — not because passive investors sold their shares, but because their refinancing costs became unserviceable.  The equity index merely reflected the credit market’s verdict.  Index funds tracking these companies marked down their NAVs accordingly.  The price discovery that the bubble theorists claimed was absent showed up immediately when the underlying economics changed.

What are the Real Risks?

The serious risks in passive investing are not bubbles.  They are three structural issues that deserve attention.

Concentration.  The S&P 500 is not 500 equally weighted companies.  At the end of 2024, the top ten constituents — led by Apple, Microsoft, Nvidia, Amazon, and Alphabet — accounted for 36 per cent of the index by weight.  An investor who buys the S&P 500 index has concentrated 36 per cent of their equity allocation into ten technology-adjacent businesses.  That is a concentration risk.  It is not a bubble mechanism.  It is a portfolio construction problem the investor needs to understand.

Correlated selling.  In a liquidity crisis, redemptions from passive funds will sell all constituents simultaneously.  This is not unique to passive funds — active fund redemptions do the same.  But the scale of passive ownership means the selling pressure during a panic will be broad and simultaneous.  This is a liquidity risk during extreme stress events.  The 2020 COVID-19 sell-off tested this.  Markets recovered in weeks.  The mechanism held.

Governance abdication.  Large passive fund managers — BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street together hold significant stakes in almost every major public company in the United States — exercise proxy votes on behalf of their shareholders.  Whether they exercise that voting power well is a legitimate governance question.  It is not a price bubble question.

The Position

The bubble thesis is intellectually lazy in a satisfying way.  It takes a real phenomenon — the extraordinary growth of passive investing — and attributes to it consequences that require a different causal mechanism.  Zombie companies need cheap credit, not index investors.  Bubbles require leverage, narrative momentum, and a catalyst.  Price discovery requires active traders with financial incentives, not an absence of passive ones.  Michael Burry called the 2008 crisis correctly.  He has also called the index fund bubble since 2019.  The bubble has not arrived.  Seven years of waiting is not a track record.  It is a thesis looking for a data point.

Passive ETFs are a cost-efficient, tax-efficient, and structurally sound vehicle for capturing market returns.  They are not a retirement plan.  They are not a substitute for asset allocation, liability matching, or the insurance architecture that holds a portfolio together when the market decides to have a bad Thursday.  The question is not whether the ETF will explode.  The question is what sits beneath the ETF when it goes down.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code



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