01 November, 2026

COP17: Thirty Years of Hypocrisy & Scheduled Failure

The 17th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity concluded in Yerevan, Armenia, on 1st November 2026.  Critics described the outcome as a “bunch of baloney.”  That may be the most accurate scientific assessment the summit produced.  After thirty-one years of annual summits, communiqués, pledges, side events, and carbon-intensive flights to discuss carbon emissions, the world has arrived at the following position: emissions are at an all-time high, biodiversity targets are off-track, and the mechanism designed to fix both is structurally incapable of doing so.  Thirty-one years.  This is not a crisis of information.  This is a crisis of will.  The information exists.  The will is elsewhere.

The Scorecard of Failure

In 2022, nearly 200 countries signed the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework.  They committed to 23 targets by 2030: protecting 30 per cent of land and sea, mobilising US$200 billion annually in biodiversity finance, and sharing the benefits of genetic resources.  A UN report released on 15th October 2026 — two weeks before the summit concluded — found that fewer than half of those targets are on track.

Global fossil CO2 emissions reached 38.1 billion metric tons in 2025 — a new record, up 1.1 per cent from 2024, which was itself a record.  The world has warmed 1.4 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.  The UN Environment Programme’s latest Emissions Gap Report says the world is on track for 2.6 degrees under full implementation of current pledges.  Under current policies, 2.8 degrees.  Any chance of holding to 1.5 degrees has, in the UN’s own words, been “lost.”  The remaining carbon budget for a 50 per cent chance of staying within 1.5 degrees will be exhausted within four years.  The next COP will be held before the budget runs out.  It will achieve as much as this one.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has held annual summits since 1995.  COP1 was in Berlin.  COP3 produced the Kyoto Protocol, which the United States signed, then refused to ratify.  COP21 in Paris produced the Paris Agreement, celebrated as a historic breakthrough.  Global emissions have risen every year since Paris except 2020, when a pandemic shut the world economy.  The celebrated mechanism of the Paris Agreement is that countries submit their own targets — Nationally Determined Contributions — and then voluntarily try to meet them.  There is no enforcement mechanism.  There is no penalty for failure.  There is no independent verification.  There is, however, an enormous annual conference with significant carbon emissions from the flights of delegates travelling to discuss the problem of significant carbon emissions from flights.

COP28 in Dubai was hosted by the United Arab Emirates and presided over by Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber Al Falahi, Chief Executive Officer of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.  He opened the conference by suggesting that phasing out fossil fuels was not supported by science.  He later clarified his remarks.  Global oil production continued to rise.  Critics describe the consensus rule — under which a single country can stall or block an agreement — as the mechanism by which “one idiot” can hold 196 countries hostage.  This is an accurate description, not a rhetorical flourish.

The Canada Template

The anecdote that summarises this is Canada.  Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 and committed to reducing emissions to six per cent below 1990 levels by 2012.  By 2012, Canadian emissions were 18 per cent above 1990 levels.  Canada withdrew from Kyoto in 2011, citing the cost of compliance.  It then signed the Paris Agreement in 2016.  Canadian emissions have continued to rise.  This is not an anomaly.  This is the template.

Australia ratified Kyoto in 2007 and promptly began expanding its coal export industry — the largest in the world by 2019.  Japan signed the Paris Agreement and built sixty-five new coal-fired power plants between 2015 and 2023.  Germany, the self-declared leader of the green transition, restarted seventeen coal plants in 2022 when Russian gas was cut off.  Brazil signed every framework, ratified every protocol, and presided over the acceleration of Amazon deforestation under Jair Messias Bolsonaro Neto, with deforestation hitting 11,568 square kilometres in 2019 alone.  The pattern is not rare.  The pattern is the norm.

The Cost of Doing Nothing

The economic argument for climate action is not environmental sentiment.  It is self-interest, and the numbers are unambiguous.  Swiss Re, the global reinsurer, published its sigma study in 2021 projecting GDP losses by 2050 under four warming scenarios.  Under the worst scenario — no mitigating action, 3.2 degrees of warming — global GDP falls by 18 per cent.  Under the current policy trajectory, which puts warming at 2.6 degrees, the projected loss is 14 per cent of global GDP.  Even if every current pledge is fully delivered — which no serious analyst believes will happen — GDP falls by 11 per cent at 2 degrees.  Only the Paris Agreement target of below 2 degrees holds the loss to 4 per cent.

For China, the worst case is a 24 per cent GDP loss by 2050.  For the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, 10 per cent each.  For Europe, 11 per cent on average.  The Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, in a study published in Nature in April 2024, calculated that CO2 already in the atmosphere will cut global GDP by US$38 trillion annually by 2050 — nearly one-fifth — even if emissions are cut aggressively from today.  Under a high-emissions scenario, the average regional income loss rises to 60 per cent by the end of the century.  The damages are “locked in” from past emissions regardless of future action.

By 2050, McKinsey’s analysis projects US$2.8 trillion to US$4.7 trillion of Asian GDP at risk annually from lost outdoor working hours alone — not from crop failure, flooding, or infrastructure damage.  From heat.  Five hundred million to seven hundred million people in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan alone could live where the annual probability of a lethal heat wave approaches 20 per cent.  These numbers are not projections designed to frighten voters.  They are actuarial calculations made by organisations whose business is pricing risk.  Swiss Re is in the business of being right.  If they thought the losses were smaller, they would have published smaller numbers.  They did not.

The Carbon Market Failure: A Case Study in Structural Dysfunction

The climate machinery produced a second mechanism alongside the COP summits: the carbon market.  The premise was logical.  Price emissions.  Let markets find the cheapest abatement.  Drive capital toward low-carbon alternatives.  The voluntary carbon market (VCM) grew rapidly on that premise, with credits jumping 86 per cent in value between 2019 and 2021.  Then the numbers were examined.

Nature-based offset prices — the category marketed as sequestration from forests and wetlands — collapsed from US$15 per metric ton in June 2022 to below US$1 per metric ton by mid-2023.  Prices on the Xpansiv CBL exchange, the primary spot market, fell by over 80 per cent in eighteen months.  Corporate buyers including Shell, Nestlé, EasyJet, and Fortescue Metals Group publicly retreated from offsets.  The Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM), the body established to set quality standards, applied its Core Carbon Principles (CCPs) to the market in 2024.  The result: 32 per cent of all unretired voluntary carbon credits — 236 million credits — failed the test.  Only 3.6 per cent of the market received approval.  Every renewable energy credit in the market was disqualified on additionality grounds: if the project would have happened without carbon revenue, the credit is not real.  Most of them would have.

The collapse of the voluntary carbon market is not a market failure.  It is the predictable consequence of building a market on unverifiable claims.  Forestry projects claiming to have saved trees that were never at risk.  Wind farms claiming credit for electricity that would have been built regardless.  Payments for non-events certified by organisations with a direct financial interest in approval.  The voluntary market was, in the terminology of financial services, a product of the imagination.

The Compliance Market: The Mechanism That Works — When It Is Used

The contrast with the compliance carbon market is instructive.  The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) sets a hard cap on total emissions from covered sectors, issues a fixed number of allowances, and reduces that cap annually.  EU ETS prices broke records in February 2023, surpassing €100 per metric ton.  Even after pulling back to €78, compliance prices remained forty to eighty times higher than the collapsed voluntary credit prices.  Why?  Because compliance is mandatory.  The mechanism has enforcement.  A covered facility that exceeds its allowance faces a penalty.  The cap declines.  Companies must reduce emissions or pay to emit.

The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), phased in from 2023, extends the discipline to imports: goods from countries without equivalent carbon pricing bear a carbon cost on entry into Europe.  This is what enforcement looks like.  It is not complicated.  It requires political will and the willingness to impose costs.  The critical design feature that the voluntary market lacked and the compliance market contains is fungibility with enforcement.  An EU Emissions Trading Allowance (EUA) is a standardised, exchange-traded instrument subject to regulatory oversight by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which published its first annual report on EU carbon markets in 2024.  It trades on established derivatives exchanges.  It generates a secondary market in futures, options, and structured products.  It is, in the language of financial markets, a real asset.

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, whose rules were finally adopted at COP29 in Baku in November 2024, creates the international framework for credit transfers between countries — so-called Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs).  This is the architecture for a global compliance-grade carbon market.  It is the first credible mechanism for making credits from Southeast Asian blue carbon — from seagrass meadows, mangroves, and coastal wetlands — fungible within the international compliance infrastructure.  That fungibility matters.  A credit that trades on an established exchange, with regulatory oversight, against a mandatory cap, is a financial instrument.  It generates a secondary market.  It attracts institutional capital.  It prices real scarcity.  The voluntary market sold the story of scarcity without the substance.  The compliance market is scarcity.

Singapore is not a disinterested observer in this.  The Carbon Tax Act, amended in 2022, raised Singapore’s carbon tax to S$25 per metric ton in 2024 and sets a trajectory to S$50 to S$80 by 2030.  Singapore’s International Carbon Exchange, through the ICE GreenTrace platform, is positioned to be the settlement infrastructure for high-integrity compliance credits from Southeast Asian blue carbon projects.  The supply of blue carbon — seagrass, mangroves, coastal wetlands — is concentrated in exactly the region where demand for compliance credits is growing fastest.  This is not philanthropy.  This is a market.  The countries that build the infrastructure for compliance-grade carbon credits, and that hold the underlying blue carbon assets at scale, will benefit materially from the correction that is coming when voluntary credits are displaced by verified compliance instruments.  The window is open.  The Article 6 framework exists.  The question is whether governments and institutions move before or after the crisis forces them to.

The Trajectory

The IPCC projects the following under a 2.6 degree trajectory — which is the best-case outcome under current pledges, not under current policies:  Widespread coral reef collapse above 1.5 degrees, which is less than four years away at current rates.  Displacement of hundreds of millions of coastal residents from sea level rise and intensifying storms.  Severe agricultural disruption across the tropics, where the most food-insecure populations live.  Accelerating feedback loops — Arctic methane release, Amazon dieback, permafrost thaw — that remove warming from political control entirely.  Under the current policy trajectory of 2.8 degrees, those consequences arrive earlier and harder.  The biodiversity picture compounds the economic damage.  Species are going extinct at approximately 1,000 times the natural background rate.  Pollinators, soil microbiota, coastal fish stocks — the biological infrastructure of the food system — are degrading faster than the food system is adapting.

The equity argument compounds the national interest argument.  The people most exposed to these consequences are the people least responsible for causing them.  Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Small Island Developing States contribute a fraction of global emissions and absorb a disproportionate share of the consequences.  The G20, which produces three-quarters of global emissions, attends the summits, produces the communiqués, and flies home.

The voters of those countries continue electing governments committed to growth, consumption, and deferral.  They do this knowingly.  The information is available.  The science is not contested.  The projections have been accurate.  People prefer present comfort to future survival, and they vote accordingly.  This is not a failure of the system.  This is the system working as designed.  The system was designed by governments to produce the appearance of action while avoiding its substance.  It has done so with remarkable consistency for thirty years.

The Assessment

The UNFCCC held COP30 in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025.  Countries arrived with updated pledges.  The pledges were insufficient — more than 70 countries did not even submit updated Nationally Determined Contributions.  The fossil fuel phase-out language was made voluntary after Saudi Arabia and Russia objected; the final text did not mention fossil fuels at all.  A US$120 billion adaptation fund was pledged by developed nations; developing countries said US$360 billion was needed.  The Just Transition Mechanism was adopted without the funding to operate it.  Australia signed the Belém Declaration and then announced plans to proceed with new gas projects.  COP31 will be held in Australia.  A communiqué was issued.  The language was stronger than last time.  Emissions continued rising.

The process is not broken.  It is working as its architects intended — as a pressure-release valve for public concern, a mechanism for governments to demonstrate engagement without delivering action, and a conference industry that employs a significant number of people whose professional existence depends on the problem remaining unsolved.  The national interest argument for action is not contested.  Fourteen per cent of global GDP — the Swiss Re projection for the current policy trajectory — is not an environmental number.  It is a solvency number.  Governments choosing to ignore it are not making a trade-off between growth and environment.  They are borrowing against the future, as governments are prone to do, and assuming their successors will pay.  Their successors will pay. The mathematics does not negotiate.  Civilisations that cannot learn from evidence decline.  The rate of that decline is the only variable still in play.


Terence Nunis | Executive Chairman, Equinox Zenith & Red Sycamore | Author, The 1% Playbook: The Billionaire Cheat Code



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